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THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN BANKRUPTCY

FRANK

R.

KENNEDY*

The filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Act consitutes an automatic stay of all litigation against the debtor and most acts and actions
against the debtor's property. The stay is one of the most notable features
of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure promulgated by the Supreme
Court. 1 The constitutional and statutory basis for the automatic stay has
been challenged, and the propriety and the scope of the stay have been
contested and ruled on, in many reported opinions. The need and justification for an automatic stay in bankruptcy and debtor relief cases have
been widely acknowledged, and an automatic stay seems certain to be
included in any comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation likely to be
enacted by Congress. 2 The role of this procedural device is still sufficiently new, its full implications sufficiently unexplored and unappreciated, and its day-to-day operations and effects sufficiently controversial and unsettled that an article devoted to the automatic stay seems
useful at this stage of its development. 3
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. As Reporter for the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules, I was considerably involved in the drafting of the automatic stay rules
and, as Executive Director of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, in
the drafting of a section on the automatic stay in the Bankruptcy Act of 1973 proposed by the
Commission. I thus come to questions addressed to the validity of the automatic stay rules
and the soundness of the policy decisions implicit in the proposal for a stay section in
proposed bankruptcy legislation with a predisposition in favor of affirmative answers.
I wish to acknowledge research assistance rendered in the preparation of this article by
Richard Rufner, a member of the third-year class of the University of Michigan Law School.
' Automatic stays are prescribed by the following Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure: 401,
601, 8-501, 9-4, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970). Rules 401, 601, and
13-401 became effective·on October I, 1973; Rule 11-44 on July I, 1974; Rules 10-601 and
12-43 on August I, 1975; and Rules 8-501 and 9-4 on August I, 1976. The Rules, together
with the Advisory Committee's Notes, are published in 11 U.S.C. app. (1975 Supp.).
[Hereinafter references to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will be cited either as Rules or
Bankr. Rules].
In accordance with general practice, citations to the present Bankruptcy Act in this article
will refer only to the original numbering of the Act as enacted in the Statutes at Large, not to
the numbering of Title 11 of the United States Code. The proposed bankruptcy legislation
pending in Congress and referred to in note 2 infra will eliminate the confusing discrepancies
between the numbers in the original Act and Title 11.
2
See§ 362 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, pending in the 95th Congress. H.R. 8200 was passed
by the House on February I, 1978. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1978, at 8. col. 3. S. 2266, which
was introduced on October 31, 1978, has not come to a vote in the Senate. Hereinafter these
·
bills will be cited as H.R. 8200 and S. 2266.
3
The automatic stay provisions of the rules have been discussed in Miller, The Automatic
Stay in Chapter XI Cases-A Catalyst for Rehabilitation or an Abuse of Creditors' Rights,
94 BANKR. L.J. 676 (1977); Peitzman & Smith, The Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief
from the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings. 65 CAL. L. REV. 1216 (1977);
Webster, Collateral Control Decisions in Chapter Cases-Clear Rules v. Judicial Discretion, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1977); Werth & Reed, The Chapter XI Stay Order and the
Secured Creditor, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 33 (1977); 12 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,i,i 401.1-401.7
(14th ed. 1975); 13 id. ,i,i 601.01-601.10 (1975); 13A id. ,i,i 10-601.01 et. seq. (1976); 14 id. ,i,i
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Although the scope of the stay will be. more fully elaborated later in this
article, it will facilitate understanding to set out briefly at the threshold of
the discussion the general features of the automatic stay. The filing of a
petition for adjudication of a debtor as a bankrupt or for relief under one
of the six debtor relief chapters of the Bankruptcy Act not only commences a case under the Act 4 but also operates ipso facto as a stay of
certain judicial proceedings and acts. 5 The stay is triggered by an involuntary petition, when one is authorized, 6 as well as by a voluntary petition. 7
Although there are two stay rules for straight bankruptcy cases, 8 the
combined stays in such cases are narrower than the stays prescribed for
cases under the debtor relief chapters. 9 The stay provided by Bankruptcy
Rule 401 operates only against certain in personam actions, including all
actions that are based on dischargeable claims and claims that are not
dischargeable unless excepted from discharge by section 17a(l), (5), (6),
or (7) of the Act. 10 Rule 601 operates against the enforcement of any lien
against property in the custody of the bankruptcy court or any lien
obtained by judicial proceedings within four months prior to bankruptcy.
With minor qualifications, 11 a stay that commences a debtor relief case
under Chapter VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, or XIII operates against any kind of
proceeding against the debtor or any kind of lien enforcement against its
11-44.01 et seq. (1976); 15 id. ,r,r 13-401.01 et seq. (1975). [Hereinafter the Collier treatise on
Bankruptcy will be cited as COLLIER with a reference to the date of the publication of the
material cited].
• See Rules IOI, 8-101, 9-2, 10-101, 11-3, 12-3, and 13-101.
5 Subdivision (a) of each of the automatic stay rules cited in note I supra provides for an
automatic stay. But cf. North Peachtree 1-285 Property, Ltd. v. Hicks, 136 Ga. App. 426,
221 S.E.2d 607 (1975) (filing of Chapter XI petition held not to terminate or stay a pending
state court action, absent an appropriate order by the bankruptcy court or action taken in the
state court).
6
Involuntary petitions are authorized only for straight bankruptcy-i.e., only for liquidation of the debtor's estate-and for reorganization under Chapter VIII or Chapter X. The
relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are §§ 5b, 59b, 77(a), and 126, and the governing
Rules are 104, J05(b) and (c), 8-103, and 10-105. A petition filed against a partnership by one
or fewer than all the partners pursuant to § 5b of the Act and Rule 105(b), or by a party in
interest pursuant to§ 5i of the Act and Rule 105(d), has the same effect under the automatic
stay rules as an involuntary petition filed by creditors of the partnership.
7 A voluntary petition may be filed by an eligible debtor pursuant to § 5b, 59a, 77(a), 85(a),
126, 321, 421, or 621 of the Act. The corresponding Rules are 103, 105(a), 8-102, 9-3,
I0-104(a), 11-3, 12-3, and 13-103.
8
Rules 401 and 601.
9 See Part III infra.
10 Secti.on 17a( I) excepts from discharge cen;ain tax claims; § 17a(5) excepts claims for
earnings that are also entitled to priority under§ 64a(2) of the Act;§ 17a(6) excepts liabilities
for refund of employees' security deposits; and § 17a(7) excepts liabilities for alimony,
maintenance, support, and torts arising out of sexual misconduct. It should be noted here
that the stay also applies to collection of certain educational loan obligations, which become
dischargeable only after a period of delay following an original default. See text accompanying notes 132, 134-35, & 223-25 infra.
11
The qualifications include the following: Rule 8-501(a) excepts from the operation of the
stay (I) an action to collect damages caused by the operation of any means of transportation
and (2) repossession of rolling stock equipment pursuant to contract. Rule 9-4 authorizes a
stay only of a proceeding to enforce a claim against the petitioner but contains broad
provisions applicable to the enforcement of liens, setoffs, and counterclaims. Rule I l-44(a)
excepts a case pending under Chapter X from the scope of the stay triggered by a Chapter XI
petition.
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property. Moreover, a stay in a case under Chapter VIII or Chapter IX
operates against a setoff by a creditor of the debtor.
I.

ORIGINS

A. The Stays of the Farm-Debtor Relief Acts

The original automatic stay appears to have been provided by section
75(0) of the first farm-debtor relief legislation, enacted on the last day of
the administration of President Hoover. 12 This provision 13 declared that
six categories of proceedings and acts "shall not be instituted, or if
instituted ... prior to the filing of a petition under this section, shall not be
maintained, in any court or otherwise, against the farmer or his property,
at any time after the filing of the petition under this section." The purpose
of section 75 was to extend to farmers the ad vantages of the composition
or extension proceedings already provided other debtors under section 74
but with special features to protect farmers in respect to secured debt. 14
The stay provided was similar in scope and duration to the automatic
stays of the debtor relief chapter rules. 15 As originally enacted, section 75
excluded from the scope of the stay proceedings to collect taxes, including tax penalties arid interest, and proceedings affecting property not used
in farming operations, including the home and household effects of the
farmer and his family. 16 A subsequent amendment removed these limita-

12
13

47 Stat. 1473 (1933).
The provision in full is as follows:
Except upon petition made to and granted by the judge after hearing and report
by the conciliation commissioner, the following proceedings shall not be instituted,
or if instituted at any time prior to the filing of a petition under this section, shall not
be maintained, in any court or otherwise, against the farmer or his property, at any
time after the filing of the petition under this section, and prior to the confirmation
or other disposition of the composition or extension proposal by the court:
(I) Proceedings for any demand, debt, or account, including any money demand;
(2) Proceedings for foreclosure of a mortgage on land, or for cancellation,
rescission, or specific performance of an agreement for sale of land or for recovery
of possession of land;
(3) Proceedings to acquire title to land by virtue of any tax sale;
(4) Proceedings by way of execution, attachment, or garnishment;
(5) Proceedings to sell land under or in satisfaction of any judgment or
mechanic's lien; and
(6) Seizure, distress, sale, or other proceedings under an execution or under any
lease, lien, chattel mortgage, conditional sale agreement, crop payment agreement,
or mortgage.

Id.
14

GILBERT'S COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1368 (4th ed. Moore & Levi eds. 1937).
The stay of § 75(0) was broader insofar as it operated against proceedings for the
cancellation, rescission, or specific performance of an agreement for the sale of land or for
the recovery of possession of land and possibly in its application to proceedings under any
lease or crop payment agreement.
16
47 Stat. 1473 (1933).
15
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tions on the stay . 17
On June 28, 1934, as its last public act, the New Deal Congress amended
section 75 to add a new subdivision (s), 18 which imposed a five-year stay
of all proceedings by a secured creditor against a farmer-debtor's property. The stay was available to any farmer-debtor unable to obtain appropriate relief under the other provisions of section 75. During the stay the
farmer-debtor could remain in possession of his property under the control of the court but subject to a duty to pay a reasonable annual rental. At
or prior to the end of the five-year period the debtor was authorized to pay
the appraised price of the property into court. The farmer-debtor thereupon took full possession and title to the property and he could apply for
his discharge from any deficiency remaining on the theretofore secured
debt as well as from his other dischargeable debts.
Subdivision (s) was the first and only congressional exercise of the
bankruptcy power to be found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
under the fifth amendment. The law was said to effect a substantial
impairment of a mortgagee's security and thereby to sanction a retroactive taking of his property without just compensation. 19 The Court identified five property rights of the mortgagee recognized by state law that
were unconstitutionally taken: (1) the right to retain the lien until the
indebtedness thereby secured is paid, (2) the right to realize upon the
security by a judicial public sale, (3) the right to determine when such sale
shall be held, subject only to the discretion of the court, (4) the right to
protect its interest in the property by bidding at such sale, whenever held,
and thus to assure having the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the
satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds of a fair
competitive sale or by taking the property itself, and (5) the right to
control the property during the period of default, subject only to the
discretion of the court, and to have the rents and profits collected by a
receiver for the satisfaction of the debt. 20
As Professor Countryman has recently suggested,2 1 the Court's
rationale could have been invoked by any lienor whose security interest
recognized by state law was being attacked by the trustee as voidable
under section 60 or 67 of the Bankruptcy Act. The pernicious potentialities of Louisville Bank v. Radford have been considerably blunted,
however, by subsequent developments. Three months and one day after
the decision in Louisville Bank v. Radford, Congress enacted a new
version of subdivision (s), 22 reducing the period of the stay from five

17 "The prohibitions of subsection (o) shall apply to all judicial or official.proceedings in
any court or under the direction of any official, and shall apply to all creditors, public or
private, and to all of the debtor's property, wherever located .... "§ 75(p), as amended by
49 Stat. 943 (1935). Contrast this forthright provision with § 362(b) of Title 11 as set forth in
H.R. 8200 and S. 2266.
18 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
19 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
20
Id. at 594-95.
21 ·Countryman, Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349, 358
(1977).
22
49 Stat. 943 (1935).
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years to three and giving the court discretion to terminate qr modify the
stay earlier and to order sale of the property at public auction. The new
subdivision was held constitutional in Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank. 23
The Court noted that the new subdivision (s) preserved three of the
property rights enumerated in Louisville Bank v. Radford. Further, the
limitations on the secured creditor's right to determine when a judicial
sak should be held and to control the security during default were held to
make no unreasonable modification of the mortgagee's rights in view of
the "court's broad power to curtail the stay for the protection of the
mortgagee. " 24
The congressional intention to protect the farmer-debtor from mortgage
foreclosure proceedings during the pendency of his petition for relief
under section 75(s) was given unqualified effect in Kalb v. Feuerstein. 25 A
judgment of foreclosure had been entered by a state court of general
jurisdiction over a year before the farmer-debtor had filed a petition under
the Bankruptcy Act, but confirmation of a sale under the judgment did not
occur until after the filing of the petition under the Act. 26 The debtor was
thereafter ejected pursuant to a writ of assistance issued by the state
court. The debtor neither sought relief from the bankruptcy court nor
appealed from any of the state court judgments but filed an equitable
action in the state court against the mortgagees, who had taken possession of the farm as purchasers at the judicial sale. The Wisconsin courts
denied relief, taking the position that the Bankruptcy Act provision was
not self-executing and that the farmer-debtor, having taken no appeal
from the previous judgments, was barred from relief by res judicata. 27
23

300 U.S. 440 (1937).
Id. at 464, 470. Both Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)
and Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank were unanimous decisions of the same bench, Mr.
Justice Brandeis writing the opinions in both cases. Interestingly, the Court relied on the just
compensation clause of the fifth amendment in striking down the first version of§ 75(s), 295
U.S. at 601-02, but it referred only to the due process clause in sustaining the constitutionality of the second version. 300 U.S. at 470. The Court referred to the bankruptcy court's
acknowledged powers to sell property of a bankrupt estate free of liens and to enjoin sales of
pledged property as illustrations of how "[a] court of bankruptcy may affect the interests of
lien holders in many ways." 300 U.S. at 464. The Court had said in Louisville Bank, 295
U.S. at 579, that "[n]o instance had been found, except under the Frazier-Lemke Act [the
popular name for § 75(s)], of either a statute or decision compelling the mortgagee to
relinquish the property to the mortgagor free of the lien unless the debt was paid in full."
The Court later acknowledged the bankruptcy court's power to order sales free of liens but
explained that "[n]o court appears ever to have authorized a sale at a price less than that
which the lien creditor offered to pay for the property in cash." 295 U.S. at 584.
25
308 u .s. 433 (1940).
26
Two mortgagees began foreclosure proceedings against the debtor's property in a
Wisconsin county court on March 7, 1933, and the foreclosure judgment was entered on
April 21, 1933. The sheriff sold the property under the judgment on July 20, 1935, and the
court confirmed the sheriffs sale on September 16, 1935. In the meantime Kalb, the debtor,
filed a petition under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act on October 2, 1934. The petition was
dismissed on June 27, 1935, but reinstated on September 6, 1935. The Supreme Court
opinion does not indicate what further proceedings, if any, ever occurred in the bankruptcy
court.
27
Kalb v. Luce, 228 Wis. 519 and 525, 279 N.W. 685, 280 N.W. 725 (1938), appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 566 (1938), on remand, 231 Wis. 186, 285 N .W. 431 (1939). It was noted in
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 n.12 (1963), that the jurisdictional issue in Kalb had not
been litigated in the state court.
24
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The Supreme Court held that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor's property and the statutory stay provisions of section 75 deprived
the state court of jurisdiction. 28 It was inconsequential that the debtor had
not contested the jurisdiction of the foreclosing court in view of the clarity
of the congressional intention to divest the state court of jurisdiction. In
finding a congressional intent to relieve the farmer-debtor of a duty to
object to the county court's jurisdiction, the Court took note of the fact
that Congress relied on conciliation commissioners, "who might be
laymen," to assist the farmers in obtaining the protection afforded by the
Act.29

Kalb v. Feuerstein is admittedly a drastic ruling, but it has not been
overruled and, as a recent critic of the doctrine of the voidness of judgments observed, it "cannot be viewed as aberrational. " 30 Many of the
same considerations that underlay Kalb v. Feuerstein are involved when
the automatic stay prescribed by one of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure is disobeyed, and the opinion and result of the case will have even
more relevance if the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy law
now pending in Congress are enacted. 31
B. The Statutory Stays of Chapter X and Chapter XII

In addition to the relatively short-lived automatic stay of the farmdebtor relief legislation, three statutory stays in Chapters X and XII
anticipated the stays of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure by more than
thirty years. Section 148, enacted in 1938, gave to an order approving a
reorganization petition under Chapter X the effect of an automatic stay
both of lien enforcement against the property of the debtor and of a
pending bankruptcy or equity receivership proceeding. 32 An even closer
analogy to the stays currently provided by the Rules is found in section
428, which gave the effect of an automatic stay- to the filing of a petition
under Chapter XII as against any act or proceeding to enforce a lien

s 308 U.S. 440, 444.
Id. at 444.
30
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L.J. 164, 178 (1977). The Note strongly criticizes the rationale of Kalb v. Feuerstein
but suggests that result may well be justifiable for lack of due process afforded to the debtor.
The state court appears to have confirmed the foreclosure sale without notice to the debtor.
Id. at 210. The Note also reaches the extraordinary conclusion that the provision in§ 14f of
the Bankruptcy Act, nullifying all state court judgments on dischargeable debts, is unconstituional under the 10th amendement. Id. at 213. While he criticizes the rationale of Kalb v.
Feuerstein, he does not suggest that it also violated the 10th amendment, and his argument
leaves at large the constitutionality of§ 14f insofar as it applies to judgments of federal
courts.
31
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
32
The full text of§ 148 reads as follows: "Until otheiwise ordered by the judge, an order
approving a petition shall operate as a stay of a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage
foreclosure, or equity receivership proceeding, and of any act or other proceeding to enforce
a lien against the debtor's property." For a discussion of § 148 and its relation to Rule
J0-601, see 6 COLLIER ,r 6.12 (1977).
2

29
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against the debtor's real property or chattel real. 33
Another antecedent of the provisions for an automatic stay in a Chapter
XII case is section 507. That section provided that a prior mortgage
foreclosure, equity, or other proceeding in a federal or state court in
which a trustee or receiver of the debtor's property has been appointed or
applied for shall be stayed by the filing of a Chapter XII petition. The stay
of section 428 was automatic, but whether section 507 was self-executing
seems never to have been decided in a reported case. 34 Rule 12-43 makes
the point academic.
These three statutory provisions have generated little litigation challenging their validity or scope and little controversy in the literature with
respect to their need and justification. 35 At the same time forty years'
experience with these provisions has not produced many answers to the
questions arising in connection with the automatic stays prescribed by the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure have extended the device of the
automatic stay well beyond the confines of Chapters X and XII. The
automatic stay now arises immediately on the filing of a petition commencing a case under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Act, whether the
petition is voluntary or involuntary. 36 Moreover, its reach includes in
33

The full text of § 428 reads as follows:
Unless and until otherwise ordered by the court, upon hearing and after notice to
the debtor and all other parties in interest, the filing of a petition under this chapter
shall operate as a stay of any act or proceeding to enforce any lien upon the real
property or chattel real of a debtor.
For a discussion of §428, sec 9 COLLIER ,i 4. 16 (1976).
34
The automatic stay of§ 428 covered nearly every case to which§ 507 applied. Only an
equity receivership proceeding instituted for a purpose other than the enforcement of a lien
would fall within the ambit of the latter section and not the former.
35
The principal cases applying§ 428 are Meyer v. Rowen, 181 F.2d 715, 716 (10th Cir.
1950) and 195 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1952); and Potts v. Potts, 142 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868 (1945).
In Tingle v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Ga. App. 393, 395, 91 S.E.2d 304 (1956),
the state court held that the stay of § 428 was inoperative as against confirmation of a
foreclosure sale because the debtor's Chapter XII petition was never "perfected" and
because there was no notice and hearing as required by the section. As pointed out in In re
Johnson, l Collier Bankr. Cas. 90, 100 (Ref., N .D. La. 1974), § 428 requires a notice and
hearing only if the stay is to be terminated or modified. In the Johnson case, Bankruptcy
Judge Thinnes read the Tingle case as requiring the Chapter XII petition to be accompanied
by a plan in order to be "perfected" and operative as an automatic stay. Id. at 99. Whatever
the correctness of such a ruling under the law as it then existed, Rule 12-36(a) now eliminates
the requirement that a plan be filed with the petition.
36
The stays provided by §§ 428 and 507 could arise only in a case commenced by a
voluntary petition.
The automatic stay of§ 148 arose without regard to whether the case was commenced by a
voluntary or an involuntary petition, but the triggering event, approval of the petition, was
likely to occur earlier in a voluntary case. Section 141 authorized the judge to approve a
voluntary petition under Chapter X immediately upon the filing of a petition if he was
satisfied that it complied with the requirements of the chapter and was filed in good faith.
Section 142 authorized the judge to approve an involuntary petition if the debtor filed no
answer or if the answer filed by the debtor controverted no material allegation of the
petition, but § 136 allowed the debtor ten days after the service of the petition for filing an
answer. Additional time could be allowed for the filing of the answer, and, if the answer filed
controverted material allegations of the petition, a trial of the issues might entail a delay of
the approval for several days or weeks.
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personam actions as well as those involving the debtor's property. 37 The
need or justification for staying in personam proceedings differs from that
underlying the stay of acts and actions directed toward enforcing rights
against the debtor's property. The raison d'etre for the stay of acts and
actions to enforce liens or setoff against the debtor's property is the need
for protection of the estate against dismemberment and disappearance at
the instance of the more aggressive creditors. 38 A stay of in personam
actions against the debtor, including the enforcement of judgments, may
also serve that purpose to some extent, 39 but, particularly for debtors, the
stay protects the fresh start provided by the discharge and other modes of
relief under the Act. 40 The comprehensive stay prescribed by the rules for
debtor relief cases against proceedings of all kinds and lien enforcement
implements more fully than did the statutory stay provided by sections
148 or 428 the acknowledged purpose of these sections "to maintain the
status quo of the debtor ... pending a reasonable opportunity to reorganize its financial structure .... " 41
C. The Mandatory Stay of Section lla

Although section I la of the Bankruptcy Act is susceptible to a literal
reading that would have imposed a limited, automatic stay, the language
fell short of accomplishing that result. The stay mandated by the first
main clause of the subdivision was effective only against suits founded on
dischargeable claims and only until adjudication or dismissal of the petition. It is not clear whether it imposed a duty on the bankruptcy court or
As pointed out subsequently, § 148 was supplemented by §§ 2a(l5) and 113 of the Act,
authorizing the bankruptcy court, prior to the approval of the petition. to enjoin the same
proceedings and acts subjected to the automatic stay by§ 148. In like manner§§ 428 and 507
were supplemented by § 414.
37 Most of the automatic stays provided by the Rules, including those applicable in
Chapter X and XII cases, operate against "any court or other proceeding against the
debtor," irrespective of the nature of the cause of action asserted or the kind of relief
sought. Provisions in Rules 8-50l(a), I0-601(a), 11-44(a), 12-43(a), and 13-401(a) extending
the stay to any court proceeding for the purpose of rehabilitating the debtor or liquidating its
estate reach cases commenced under the Bankruptcy Act by voluntary as well as involuntary petitions. A case pending under Chapter X of the Act is not stayed by the filing of a
Chapter XI petition.
38 "The premise of the rule [601) is that such a stay is no less needful in straight
bankruptcy than in a reorganization case to protect creditors against prejudicial dismemberment and disposition of the estate before a trustee or receiver can qualify." Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 601(a).
39 As recognized in Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 634 (1882), the automatic stay against in
personam actions not only protects the debtor against harassment but gives the receiver of
the bankrupt estate an opportunity to intervene and defend the estate against the assertion of
a claim that may be partially secured.
40 "The stay provided by this rule [i.e., 601) is to be distinguished from that provided by
Rule 401, which reinforces§§ lla, 14f(2), and 17c(4) of the Act by protecting the bankrupt
against harassment and possible frustration of his right to a discharge." Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 60I(a). See also the Advisory Committee Notes to Rules 10-601, 11-44,
12-43, and 13-401.
The distinction between the purposes of Rules 401 and 601 is analogous to that frequently
drawn between the purposes of§§ I la and 2a(l5) of the Act. See, e.g., In re S. W. Straus &
Co., 6 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
41
See In re Maier Brewing Co., 38 F. Supp. 806, 816 (S.D.Cal. 1941).
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on the court in which an action subject to the stay was pending. The
courts have regarded the statute as not self-executing, 42 and debtors
could find themselves without relief when neither the bankruptcy court
nor the court in which the action was pending took any step to implement
the evident policy of the provision. 43
The uninitiated reader might have supposed that the first sentence of
section 1 la operated to protect the debtor who filed a voluntary petition
as well as one against whom an involuntary petition had been filed. Since
section 18f invests the filing of a voluntary petition with the effect of an
adjudication, however, the limitation of the mandatory stay of section 1 la
to the interval before adjudication or dismissal meant that it afforded no
protection at all to the vast majority of bankrupts who would be the
supposed beneficiaries of the provision. The explanation is historical:
when section l la was originally enacted in 1898, adjudication was not
automatic, and the first clause did serve, for its limited term, to protect
voluntary as well as involuntary bankrupts. 44
Section I la was also inadequate to protect the debtor against actions on
dischargeable claims during the interval between filing of a petition and
adjudication because it did not affect the postpetition commencement of
such actions. 45 A possible rationale was that the commencement of such
an action would be attended by notice that would alert the debtor to the
need for seeking relief against its continuation, whereas prejudicial steps
might be taken in a pending action by a debtor preoccupied with a pending
bankruptcy petition filed by or against him. In any event, bankruptcy
courts have been willing to find a statutory basis for enjoining postpetition
actions against a bankrupt in the general grant of power to make necessary orders in section 2a(15). 46

42
See Connell v. Walker, 291 U.S. I, 6 (1934); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops
Mfg. Co., 381 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968). See also Hill v.
Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 633 (1882), construing§ 21 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (Rev. Stat.
§ 5106). But cf. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 244 (1956) ("This subdivision [§ I la]
provides for an automatic stay until adjudication or dismissal of the bankruptcy petition of a
suit founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release").
For the purpose of applying § I la, courts indulged a presumption that a claim was
dischargeable. See In re De Lauro, I F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Conn. 1932) (continuing stay
against enforcement of judgment based on assault); In re Levitan, 224 F. 241 (D.N .J. 1915)
(stay against judgment imposing liability for conversion of note).
43
Consider, for example, the bankrupt in Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631 (1882), who did
not obtain injunctive relief from the court in bankruptcy but pursued his remedy through the
state trial courts, appellate court, and supreme court before finally getting relief from the
United States Supreme Court.
44
The elimination of the interval between the filing of a voluntary petition and an
adjudication occurred in 1959 when § 18f was amended to make adjudication automatic. 2
CoLLIER ,I 18.01[3.6] (1974).
45
Section I la was held to authorize a stay of the enforcement by levy of execution on a
judgment on a dischargeable debt entered before the filing of a petition by or against the
judgment debtor. IA COLLIER ,I 11.03 (1974).
46
ln re Nuttall, 201 F. 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); see In re S. W. Straus & Co., 6 F. Supp.
547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). Section 2a(15) vests in the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to
"[m]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those
specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act." This provision is further discussed in the text accompanying notes 55 - 57 infra.
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A final criticism of the mandatory stay provided by the first clause of
section 1 la is that it left unanswered questions concerning the status of an
action on a dischargeable claim after adjudication. The practical result
was that competent counsel for both voluntary and involuntary bankrupts
routinely sought and obtained injunctions from the bankruptcy courts
against the commencement and continuation of in personam actions,
particularly actions on dischargeable claims.

D. The Dischargeability Legislation of 1970

Beginning about 1960, Congress became increasingly concerned about
the frustration of its purpose to provide an effective fresh start for individual bankrupts.47 This concern culminated in the enactment of the
dischargeability legislation of 1970. 48 This legislation amended several
sections of the Bankruptcy Act 49 with a view to protecting individual
bankrupts from the risk of losing the benefits of a discharge as a result of
aggressive action by their creditors. Congress sought to reduce this risk
by taking the extraordinary step of transferring the bulk of litigation
concerning the effect of a discharge from the state courts to the bankruptcy courts. One provision of that legislation authorized the bankruptcy
court to enjoin any action on a debt of a bankrupt, 50 and another provided
that "[a]n order of discharge shall ... enjoin all creditors whose debts are
discharged from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or employing any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt. "51
The evolution of the dischargeability legislation and Bankruptcy Rule
401 were approximately contemporaneous. 52 If a debtor seeking discharge in bankruptcy is entitled to protection against the risk of being
thwarted by creditors' pursuit of remedies in other forums, the risk does
not end with the debtor's adjudication as a bankrupt. Moreover, the
protection ought not to be dependent on the debtor's alertness and ability
to persuade the bankruptcy court or the court in which an action is
47
The Act of July 12, 1960, 74 Stat. 408, amended§§ 14c(3) and 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy
Act to limit the use of a false financial statement as a bar to discharge. Subdivisions b and c
of§ 14 were amended by the Act of Sept. 2, 1%5, 79 Stat. 646, to enable the bankruptcy
court to start proceedings to determine a bankrupt's right to a discharge without awaiting the
full payment of filing fees by a bankrupt permitted to pay them in installments. The Act of
July 5, 1966, 80 Stat. 270, amended § 17a(I) to make certain tax debts nondischargeable.
4 s 84 Stat. 990 (1970).
4 9 §§ 2a(l2), 14, 15, 17, 38, and 58b.
so § 17c(4).
51
§ 14f(2). See also Rule 404(f) and ,r 3 of Official Form No. 24.
52
The legislative history of the dischargeability legislation extends from 1956 to 1970.
Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L. J. I, 17-23 (1971). The
Bankruptcy Rules were in the process of drafting, circulation to the bench and bar, and
review by the cognizant committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
Supreme Court, and Congress during the years 1960 to 1973. Kennedy, Overview, in
BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE 1-7 (Lempert ed. 1974).
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pending or commenced to stay the action pending the resolution of contingencies on which his right to a discharge depends. That is the rationale
for the provision of an automatic stay in Bankruptcy Rule 401.

E. The Protection of the Bankrupt Estate Against Lien Enforcement

The language and context of section I la and the dischargeability legislation of 1970 bespeak a concern for protection of the debtor's opportunity for a fresh start unburdened by liability for dischargeable debts. Other
provisions of the Act reflect the need for protection of the estate of the
bankrupt against the ravages that would be inflicted on the estate if grab
law were allowed to govern. Section 2a, in a general introduction to a long
list of categories of jurisdiction given the courts of bankruptcy, declares
that these courts are invested ''with such jurisdiction at law and in equity
as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under
this Act." As Collier appropriately points out, 53 the power to enjoin is
undoubtedly inherent in the bankruptcy court as a court of equity. The
most important of the twenty-three grants of jurisdiction54 made by section 2a has already been mentioned, 55 namely that made by section
2a( 15). That clause does not, in the words of its broad grant, mention
"injunction" or "stay." Rather, the clause simply authorizes the court to
"[m]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act." Whatever doubt might be
raised as to whether an injunction of another court was intended to be
included in this broad authorization is dissolved by the proviso at the end
of the clause "that an injunction to restrain a court may be issued by the
judge only.'' The proviso actually incorporated a limitation on the authority of the referee that had previously appeared in the General Orders. 56
The principal purpose of section 2a(15) has been regarded as that of
protecting th! Cl!stocly of the estate and the administration of it by the
bankruptcy court. 57 Rule 601 serves the purpose by protecting the estate
against precipitate enforcement of certain liens. The stay of acts and
actions to enforce liens is less comprehensive in straight bankruptcy cases
than in debtor rehabilitation cases. The explanation lies primarily in the
differing scope of the court's jurisdiction in the two kinds of cases.
53

I COLLIER 1J 2.61(1), at 323 (1974).
The last clause of§ 2a is numbered (22), but the third clause, inserted in 1966 by 80 Stat.
270, was numbered (2A) to avoid renumbering the twenty subsequent clauses.
55 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
56 The proviso was added by the Chandler Act. 1 COLLIER ,r 2.60 (1974). General Order
XII(3), as it read before 1938, required applications for injunctions to stay proceedings of
other courts to be heard and decided by the judge. Id°. It thus appears that the power to
enjoin another court was originally witheld from the referee at the instance of the Supreme
Court rather than Congress, but that Congress ratified this allocation of power in 1938. The
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure left this distribution of injunctive authority intact. See Rule
102(a).
57 See 1 COLLIER ,r 2.61(1] at 324 (1974).
54
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The automatic stay provided by Rule 60l(a)(l) against any act or action
to enforce a lien protects only the property in the custody of the bankruptcy court. Property is deemed to be in the custody of the bankruptcy
court if it is in the actual or constructive possession of the bankrupt at the
date of bankruptcy. 58 As pointed out in the Advisory Committee's Note
accompanying Rule 601, the rule is a restatement, though substantially
restricted, of the familiar dictum of Mueller v. Nugent that "the petition is
a caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction. " 59
"The automatic stay is thus a logical corollary of the bankruptcy court's
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the property of the bankrupt within its
custody from the date of bankruptcy. " 60
The automatic stay provided by Rule 60l(a)(2) operates to bar any act
or action to enforce a lien against the property of the bankrupt obtained
within four months before bankruptcy by a judicial proceeding. To allow
such a lien to be enforced by a sale and distribution of the proceeds to the
lien creditor frustrates the objective of the Bankruptcy Act to provide
equitable distribution of the estate to all creditors, except in the rare
situation where the estate is sufficient to pay all creditors in full. Section
67a renders a judicial lien obtained during the four-month period voidable
if the debtor was insolvent at the time the lien attached, and Congress has
explicitly conferred summary jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to
determine the issues under section 67a. 61 Quite apart from this grant of
summary jurisdition, it has long been clear that the bankruptcy court can,
pursuant to section 2a(l5), protect the trustee's right to seek the
avoidance of a judicial lien obtained within the four-month period by
enjoining its enforcement pending the institution and maintenance of
proceedings under section 67a. 62 The stay of Rule 60 I is calculated to
minimize the number of instances in which recovery under this section is
defeated or impaired by sale of the property after bankruptcy. 63

F. The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Debtor and its Property in Debtor
Relief Cases

The automatic stays imposed by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
that apply in debtor relief cases under Chapters VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, and
58

2 COLLIER ,I 23.05 (1974).
184 U.S. I, 14 (1901).
60
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 601(a).
61
The grant of summary jurisdiction is made by§ 67a(4) of the Act. Summary proceedings
under§ 67a(4) are discussed in 4 COLLIER ,i 67.18 (1975).
62
See In re Kenney, 105 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1900), afj'd sub nom. Clarke v. Larremore, 188
U.S. 486 (1903); I COLLIER ,i 2.63[1] at 352-354.1 (1974); I id. ,i 2.78[1] at 390.9 (1968); 4id.
,i 67.18 at 196-97 n.7 (1967).
63 If the property is sold to a bona fide purchaser after the filing of the petition, he is
protected by the express terms of the proviso of§ 67a(3). If the purchaser's title is acquired
otheiwise than at a judicial sale, however, he is protected only to the extent of the present
consideration. The implications of this proviso with respect to the rights of the lien creditor
purchasing at his own sale are unclear. See 4 COLLIER ,i 67.17 (1975).
59
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XIII 64 extend to all in personam actions and proceedings against the
debtor, without reference to whether they are based on dischargeable
claims. Likewise these stays bar enforcement of liens against the property
of the debtor without regard to who has custody of the property and
without regard to the age or nature of the lien. The extension of the scope
of these stays beyond the scope of the stays of Rules 401 and 601 for
straight bankruptcy is a recognition of the congressional policies underlying the provisions in the debtor relief chapters that (l) confer on the
bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property 65
and that (2) broadly authorize injunctions against the commencement or
continuation of suits against the debtor and against enforcement of liens
upon its property. 66 Congress has manifestly concluded that the bankruptcy court must have control of litigation against the debtor and of
attempts to enforce liens against the estate in order to be able to supervise
and facilitate its rehabilitation. 67
The provisions in the debtor relief chapters conferring exclusive jurisdiction and authorizing the issuance of stays and injunctions supplement
without superseding or limiting the general grants of injunctive power
implicit in sections 2a and 2a( 15). 68 Reference should also be made here to
section 1651 of the Judicial Code, which authorizes United States courts
to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute which may be
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions. 69 The
plenitude of explicit authority in the Bankruptcy Act for staying acts and
proceedings that interfere with the attainment of its objectives makes
resort to the "all writs statute" supererogatory, but occasionally courts
have recurred to it to emphasize the amplitude of the power of the
bankruptcy court to protect its processes. 70 Each of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure providing for an automatic stay includes a caveat that
"[n]othing in this rule precludes the issuance of, or relief from, any stay,
restraining order, or injunction when otherwise authorized." 71

64

Rules 8-501, 9-4, 10-601, Ii-44, 12-43, and 13-401.
§§ 77(a), 82(a), 111, 311, 411, and 611. These sections are discussed in 5 COLLIER 'il'il
77 .11-.12 (1964); 6 id. 'il'il 3.03-.13 (1977); 8 id. 'il'il 3.01-.05 (1974); 9 id. 'ii 3.01 (1976); and IO id.
'ii 23.01 (1974).
66
§§ 77(j) (excepting suits for damages caused by the operation of trains, etc.), 85(f), 113,
116(4), 314, 414, and 614. Some of these sections require notice and a showing of cause
before enforcement of a lien may be stayed. These sections are discussed in 5 COLLIER
'ii 77.12 (1964); 6 id. 'il'il 3.15, 3.28-.34, 6.12 (1977); 8 id. 'il'il 3.2CU2 (1974); 9 id. 'ii 3.06 (1976);
and IOid. 'ii 23.05 (1974). Curiously,§§ 314 and 614 appear to authorize the court to stay any
and all suits "other than suits to enforce liens upon the property of the debtor," but this
openendedness seems not to have led any court to enjoin actions against persons other than
the debtor.
67
See 6 COLLIER 'ii 3.03 (1977). The bankruptcy court's need for control of litigation does
not necessarily require the court to conduct all litigation against the debtor. Cf. Foust v.
Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 83 (1936).
68
See notes 53 - 57 and accompanying text supra.
69
28 U.S.C. § 165 l(a) (1970).
10
See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.,
294 U.S. 648, 675-76 (1935).
71
This provision is the last subdivision of each of the stay rules.
65
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II. VALIDITY OF THE STAY

A. Constitutional Considerations

After the decision in Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank 72 the constitutional
validity of an automatic stay imposed at the threshold of a debtor relief
case seemed assured, and the Court observed in 1938 that "(s]uch a stay
[as that provided by section 75(s)] under judicial discretion as to enforce~
ment of claims does not take property without due process and is constitutional. " 73 The Court cited, in addition to Wright, its earlier ruling in
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Railway, 74 that an injunction entered by a bankruptcy court
against enforcement of a pledgee 's rights constitutes no impairment of his
lien: "It does no more than suspend the enforcement of the lien by a sale
of the collateral pending further action. " 75 The Court did not deny the
pledgee's claim that injurious consequences might result to the pledgee
but pointed out that the claim presented "a question addressed not to the
power of the court but to its discretion. " 76
It is thus not surprising that the constitutionality of the statutory stays
prescribed by sections 148 and 428 was generally assumed and, until
recently, not even contested. 77 The automatic stay prescribed by the
statute has undoubtedly been supplemented or reinforced in many cases
by the issuance of an injunction by the bankruptcy court. 78 There is little
point in litigating the validity and scope of an automatic stay if the action
or act affected by it is also barred by an injunction that cannot be
effectively challenged. Recognition that such an injunction can be obtained from the bankruptcy court without undue delay or difficulty has
surely contributed to the reluctance of parties affected by an automatic
stay to wage a strenuous attack against it.
72

300 U.S. 440 (1937), discussed in the text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
Adair v. Bank of America Nat'I Trust & Sav. Ass'n., 303 U.S. 350, 355-56 (1938).
74
294 u .s. 648, 677 (1935).
75
Id. at 676-77.
76
Id. at 677.
77
·
The only judicial opinions found to consider the constitutionality of a statutory stay are
recent rulings in First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Robinson (In re B & B Properties, Ltd.), 423
F. Supp. 23, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1976), and Tharpe & Brooks of Fla., Inc. v. Pickett, Gardner,
Landers & Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 370, 385-90 (N .D. Ga. 1977). The latter ruling
rejected attacks on the constitutionality of§ 428 and Rule 12-43, but the district court in B &
B Properties rested its denial of relief to secured creditors on the inappropriateness of their
resort to a petition for mandamus.
78
See, e.g., Young v. Kerr Industries, Inc., 540 F.2d 755, 756 (4th Cir. 1976); Amadori
Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. (In re Stanndco Developers, Inc.), 534 F.2d 1050, 1051
(2d Cir. 1976); Potts v. Potts, 142 F.2d 883, 886 (6th Cir. 1944).
It has been frequently noted that common practice developed, prior to the advent of the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, for a comprehensive stay of proceedings against the debtor
and the estate to be ordered at the outset of a case commenced under the Bankruptcy Act,
and especially of a case initiated under one of the debtor relief chapters. See D. ST AN LEY &
M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 84 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
STANLEY & GIRTH]; Peitzman & Smith, supra note 3, at 1224.
73
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The very availability of a comprehensive injunction prohibiting most
creditors' actions and acts to enforce their claims against the property of a
debtor in a Chapter X or Chapter XII case is, of course, a factor of
significance in evaluating the constitutionality of the automatic stay. If
Congress can create courts and vest them with power to enjoin litigation
against debtors in cases arising under a federal bankruptcy act, it can
surely provide that the commencement of such a case automatically stays
such litigation. The congressional power to authorize bankruptcy courts
to restrain litigation in other courts has long been established. 79
The Supreme Court's views of the demands of the due process clause
have, however, undergone revision during the last decade. In particular,
the Court has overruled cases upholding the constitutionality of attachment and prejudgment garnishment against contentions that these writs
deprived debtors of their property without notice and hearing. 80 The
implications of recent decisions of the Court are still the subject of debate
and much litigation, but categorical absolutes are, in any event, inappropriate in describing the demands of due process. The Court has been
engaged in a balancing process, weighing the private interest in assuring
procedural safeguards in advance of any taking against the competing
need for subjecting property and enjoyment of rights to particular restraints and restrictions for compelling reasons. 81
Thus, the Court has recognized that a person may be immediately
subjected to limitations on the exercise of his property rights when a
paramount public interest is served by the restraint. 82 That the ends of the
bankruptcy process do serve the public interest is inferable from the
constitutional grant of power to Congress to enact bankruptcy laws and
from the constitutional exercise of its power in the Bankruptcy Act. 83
79 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132 (1941); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL CouRTS § 47 (3d ed. 1976); Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin
Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1933).
80
Attachment and certain modes of prejudgment levy were generally accepted creditors'
remedies prior to 1969. McKay v. Mcinnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1928); Coffin Bros. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). In 1969 and since, the
Supreme Court has several times held that prejudgment seizure in accordance with established procedures nevertheless violated constitutional guaranties of due process when no
hearing ornotice preceded the levy. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601 (1975).
81
See Notes in 68 M1cH. L. REV. 986 (1970), 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 554 (1977), and 6 U.
ToL. L. REv. 185 (1974).
82
See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351 (1977) (seizure of
automobiles to obtain partial satisfaction of tax liabilities held not to violate either the fourth
or fifth amendment); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928)(summary execution
against bank stockholder's property to enforce liability of stockholder of a failed bank
sustained).
83
In Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977), the court stated:
The policy considerations underlying Rule 11-44 are considerable. The automatic
stay ... is designed to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's
assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts. The stay
insures that the debtor's affairs will be centralized, initially, in a single forum in
order to prevent conflicting judgments from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the creditors' interests with one another.
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Recent opinions of the Supreme Court do not raise any doubts about the
necessity for the bankruptcy court to be able to exercise comprehensive
control of the debtor and his property within the limitations prescribed by
Congress in order to perform its administrative functions and to provide
the relief of debtors contemplated by the Act.
Even when the public interest is less easily discerned, the Court has
recognized that due process may be satisfied by notice and a hearing that
follows rather than precedes the restraint imposed on the exercise of
property rights. 84 The stay rules are carefully drafted to assure immediate
access to the court by parties subject to the stay and expeditious hearing
of their objections to the operation of the stay. 85 The courts have thus far
uniformly rejected challenges to the validity of the stay rules. 86

B. The Scope of the Rule-Making Power

An attack on the validity of the automatic stay rules may be based on
the argument that these rules exceed the bounds of the grant of rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court. 87 On the positive side, that grant
authorizes the Court to prescribe general rules to govern the ''forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
under the Bankruptcy Act.'' Negatively, the grant proscribes rules that
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Similar language
84
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). In a concurring opinion in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 611 (1975), Mr. Justice Powell
observed: "Pregamishment notice and a prior hearing have not been constitutionally mandated in the past. Despite, the ambiguity engendered by the Court's reliance on Fuentes, I
do not interpret its opinion today as imposing these requirements for the future."
It was noted in Tharpe & Brooks of Fla., Inc. v. Pickett, Gardner, Landers & Assoc., 14
Collier Bankr. Cas. 370, 388 n.19 (Ref., N.D.' Ga. 1977), that "[t]he automatic stay in
rehabilitative and bankruptcy contexts is no less necessary than a temporary restraining
order under Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, granted without a prior hearing and a
showing of possible irreparable harm. The same considerations apply to each."
85
See the discussion accompanying note 274 infra.
86
See Caribbean Food Prod., Inc. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 575 F.2d 961,
963-64 (1st Cir. 1978); Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47,
55-56 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977); Beneficial Corp. v. Barker, 445 F.
Supp. IOI, 105 (W.D. Mo. 1977); First Nat'I Bank of Atlanta v. Robinson (In re B & B
Properties, Ltd.), 423 F. Supp. 23, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1976)(noting "grave concern" as to the
constitutionality of the automatic stay provisions but denying relief sought by petition for
mandamus); Great Nat'I Life Ins. Co. v. Pine Gate Assoc., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 137 (Ref., N.D.
Ga. 1976), affd. 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 613 (N.D. Ga. 1976), motion for leave to file petition
for writ of prohibition and other relief denied,429 U.S. 1071 (1977); In re Creed Bros., Inc.,
14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 426, 430 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977); Tharpe & Brooks of Fla., Inc. v.
Pickett, Gardner, Landers & Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 370, 385-90 (Ref., N.D. Ga.
1977).
87 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970). The grant of rule-making power to the Supreme Court in
respect to "procedure and practice under the Bankruptcy Act" was made in 1964. 78 Stat.
1001. Prior to 1964 the Supreme Court's rule-making authority in the area of bankruptcy was
limited to § 30 of the Act and to the prescription of interstitial rules of procedure. The
General Orders of Bankruptcy were promulgated pursuant to that authority. Any order in
conflict with the Act was invalid. See, e.g .• Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U.S.
426 (1925).
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appears in other enabling legislation under which the Supreme Court has
exercised its rule-making functions for the federal courts. 88 Not surprisingly. perhaps, the Court has given a hospitable reading to the congressional grants and to the products of its exercise of the rule-making authority vested in it. 89
The rule of procedure that appears to be most nearly analogous to the
automatic stay rules discussed in this article is Rule 62(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule imposes an automatic stay for ten
days against the issuance of an execution on a judgment and of any other
kind of proceedings for its enforcement until ten days have elapsed after
its entry. No challenge to the validity of this rule has been discovered.
The automatic stay rules come closer in spirit and purpose, however, to
being a kind of codification of the practice that characterized the inauguration of a federal equity receivership. As the law of federal equity
receiverships evolved, federal courts assumed functions and fashioned
appropriate procedures that are comparable to those now carried out in
cases under the Bankruptcy Act. To a considerable extent the bankruptcy
court's functions and procedures in reorganization cases under Chapters
VIII-XII are adaptations of what the federal courts developed in administering equity receiverships during the several decades preceding the
enactment of reorganization legislation in the early thirties. 90 The federal
courts recognized from the beginning that successful administration of an
equity receivership required a stay of actions or acts that might interfere
with the receiver's discharge of his responsibilities for operating the
debtor's business and preserving the estate during the pendency of the
proceedings. 91 The comprehensive stay effected by the inception of the
proceedings was so characteristic that the label of "umbrella receiverships'' was often applied. 92
Any suggestion that the imposition of a stay abridges or modifies a
substantive right is contradicted by the Supreme Court's declaration in
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rhode Island
& Pacific Railway 93 that the court's injunction against a pledgee's enforcement of his security interest did not impair his rights. A realistic
88
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 (civil procedure), 2073 (admiralty rules), 2074 (rules for reviewing decisions of the Tax Court) (1970).
89
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470!'71 (1965); 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
,i 1.04[1] (2d ed. 1967); c. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 294 (3d ed. 1976); cf.
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 697, 718-38 (1974).
0
• See 6 COLLIER ,i 0.04 (1977); T. FINLETTER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION ch. I (1939).
91
See T. FINLETTER, supra note 90; at 3-8; G. GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 159 (1935).
After the court has taken possession and control of the property, no injunction is
absolutely necessary against inteiference because the law without a specific injunction forbids interference with property in control of the court ....
The order of appointment, in itself contains a number of implied injunctions.
Nevertheless, it is customary and good practice for the court to make specific
injunctions as a part of its order appointing the receiver.
2 R. CLARK, LAW OF RECEIVERS 1024 (3d ed. 1959).
92
See New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R. Co., 143 F.2d 179, 181, 185 (2d
Cir. 1944).
93
294 U.S. 648, 680-81 (1935). See text accompanying notes 73-86 supra.
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appraisal of the effect of the automatic stay supports the view that it\does
not abridge any substantive rights. As pointed out earlier, 94 a debtor
represented by adequate counsel routinely obtains an injunction' at the
threshold of a case against the actions and acts that are subject to the
stays prescribed by the rules. The few courts that have considered the
matter have had no difficulty in recognizing the procedural character of
the automatic stay rules and rejecting challenges to their validity. 95 Nor
have they been impressed by an argument that the automatic stay rules
extend the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 96

C. Conflict with Congressional Policy

There is a long and firmly entrenched congressional policy to restrict
the injunctive power of federal courts to stay state court proceedings. 97
The policy is embodied in section 2283 of Title 28 of the United States
Code:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The explicit grants of power to bankruptcy courts to enjoin suits have
been recognized as falling within the exception of the first clause of this
provision. 98 This result was not ineluctable insofar as these courts relied
on the original language of section 2a( 15) of the Bankruptcy Act, since it
contained no express reference to authority, of the bankruptcy court to
94 See_ note 78 and accompanying text supra. See also Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.,
417 U.S. 467, 471-73 (1974).
95 See Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, 550 F.2d 47, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977); Tharpe & Brooks of Fla., Inc. v. Pickett, Gardner,
Landers & Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 370, 386 n.15 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1977).
Petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition and/or mandamus from the Supreme Court to
the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Great Nat'I Life Ins. Co. v. Pine
Gate Assoc .. Ltd., reported in 45 U.S.L. W. 3469 (1976), questioned whether promulgation
of the automatic stay rules rests on an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The petition
was filed on Dec. 12, 1976, and denied on Jan. 25, 1977. 429 U.S. 1071, (1977). Neither the
district court opinion sought to be reviewed, reported in 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 613 (N.D.
Ga. 1976), nor the opinion of the bankruptcy judge affirmed by the district court, reported in
3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 137 (1976), made any reference to the delegation argument.
96
Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977). In view of the decision in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S.
433 (1940), cited in note 25 supra and discussed in the accompanying text, it is arguable that
the sections of the debtor relief chapters vesting exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his
property in the bankruptcy court divest all other courts of jurisdiction of litigation affected
by the stay rules applicable in the cases commenced under those chapters.
97
78 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE JC-925 et seq. (2d ed. 1976); c. WRIGHT, THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 47 (3d ed. 1976).
98
c. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 203 n.32 (3d ed. 1976). From 1874 to 1948, however, the
predecessors of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 - Rev. Stat. § 720 (1874), § 265 of the Judicial Code of
1911, and 28 U.S.C. § 379 - recognized as an exception to the prohibition on injunctions
against state courts any injunction "authorized by any law relating to proceedings in
bankruptcy." See J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 396 (1949).
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enjoin. 99 The proviso of section 2a(l5) added in 1938, however, which
specifies that only the district judge has power to restrain a court, 100
clearly implies that parties to a state or federal court action may be
enjoined by a referee and that a district judge, when acting as a bankruptcy judge, may enjoin both parties and judges from proceeding in such
a court action. 101
Section 2283 literally restricts only the power of a court of the United
States to grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court, whereas
the stay rules operate automatically without the necessity of a court
injunction. If section 2283 should nevertheless be thought to be in conflict
with the automatic stay rules, the rule-making grant of 28 U.S.C. § 2075
declares that all laws in conflict with the rules promulgated pursuant to
the statute "shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect. " 102 The policy embodied in section 2283 is so firmly established; however, that courts can be expected to apply the stay rules so as
not to run counter to its prohibition: if the stay cannot be justified as
perfo~ing the same function as an injunction expressly authorized by the
Bankruptcy Act or as necessary in aid of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or to protect or effectuate its judgments, it will not and
should not be sustained. As the Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying the stay rules indicate, these rules were intended to reinforce and
supplement the provisions of the Act authorizing bankruptcy courts to
enjoin actions and acts that interfere with the court's jurisdiction over the
debtor and its property. In general, the courts have been conscientious in
their efforts to construe and apply the stay rules in a manner consistent
with the objectives of the grants of jurisdiction and injunctive power,
while being sensitive to the potential harm that stays may inflict on the
parties subject to the stays. 103
III.

THE SCOPE OF THE STAY

A. The Stay of In Personam Actions Under Rule 401

Bankruptcy Rule 401 prescribes an automatic stay against all actions on
dischargeable claims. The purpose of Rule 401 is the same as that underly99

See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
Section 2a(15)'s proviso refers to ''the judge only,'' but ''judge'' is defined in§ 1(20) of
the Act to "mean a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee." Rule 901(7)
defines "bankruptcy judge" for the purpose of the Rules to mean "the referee of the court of
bankruptcy in which a bankruptcy case is pending, or the district judge of that court when
issuing an injunction under § 2a(15) of the Act and when acting in lieu of a referee under
§ 43c of the Act or under Rule 102."
101
I COLLIER § 2.64 (1974).
102
See also note 87 supra. An argument that 28 U .S.C. § 2283 prohibits any automatic
stay would render the automatic stays provided by §§ 148 and 428 and former § 75 of the
Bankruptcy Act suspect. No case authority casts doubt on these sections on the ground of
any such supposed conflict.
103
See, e.g., Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d47, 53,55 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
100
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ing section I la, namely, to prevent frustration of the Act's objective to
afford the bankrupt a fresh start. The rule goes beyond section I la,
however, in several respects: (1) it operates automatically, whereas section I la imposed a duty on an unspecified court; 104 (2) it extends to
actions commenced after the filing of the petition as well as to the
continuation of those pending at bankruptcy; 105 (3) it extends not only to
all actions on dischargeable claims but also to actions on claims not
dischargeable under four clauses of section 17a of the Act; 106 and (4) it
extends to actions and the enforcement of judgments against bankrupts,
not merely to suits. 107
That the rule is nevertheless compatible with congressional purposes is
evident in the amendments of the Bankruptcy Act, previously discussed, 108 enacted in 1970 to enhance the protection of the bankrupt in
seeking and obtaining a discharge. The automatic stay of Rule 401 extends
to actions on claims nondischargeable under section 17a(2), (4), or (8), in
recognition of the need to curb the abuse that led to the enactment of
section 17c(2) of the Bankruptcy Act in 1970. That abuse is the procurement of judgments by creditors with a view to collecting their claims
notwithstanding the discharge of the debtors in bankruptcy. Prior to the
legislative reform such judgments were often obtained by default. 109
When a bankrupt contested the creditor's action by relying on his discharge or the dischargeability of the creditor's claim, the creditor would
invoke one of the exceptions to dischargeability, typically one involving
charges of fraud, misappropriation, or conversion on the part of the
bankrupt. 110 When the bankrupt was vigorously represented, he might
prevail in this litigation or at least obtain a settlement acceptable to him,
but Congress became concerned that the typical bankrupt did not get the
full benefit intended by the discharge sections of the Act. Moreover, the

10
•
105

See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
106
Courts have given§ I la a hospitable construction by presuming dischargeability. In re
Nuttall, 201 F. 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). Section 2a(l5) has been a reservoir of injunctive
power not subject to the limitations of§ I la, although this difference in scope has not always
been kept clear in court opinions. See I COLLIER ,i 2.62 (1974). See also note 46 and the
accompanying text supra.
107
The "suit" stayed by § Ila and the "action," including "the enforcement of any
judgment," which is subject to the stay of Rule 401 are approximate equivalents. The tenn
"action" is used in contradistinction to "suit" in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See I A COLLIER ,i 11.03 ( 1974).'It is easier to construe
the language of Rule 401 than § I la to reach a criminal proceeding instituted to collect a
dischargeable debt, as the court did in In re Penny, 414 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. N.C. 1976).
Neither the word "suit" nor "action" has been held to reach contempt proceedings
arising out of disobedience of an order made prior to the stay. See David v. Hooker, Ltd., 14
Collier Bankr. Cas. 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1977). Compare § 362(a) of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266,
which subject "proceeding" and "process" to the statutory stay.
108
See notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
10
• H.R. REP. No. 91-1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970); S. REP. No. 91-1173, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2,4 (1970). See also Bankruptcy: Hearing on S.J. Res. 88, H.R. 6665 & H.R.
12250 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of House Comm. on Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25, 34,
47 (1969); Shuchman, The Fraud Exception in Consumer Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REv. 735,
736, 757-61 (1971).
110
See Shuchman, supra note 109, at 741-42.
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mere threat to bring such an action or the commencement of the action
frequently enabled a creditor to obtain a postpetition reaffirmation of the
bankrupt's obligation, perhaps reduced by a partial payment, without any
judicial determination of the nondischargeabilityof the debt. 111 Congress
dealt with the resulting frustration of the objective of the discharge provisions by requiring any creditor relying on certain grounds of nondischargeability112 to obtain a favorable determination with respect to those
grounds by a proceeding commenced in the bankruptcy court during the
pendency of the debtor's case. 113 Providing an automatic stay of all
actions on claims that are nondischargeable only if creditors obtain timely
determinations in their favor in the bankruptcy court clearly fulfills the
congressional design. Judicial economy is served, and both debtor and
creditors are benefited, by the certainty and celerity that the Act and the
Rules have made possible in the settlement of the largest portion of
disputes and litigation regarding dischargeability of debts.
The automatic stay of Rule 401 extends to actions on unscheduled
claims, notwithstanding their potential nondischargeability, if the claims
are provable. 114 The reason for this treatment is the considerable likelihood that the claim will be scheduled or filed in time to permit the
allowance of the claim and meaningful participation by the creditor in the
case. If neither scheduling nor filing of the claim occurs within thirty days
after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors, however, the
assumptions underlying the stay are no longer warranted and it is deemed
annulled. Any action commenced on such a claim, and any step taken in
an action on such a claim, during the thirty-day period will be given
retroactive validity or effect by the annulment of the stay without any
necessity for the creditor to seek relief. 115 The annulment of the stay is
not, however, tantamount to a ruling that the unscheduled claim is not
dischargeable. The debtor may nevertheless be able to show in a subsequent proceeding to determine dischargeability or in an action brought
on the claim that the creditor had knowledge of the bankruptcy and could
have filed his claim in good time. The debtor may indeed be able to obtain
an injunction against commencement or continuation of an action on the
111

Shuchman, supra note 109, at 757-61.
Namely, those listed in§ 17a(2) (liabilities for use of false pretenses, representations,
or financial statement-or for winful and maliciou~ conversion of property), § I 7a(4) (fraud or
misappropriation in a fiduciary capacity), and § 17a(8) (liabilities for willful and malicious
injuries). The reasons for the selective treatment of holders of certain nondischargeable
claims are explained in Countryman, The Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J.
1,10-17 (1971).
113 § 17c(2), now supplemented by Rule 409(a)(2).
11 • Such a claim is not dischargeable under § I 7a(3) only if it is not sched_uled in time for
proof and allowance and if the creditor had no notice and no actual -knowledge of the
pendency of the bankruptcy case. If the scheduling or knowledge of the pendency of the
case comes too late to enable the creditor to participate meaningfully in the administration of
the estate, his claim is not discharged although he might have been able to file a proof of
claim before the lapse of the filing period. Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 195 U.S. 345, 350
(1904); United States v. Hermetic Seal Prod. Co., 198 F. Supp. 749 (D. P.R. 1%1).
115
But see In re Butcher, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 913, 914 (Ref., N .D. Ohio 1975) (lien obtained
by judgment after bankruptcy held to have been obtained in violation of Rule 401 although
creditor was not scheduled until nearly two months after the first meeting of creditors).
112
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unscheduled claim notwithstanding the annulment of the automatic
stay .116
Although the injunctive power of the court under section 17c(4) of the
Act is without explicit limitation, Rule 401 does not stay actions on
nondischargeable claims for taxes, 117 wages, or commissions, 118 refund
of security deposits made by employees, 119 alimony, maintenance, or
support, 120 and torts involving seduction or adultery. 121 Claims listed in
these exceptions involve special considerations that outweigh the bankrupt's interest in a prompt determination of dischargeability. The need of
the tax collector, the employee, or salesman, and the alimony, support, or
maintenance claimant for prompt payment of their nondischargeable
claims is recognized as more exigent than the discharged bankrupt's need
for freedom from harassment by claimants seeking unwarranted recoveries in these classifications. The bankrupt's need for an automatic
stay against collection efforts by a claimant holding a judgment or settlement for seduction or criminal conversation seems insubstantial.
Notwithstanding the unavailability of an automatic stay to deter actions
to collect nondischargeable claims within section l 7a( 1), (5), (6), and (7), a
debtor may obtain an injunction against such an action from the bankruptcy court. 122 The injunction may be obtained independently of and
before the commencement of a proceeding to determine dischargeability,
but presumably the court will not issue such an injunction unless there is a

116
For example, by showing that the claim was dischargeable even though unscheduled
or scheduled belatedly. Such an injunction may be issued pursuant to § 17c(4) of the Act.
For an early instance of an injunction against a creditor in such a case, see In re Beerman,
112 F. 662, 663 (N.D. Ga. 1901).
117
Nondischargeable taxes under§ 17a(I) must generally have become due and payable
within the three years preceding the filing of the petition under the Act, but a proviso adds
five qualifications that render many taxes nondischargeable even though they became due
and payable within the three-year period. See IA COLLIER ,i 17.14 (1971). For a case
declaring Rule 401 applicable to stay the collection of dischargeable federal taxes, see
Verran v. United States, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 288, 302 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1977), vacated
and remanded, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 47 (E.D. Mich. 1978), without ruling on the applicability of
Rule 401 to attempts to collect discharged taxes, the district court vacated the bankruptcy
court's' order insofar as it barred collection of taxes out of exempt property and property
subject to a valid tax lien. The court acknowledged that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enjoin the IRS under90 Stat. 2721 (1976), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702-03 (1977). 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. at 48.
118
Wages and commissions that are nondischargeable under§ I7a(5) are also entitled to
priority under § 64a(2). They must have been earned within the three months prior to the
filing of the petition and are limited to $600 per claimant. See IA COLLIER ,i 17.25 (1973).
119
This ground of nondischargeability is infrequently invoked. See IA COLLIER ,i 17 .25
(1973).
120 The dischargeability of liability for alimony, maintenance, or support is a frequently
litigated question arising under§ 17a, in part because of the difficulty of determining whether
a property settlement falls within the scope of§ 17a(7). See IA COLLIER ,i,i 17.18-19, 17 .22A
(1973).
121
Liability for "seduction of an unmarried female or for breach of promise of marriage
accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation" is seldom invoked as a ground of
nondischargeability. See IA COLLIER ,i,i 17.20-.22 (1973).
122
Pursuant to § I7c(4). Thus, even the federal tax collector may be enjoined from
proceeding against a bankrupt or debtor in a chapter case. See, e.g., Bostwick v. United
States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975). For further discussion see note 161 and the accompanying text infra.
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legitimate question as to whether the creditor's claim is dischargeable and
there is a reasonable expectation that a determination of that question will
be sought without delay. Because ajudgment on a discharged claim is null
and void under section 14f(l) of the Act and because a determination of
dischargeability entered by the bankruptcy court is binding on a creditor
duly served under Rule 409, state courts have appropriately exercised
caution in allowing a creditor to enforce collection of a claim during the
pendency of proceedings in the bankruptcy court. 123
There are limitations on the scope of the stay of Rule 401 other than
those referable to the four exceptions from dischargeability in section
17a( 1), (5), (6), and (7). Any action founded ori a nonprovable debt is not
subject to the stay . 124 Whether an action is founded on a provable debt
may be in doubt in a particular case even though the the bankrupt has
scheduled the debt. Under section 57d the court may conclude that a
claim, though duly filed on a proof of claim pursuant to Rule 302, is not
capable ofliquidation or reasonable estimation within the time reasonably
available to the court. 125 Such a claim is not allowable, provable, or
dischargeable, and the logical implication is that any action on the claim is
not subject to the automatic stay. Pending the bankruptcy court's disallowance pursuant to§ 57d's proviso, however, the stay should be operative.12a
When a creditor sues on a debt secured by a pledge or obtains the
appointment of a receiver in a mortgage foreclosure action prior to bankruptcy, Rule 401 is susceptible to a construction that makes the stay
inoperative against such an action. 127 A more rational interpretation,
123
The Supreme Court of Georgia has considered a series of cases in which bankrupts
have sought to defend against efforts to enforce compliance with divorce settlements by
invoking the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and the Rules dealing with discharge.
Recognizing the power of the bankruptcy court to make a final binding determination and to
apply a federal rather than a state standard, the state supreme court has remanded three
cases to the trial court (one of them twice) with instructions to defer to any relevant
determination by the bankruptcy court. Graves v. Graves, 239 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. 1977) (bankrupt held in contempt for failure to make payments on a house pursuant to a divorce
settlement incorporated in a state court judgment; case remanded for consideration of
whether the state court's action was subject to automatic stay); Hines v. Hines, 239 Ga. 689,
238 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. 1977) (reversing state court determination that a bankrupt's obligation
to pay his former wife the value of an automobile pursuant to a separation agreement
incorporated in a divorce decree was nondischargeable; "[t]he superior court should have
stayed the present action pending culmination of bankruptcy proceedings"); Manuel v.
Manuel, 237 Ga. 828, 229 S.E.2d 644 (1976) (case remanded to await determination by the
bankruptcy court of the dischargeability of the bankrupt's obligation to make periodic
payments to his former wife, maintain a life insurance policy, and pay wife's attorney's fees
pursuant to a property settlement); cf. Robinson v. Mountjoy, 368 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mo.
1973) (upholding a bankruptcy judge's order permitting a state court action against a
discharged bankrupt to continue notwithstanding the pendency in the bankruptcy court of a
proceeding to determine the dischargeability of the claims sued on in the state court).
12 • See, e.g., Tinios v. Bahl, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 594 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1976) (action
grounded on fraud, misrepresentation, and willful conversion).
125
See 3 COLLIER ,i 57.15[4] (1974).
126
See notes 234-36 and accompanying text infra.
127
Cf. Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 64,285 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972), where the court appeared to take the view that if a debt is
secured at all, it is to be treated as entirely secured for the purposes of Chapter XIII. See
also Wolff v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Moralez), 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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however, would make the stay effective only insofar as the creditor seeks
a deficiency judgment on a provable debt, unless it is not dischargeable
under section 17a(l), (5), (6), or (7). 128 The purpose of the stay is as much
served by its application to the action on the unsecured portion of the debt
as to any other unsecured debt. The question seems, however, not to
have been determined in any reported cases. 129 In any event, it is clear
that the court retains the power under both sections l la and 2a(l5) to
enjoin the prosecution of the action to the extent it seeks a deficiency
judgment.
Actions on three kinds of provable claims that are not dischargeable
although not excepted in section 17a appear to be subject to the stay.
These are actions on claims that are not dischargeable (1) because of the
operation of res judicata, 130 or (2) because they are claims for penalties, 131 or (3) because they are obligations insured or guaranteed under
federal educational loan legislation. 132 The first category would be likely

128
See Countryman, Partially Secured Creditors Under Chapter XIII, 50 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 269 (1976).
129
A bankrupt was held not protected by the automatic stay against a claim and delivery
action instituted by a secured seller in Shaffer v. Anderson, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 327 (Ref.,
W.D. Mich. 1977), but the court relied on four grounds: (I) the stay did not operate against
secured creditors; (2) insofar as the seller was unsecured, its claim was not scheduled within
30 days after the first meeting of creditors and its action was therefore not subject to the stay
under Rule 401(c); (3) the bankrupt was barred from relief in the bankruptcy court against
the seller because the bankrupt had incurred the debt sued on in violation of an order
confirming a Chapter XIII plan and had not disclosed the transaction in the schedules filed in
the superseding bankruptcy; and (4) he was guilty of laches in seeking relief.
130
Section 17b, enacted as part of the dischargeability legislation in 1970, clarified the
operation of a denial or loss of discharge in one case as a bar to the discharge, in a
subseque·nt case, of the debts that were dischargeable in the first case. See Countryman, The
New Dischargeability Law, 41 AM. BANKR. L.J. I, 50-53 (1971).
131
A claim based on a penalty or forfeiture may be provable, but, if asserted by the
United States, a state, or a subdivision of either, it is not allowable beyond the amount
represented by actual pecuniary loss to the governmental unit owning the claim. Bankruptcy
Act § 57j; 3 COLLIER ,i 57.22 ( 1974). The nondischargeability of liabilities for penalties rests
on an uncertain foundation, since§ 17a does not mention penalties. See IA COLLIER ,i 17.13
(1967). Some cases rest nondischargeability on nonprovability, but that is an unsatisfactory
rationale. Compare United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1959) with Custom
Wood Products, Inc. v. United-States, 338 F. Supp. 337, 339-40 (W.D. Mich. 1971). To the
extent that penalties can be assimilated or connected -to nondischargeable taxes, their
nondischargeability is more easily supported. See United States v. Sotelo, 98 S.Ct. 1795,
1800 (197.8); Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of-Tax Claims, 59 CORN. L. REV. 991, 1058 (1974); cf.
Berger, Tax or Penalty? Dischargeable in Bankruptcy?, 83 COM. L.J. 79 (1978).
132
90 Stat. 2141 (1976), 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1977 Supp.); 90 Stat. 2262 (1976), 42 U.S.C. §
294f(g) (1977 Supp.). This legislation, buried in the Education Amendment of 1976 and the
Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976 effectively but somewhat surreptitiously amended § l 7a of the Bankruptcy Act. See S. REP. No. 94-882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
196 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4896-97; H.R. REP. No.
94-266, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 4947, 5052-53.
Sections 316 and 326 of H.R. 8200 repeal both of the provisions cited above. As originally
introduced H.R. 8200 contained no exception for educational loan obligations in the section
on discharge. When H.R. 8200 was passed by the House on February I, 1978, however,
§ 523(a) was amended to include as an additional category of nondischargeable debts any
obligation insured or guaranteed under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. § 1701
et seq.) if the obligation first became due within five years before, or after, the filing of the
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to consist of stale claims provable in a prior bankruptcy case in which a
discharge was not obtained. Collection of claims in the second category
arguably but not incontrovertibly should be unimpeded by the stay when
the penalties are imposed for delinquent nondischargeable taxes, but the
arguments supporting nondischargeability for other kinds of penalties do
not rest on any exigency requiring prompt collection. 133 The third category of nondischargeable claims is a result of legislation enacted after
Rule 401 was promulgated, but the condition precipitating the filing of the
petition for relief by or against a defaulting educational Joan obligor is
likely to render early collection proceedings fruitless. 134 Actions founded
on these three classes of claims thus do not appear to present any of the
considerations that warrant exemption from operation of the automatic
stay .13s
Courts have generally given generous scope to Rule 401. 136 Occasionally a court construes the rule not to apply when a sounder construction
would recognize its applicability but terminate or modify its operation. 137
Some bankruptcy judges, however, have been overenthusiastic in their
construction of this automatic stay rule. Thus, it has been held that the
automatic stay of Rule 401 prohibits threats by a creditor to sue a discharged bankrupt. 138 Although the stay does operate against carrying out
threats to sue a debtor on a dischargeable debt, it reads too much into the
rule to see in it a prohibition on extrajudicial efforts by a creditor to

petition. The amendment makes r,o reference to an obligation governed by the Public Health
Service Act.
Section 523(a)(8) as set out in S. 2266 excepts from discharge "any educational debt" if
the first installment became due less than five years before the filing of the petition. The term
"educational debt" is ncit defined in the bill. Section 315 of S. 2266 repeals the provision for
a five-year postponement of discharge in 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3, but the bill makes no reference
to the like provision in 42 U.S.C. § 294f(g).
133
See IA COLLIER ,r 17.13 at 1610 n.10; Plumb, supra note 131, at 1058, n.423. It is not
self-evident that the overriding need of the government for prompt and unimpeded collection
of the revenue extends to the penalties incurred for delinquency.
134
But see further discussion of the implications of this legislation in the text accompanying notes 218-25 & 230-31 infra.
135
/n re Richie's Villa Capri, Inc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 144 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977), isa
case apparently contra to the position taken in the text but the result is entirely explicable. A
Chapter XI debtor sought an order from the bankruptcy court staying a town from enforcing
its municipal code by the imposition of criminal sanctions for building violations. The debtor
curiously t'elied on Rule 401 rather than the more comprehensive provisions of Rule 11-44,
and the court mistakenly relied on cases construing§ I la of the Act in stating that an action
to collect a nondischargeable debt should not be stayed. Relying on the line of authority that
treats liabilites for penalties as nondischargeable, the court held the stay imposed by Rule
401 inapplicable. This construction of Rule 401 is insupportable, and the opinion is eve:t
more vulnerable to criticism as an application of Rule 11-44. The case may be viewed,
however, as one in which the court refused to grant injunctive relief sought by the dehtor
and incidentally, but properly, granted relief from the automatic stay. The procedure did not
conform to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure governing adversary proceedings, but the
debtor who initiated the proceeding was in no position to complain of that departure.
136
See, e.g., cases cited in notes 95, 115, & 117 supra. See also In re Mott, I Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 1146 (Ref., D. Conn. 1975), where the stay was applied to invalidate a defaultjudgment
rendered in Puerto Rico after the debtor had filed a petition in the District of Columbia.
137
See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 135 and infra note 144.
138
In re Gann, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 154 (Ref., E.D. Tenn. 1974).
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collect a dischargeable debt, as a district court has explicitly held. 139
Another court, purporting to follow constructions of section I la, held the
stay to operate against a wage assignment. 140 Still another court appeared
to think, quite erroneously, that Rules 401 and 601 together afforded a
basis for restraining a municipality from refusing water service to a debtor
who was delinquent in payment of prepetition water bills. 141 An action
seeking only injunctive relief is clearly beyond the reach of the stay of
Rule 401. 142 A ruling that stayed an administrative proceeding at which a
bankrupt's liquor license was cancelled also disregards the limitation of
the scope of Rule 401 to actions on provable debts. 143
It involves no strained construction to apply the stay to the prosecution
of a counterclaim agai_nst the bankrupt in a pending action, although the
courts have had difficulty in applying the governing rules and principles to
counterclaims . 144

139
In re Thompson, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1976). See also In re Sather, 2
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 942, 943 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (four telephone calls and a visit by a
collector held to afford no basis for relief under the Act against the collector); Shaffer v.
Anderson, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 327 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1977) (Rule 401 held ~o afford no
basis for court's determining whether threatened dismissal of debtor by employer was
wrongful).
140
In re Tisdale, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 87 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977). In rationalizing
application of Rule 401 to the wage assignment, the court referred to New York law, which
was said to treat a wage assignment as the equivalent of a garnishment. Since the debtor was
a peititioner in a Chapter XIII case, an entirely adequate basis for the ruling against the
assignee is § 611 of the Act, vesting in the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and his property, in particular the debtor's earnings, during the period of consummation of the plan.
141
See Shenberg v. Village of Carpentersville, 433 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. 1977), vacating
a stay of the municipality• s action in cutting off the debtor's water supply and remanding the
case.
142
As the courts properly held in Civil Aeronautics Board v. Tour Travel Enterprises, 440
F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (action to enjoin violations of Federal Aviation Act); Brennan
v. T & TTrucking, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Okla. 1975)(action by Secretary of Labor to
enjoin violations of Fair Labor Standards Act and to restrain nonpayment of overtime due
employees).
143 Katman v. New Jersey (In re C. Angelo Priest, Inc.), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 524, 529
(Ref. D. N.J. 1977), where the bankruptcy court took the extraordinary step of ordering
reinstatement of a liquor license to the trustee. Compare Colonial Tavern, Inc., v. Byrne,
420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976), cited at note 172 infra.
144 In DiGiovanni v. All-Pro Golf, Inc., 332 So. 2d 91 (Fla. App. 1976), the automatic stay
of Rule 401 was held inoperative against a counterclaim in a prepetition state court action
brought by a bankrupt corporation and its president against its shareholder. The counterclaim was filed as a derivative action by the stockholder to obtain an accounting by the
president.
The court in Rubin v. Virgin Islands Refinery Corp. (In re Co-Build. Companies, Inc.),
408 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. I'll. 1976), vacated a stay of proceeding on a counterclaim of a party
to a contract with a Chapter XI debtor because the bankruptcy court had not determined
that it had constructive possession of the debt sued on by the debtor. Neither § I la nor § 314
required the bankruptcy court to have constructive possession of a claim against the debtor
in order to enjoin its prosecution, and the effectiveness of the stay of Rule 401 or II-44
should not depend on constructive possession of the claim sued on. See also note 163 and
accompanying text infra.
For a case refusing to regard the stay as operative against the consideration of an appeal,
see Mid-Jersey Nat'I Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1975),
commented on in 44 FORD L. REV. 837 (1976) and discussed at note 165 infra.
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B. The Stay of Lien Enforcement Under Rule 601

Rule 601 is directed against enforcement of liens on the property of the
bankrupt. It operates against nonjudicial acts as well as the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding. ''Lien'' as used throughout
this rule includes "a consensual security interest in personal or real
property, a lien obtained by judicial proceedings, a statutory lien, or any
other variety of charge against property securing an obligation. " 145 To be
subject to the stay, however, enforcement must (1) be sought against
property in the custody of the court or (2) be a step in the enforcement of a
lien obtained by judicial proceedings within four months prior to the
bankruptcy.
J. Liens Against Property in the Custody of the Court-As pointed out
in the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 601, Rule 601(a)(l) is a substantially restricted restatement of the much quoted and applied dictum of
Mueller v. Nugent 146 that "the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in
effect an attachment and injunction." The stay is an implementation of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the property
within its custody from the date of bankruptcy. Enforcement of liens
against property in the custody of the court constitutes an interference
with the custody of the court. 147 The stay protects that custody and
operates whether the lienor is proceeding in a nonbankruptcy court or by
a nonjudicial mode of enforcement. 148 It does not matter that the property

145
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 601(a). This usage is consistent with the Bankruptcy Act and proposed Title 11. See § 101(26), (27), and (36) of H.R. 8200, and § 101(27),
(28), and (37) of S. 2266.
146
184 U.S. I, 14 (1901).
147
Isaac v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737 (1931), held that a lienor cannot
enforce his lien against a bankrupt's property in the custody of the bankruptcy court.
148
Ajudgment creditor's filing of a certificate of the judgment to make it a lien on the real
property of the bankrupt during the pendency of the bankruptcy was held to violate Rule
601(a)(I) as well as Rule 40I(a). In re Butcher, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 913, 914 (Ref., N.D. Ohio
1975), cited in note 115 supra. Since the creditor's claim was not scheduled until more than
30 days after the first meeting of creditors, the stay of Rule 401 was annulled by its
subdivision (c), but the creditor apparently admitted that his claim was dischargeable. While
it is debatable whether the docketing of a judgment to make it a lien of public record
constitutes an act or a proceeding to enforce a lien, an injunction against the enforcement of
the lien was certainly issuable under§ 17c(4). The automatic stay provided by § 362(a)(4) and
(5) of proposed Title 11 as set out in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 clearly applied to the creditor's
act here.
Whether the docketing or recording of a judgment to make it effective as a lien is barred by
the automatic stay of FEo. R. C1v. P. 62(a) has caused difficulty for litigants. The stay
generally prohibits the issuance of an execution on ajudgment or the taking of any proceedings to enforce it until the expiration of ten days after its entry. In Hamilton Steel Prods.,
Inc. v. Yorke, 376 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1%7), the court rejected an argument by a judgment
creditor that his failure to record his judgment was excused or prevented in any way by the
operation of the automatic stay of FEo. R. C1v. P. 62(a). The trustee in bankruptcy of the
judgment debtor was thus enabled to sell his property free of any judgment lien asserted by
the judgment creditor. 376 F.2d at 466. The judgment creditor then sued his counsel for
malpractice. Without qualifying its earlier ruling, the same court denied the creditor any
recovery, ruling that even if the judgment had been recorded during the period of the stay,
no valid lien would have been created by virtue of the lack ofexecutability and finality of the
judgment until the expiration of the period. Anastos v. M.J.D.M. Truck Rentals, Inc., 521
F.2d 1301, _1304 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).

204

Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 11 : 177

is located in a district distant from the bankruptcy court or that no
injunction against enforcement of the lien has been entered.
Property is in custodia legis when the bankrupt has actual or constructive possession of it on the date of bankruptcy . 149 Repossession by a
secured creditor after the filing of the petition, without the consent of the
court, is violative of the stay irrespective of the location of the property . 150 Even the continuation of nonjudicial foreclosure procedures
commenced prior to bankruptcy by exercise of a power of sale without
the taking of possession from the bankrupt is subject to the stay. Judicial
foreclosure proceedings commenced prior to bankruptcy typically result
in custody of the foreclosing court when a receiver is put in charge of the
property. The law is unclear, however, whether the property has passed
into the custody of the foreclosing court when the bankrupt remains in
actual physical possession on the date of bankruptcy . 151
2. Judicial Liens Obtained Within Four Months of Bankruptcy-The
second branch of Rule 601 extends only to a lien obtained by judicial
proceedings commenced by a creditor to collect an unsecured debt. 152
The premise of Rule 60l(a)(2) is that a lien of this kind obtained within
four months of bankruptcy is likely to be voidable under section 67a of the

149 See I COLLIER ,i 2.62[1], at 329 (1974); 2 id. ,i 23.05, at 469 (1974).
It has been suggested that in order for Rule 601 to be operative, "the bankruptcy court's
custody must be superior to other courts." Landers, The New Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of
the Past as.Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827, 862 (1973). The bankruptcy
court's custody attaches to property in the debtor's possession, actual or constructive, from
the time of the filing of the petition. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 194 (1956). If the
property is then in another court's custody or in another person's possession, the automatic
stay of Rule 601(a)(l) does not operate against the enforcement of any lien against the
property. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 326 (1931), cited by Professor Landers, 57 MINN.
L. REv. at 862 n.100, for the holding that the bankruptcy court may not enjoin a sale of
property being administered in a state court proceeding to enforce a valid lien, illustrates a
situation to which the stay of Rule 60l(a)(I) does not apply because of the custody ofanother
court. When the custody of another court was obtained for the purpose of enforcing a
judicial lien, the filing of a bankruptcy petition within four months after the lien arose stays
enforcement of the lien under Rule 60l(a)(2) notwithstanding prior custody of the other
court. See discussion in the text accompanying notes 152-57 infra. Although another court
has superior custody in the sense that the bankruptcy court cannot, or at least will not, order
the turnover of the property, the automatic stay prescribed for a debtor relief case is
nonetheless operative.
150
In re Tallyn, l Bankr. Ct. Dec. 487 (Ref., E.D. Va. 1975) (repossession and sale of
bankrupt's automobile stayed).
151 A bankruptcy court recently ruled that when the sheriff left property in the actual
physical possession of the debtor during the pendency of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding
in a state court, the possession, in conjunction with certain questions raised by the trustee,
sufficed "to maintain the 601 stay." In re Stroderd, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 598, 603 (Ref.,
W.D. La. 1977). The questions raised by the trustee involved the validity of the mortgage,
the relative priority of competing lienors, the applicability of the mortgage with respect to
some of the property originally seized by the sheriff, and the presence of a substantial
equity.
152 Rule 60l(a), like§ 67a of the Act, refers to a lien obtained by "attachment, judgment,
levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings." Such a lien is denominated a
"judicial lien" by § 101(26) of H.R. 8200. A lien obtained by judicial proceedings in the
enforcement of a pre-existing lien is not vulnerable under § 67a, unless perhaps the preexisting lien itself is voidable. See Kennedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some
Reflections on Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass, 17 STAN, L. REV. 793, 800-01 (1965).
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Act. 153 The stay preserves the status quo as of the date of bankruptcy
until the trustee or the debtor can initiate appropriate proceedings to
establish the invalidity of the lien by showing that the debtor was insolvent at the time the lien was obtained. 154 The stay operates without regard
to whether the property is in the possession of the bankrupt at the date of
the filing of the petition, and often it will not be. 155 Nor does it matter
whether the property subject to the lien is exempt or nonexempt. 156
The rule does not affect either the substantive or the procedural law
applicable in the proceeding to avoid the lien under section 67a. It may be
argued that the existence of the stay prevents any postpetition purchaser
of the property subject to the judicial lien from asserting that he is a bona
fide purchaser protected by the proviso to section 67a(3). Whether a
purchaser is so protected has depended primarily on whether he has
knowledge of the vulnerability of the lien enforced by the sale at which he
acquired his title. 157 The fact that a postpetition sale violated the automatic stay should strengthen the position of the trustee or debtor in proceeding against the purchaser under section 67a, but the stay cannot deprive a
bona fide purchaser of the title and protection given him by the statute.
C. The Stay of Proceedings Against the Debtor in Debtor Relief Cases

Unlike Bankruptcy Rule 401, the stay rules applicable in the debtor

153
Although the trustee or debtor must establish the elements of voidability in an adversary proceeding against the judicial lien creditor, the burden is not heavy. The proceeding
may be instituted in a bankruptcy court or in the court where the proceeding out of which the
lien arose is pending. No proof of a mental element is required, except where the property is
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser.
154
A judicial lien obtained within four months of bankruptcy is voidable by the trustee or
the debtor under § 67a if either (I) the bankrupt was insolvent at the time of the filing of the
petition or (2) the lien was obtained in fraud of the provisions of the Act. The provision for
this second ground of attack, however, is for all practical purposes excess baggage. 4
CoLLIER ,J 67.06 (1967).
The stay does not, as has sometimes been supposed, terminate the jurisdiction of the
nonbankruptcy court in which the lien enforcement proceedings are pending or necessarily
result in their supersession. Cf. Landers, The New Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as
Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827, 863 (1973) ("The result of this provision will
be to move all 67a summary proceedings into the bankruptcy court"). See notes 412-14 and
accompanying text infra.
155
See, e.g., In re Ducich, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 243 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (garnishment of
bankrupt's employer). Under§ 67a(4), the bankruptcy court clearly has summary jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the stay provided by Rule 601(a)(2), even though the property
affected by the lien is adversely held by an officer of another court. See 4 COLLIER ,i 67 .18
(1967). Neither the automatic stay nor the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
extends to the determination of issues respecting a lien obtained by judicial proceedings
more than four months before bankruptcy and accompanied by possession in or on behalf of
the lienor. 4 COLLIER ,i 67.03[3], at 78 n.37 (1975). The stay nevertheless will be operative if
the property subject to the lien remains in the possession of the bankrupt on the date of
bankruptcy, as it typically does when a judgment lien is obtained on real property. See
Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. Lessard, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 484 (Ref., N.D. Me. 1975).
156
The lien is voidable by the debtor if it attaches to exempt property. 4 COLLIER
,i 67.15[2] (1975).
157
See 4 COLLIER ,i 67.17, at 188-190.1 n.6 (1975). The bona fide purchaser in possession
would nevertheless be subject to summary jurisdiction of the court to determine the issues
arising under § 67a.
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relief chapters 158 operate to bar all proceedings against the debtor, without regard to whether they are based on dischargeable claims 159 or
whether they are judicial proceedings. Like Rule 401 the automtic stay for
a debtor relief case is not subject to any territorial limitation. 160 The
automatic stay in a debtor relief case has been held to be effective against
a taxing authority, including the United States, when it attempts to
proceed in or out of court to establish and collect tax claims. 161 Cases are

158

Rules 8-501, 9-4, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401.
The proceeding may be based on a nonprovable claim. But see Shenberg v. Village of
Carpentersville, 433 F. Supp. 677, 678 (N .D. Ill. 1977), (indicating that the court could not
stay an action on a nondischargeable debt); In re Richie's Villa Capri, Inc., 14 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 144 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (automatic stay deemed inapplicable to action to enforce
criminal penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance because penalty deemed nondischargeable).
The automatic stay rules for the chapter cases are susceptible to a construction that would
preclude the filing of a complaint or a claim in the very court and case commenced by the
petition that triggers the stay. If such a construction has been urged under the rules, it has
apparently been disposed of without any consideration by the courts in a published ruling or
opinion. Rules 8-501, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401 do prohibit the commencement or
even the continuation of any other court proceeding to effect a rehabilitation of the debtor or
a liquidation of the debtor's estate, except that a pending Chapter X case is expressly
permitted to continue without being affected by the filing of a Chapter XI. petition by the
debtor. The chapter stay rules thus create the apparent anomaly that a petition filed under
one of the rehabilitation chapters stays the filing of another petition under the Bankruptcy
Act, but if a petition is nevertheless filed under a rehabilitation chapter, it stays the
continuation of the previously commenced case (unless the first case is a Chapter X case and
the second a Chapter XI case). A logical resolution may be found in regarding the second
petition as a nullity because violative of the stay set in motion by the first petition. This
resolution, however, makes pointless the exception made in rule 1l-44(a) that permits the
continuation of a pending Chapter X case but inferably not a case pending under any other
chapter. Rules 116(c) and 117, moreover, are premised on the assumption that the filing of a
second petition by or against the same debtor under the Act is not a nullity, and, accordingly, these Rules prescribe an orderly procedure for determining which case or cases shall
be permitted to continue and where.
160
See. e.g., Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977) (petition filed in the Southern District of New York
held to operate as a stay against the institution of an action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi); In re W & G Dev't, A.G., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
655 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stay of Rule 11-44 continued against action on note executed by
debtor, a Swiss corporation, although action had been instituted in Switzerland by a French
bank).
161
Verran v. United States, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 288, 302 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1977) (Rule
401 held violated by Internal Revenue Service) vacated and remanded on other grounds; 4
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 47 (E.D. Mich. 1978), In re Van De Veer, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1590 (Ref., W.D.
Va. 1976) ( enforcement ofprepetition levy on debtor's assets by Internal Revenue Service
stayed); cf. Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding injunction
against Government's proceeding to collect taxes pending determination of their dischargeability). The bankruptcy court in the Verran case considered and rejected the argument of
the Internal Revenue Service that the provisions of the "anti-injunction statute," 26 U .S.C.
§ 7421 (1970), deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to stay the collection of federal
taxes. 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 298-303. This district court subsequently vacated the
bankruptcy court's order on grounds indicated in note 117 supra.
The amenability of the United States to the stay when it is proceeding to enforce nontax
claims is subject to considerable doubt because of its sovereign immunity. See United States
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940) (denying jurisdiction to probate court to render affirmative
judgment against United States on cross-claim arising out of government contract); McAvoy
v. United States, 178 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1949) (court reversed injunction entered by
referee against intervention by United States in litigation on a government contract, since it
is "axiomatic that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent"). The waiver of
159
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in conflict where the stay has been invoked against a state or local
government proceeding to enforce its regulatory laws against a debtor. 162
The bankruptcy court's power to restrain the commencement or continuation of an action against a debtor in a debtor relief case does not
depend upon the court's possession of the chose in action that is the
subject matter of the action. The jurisdictional grants and the injunctive
powers granted the court in the debtor relief chapters provide an ample
statutory base for the comprehensive stays of the Rules against actions
and proceedings of every kind against the debtor. 163 As pointed out
earlier, 164 the courts have recognized the necessity for such comprehensive stays to preserve the status quo while the debtor works out a plan of

sovereign immunity in respect to the collection of taxes rests considerably, but not exclusively, on § 2a(2A), which confers jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to determine the
amount of legality of any unpaid tax. See Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir.
1975); In re Durensky, 377 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Tex. 1974), app. dismissed, 519 F.2d 1024
(5th Cir. 1975). But cf. Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Director of Int. Rev., 442 F. Supp.
1023, 1025-26 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (upholding allowance of tax claim of United States but
reversing affirmative judgment for Chapter XI debtor for an income tax refund, since the
judgment was in excess of bankruptcy court' sjurisdiction). For a case sustaining applicability of the automatic stay of§ 148 to a governmental agency, see United States v. Hollowell
(In re Delta Food Processing Corp.), 446 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 1971) ("unless this stay is
applicable to every creditor, including governmental agencies, it will be of no effect"). The
defense of sovereign immunity appears to be no longer available to the Government when
only injunctive relief is sought, by virtue of the enactment of Public Law 94-574, 90 Stat.
2721 (1976), 5 U .S.C.A. §§ 702-703 (1977). This legislation does not, however, dispose of the
potential conflict between the stay rules and 26 U.S.C. § 7421. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1656,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6121, 6133.
162
Compare Colonial Tavern, Inc., v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976) (license
revocation proceeding by a municipal authority held not subject to the stay of Rule 11-44)
with Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 195 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1974)
(action initiated in state court by Michigan Attorney General to enforce state's anti-pollution
laws held subject to stay). The stay in the Hillsdale Foundry case was later terminated by the
district court after a hearing on an application by the debtor's counsel for an injunction
against the state court judge, and issues regarding the stay thereafter became moot by virtue
of the adjudication of the foundry as a bankrupt. The referee's ruling in the Hillsdale
Foundry case was criticized by the court in Colonial Tavern, 420 F. Supp. at 45, and would
be ovenuled by § 362(b)(4) and (5) of proposed Title 11, as set forth in H.R. 8200 and S.
2266. The Colonial Tave m case is further discussed in the text accompanying note 172 infra.
Rule 401 has been stretched in a questionable interpretation to operate as a stay of a
municipal license revocation proceeding against a bankrupt in Katman v. New Jersey (In re
C. Angelo Priest, Inc.), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 524, 529 (Ref., D. N .J. 1977), cited in note 143
supra.
163
Cf. Rubin v. Virgin Islands Refinery Corp. (In re Co-Build Companies, Inc.), 408 F.
Supp. 717, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1976), where the court appeared to view the effectiveness of the
stay prescribed by Rule 11-44 as dependent on constructive possession by the bankruptcy
court of the adversary claim against the debtor. See also note 144 supra.
It is asserted in Peitzman & Smith, supra note 3, at 1220 that "difficult jurisdictional
questions arise which are important in determining ... the scope of the court's injunctive
power." The article then reviews the conflict between the COLLIER and REMINGTON
treatises regarding the scope of summary jurisdiction in Chapter XI cases and concludes that
"The Remington view-that actual or constructive possession is a prerequisite to summary
jurisdiction in chapter cases, as well as in straight bankruptcies-seems the sounder position." Id. at 1221. The conclusion as well as the statement quoted in the first sentence of this
paragraph is gratuitous because the article ultimately acknowledges that "a bankruptcy
court, as a court of equity, may enjoin the enforcement of remedies by a secured creditor
whose substantive rights it could not reach by summary adjudication"-in Chapter XI cases
as well as others. Id. at 1222-23.
164
See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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reorganization or rehabilitation.
The stay in the rules for debtor relief cases appears broad enough to
embrace counterclaims and the prosecution of appeals against the debtor,
though the courts have encountered some difficulty in accepting so hospitable a construction of the rules .165 The chapter stay rules apply to
actions against the debtor even though no money judgment is sought. 166
Thus the stay operates against an action for a declaratory judgment on the
liability of an insurer of the debtor. 167 One of the most noteworthy
applications of Rule 11-44 involved an action commenced, not by a
creditor of the debtor, but by a rival lienor of property in which the debtor
claimed a security interest. 168 The purpose of the action was to establish
the priority of the plaintiffs lien over the lien of the debtor.
The stay in most debtor relief cases operates against the commencement or continuation of "any court or other proceeding" against the
debtor. 169 The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying several of the
Rules applicable in such cases explains that the reference to "other
proceedings'' ''is to signify the inclusion of a pending arbitration proceeding within the scope of the automatic stay. " 110 Insofar as this sentence
suggests that only arbitration proceedings and only those pending at the
date of the filing of the petition are subject to the stay, it is unfortunate

165 Bohack Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 367 (Ref., E.D.N.Y. 1977). The court
declined on jurisdictional grounds to apply Rule 11-44 against a counterclaim pending in a
nonbankruptcy court in Rubin v. Virgin Islands Refinery Corp. (In re Co-Build Companies,
Inc.), 408 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The case is criticized in notes 144 & l63supra.
In Mid-Jersey Nat'! Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1975),
favorably commented on in 44 Fo&D. L. REV. 837 (1976), the court held the automatic stay
inapplicable to the prosecution of a cross-appeal from a money judgment entered against the
debtor in a Chapter XI case. The court of appeals relied on the proposition that a deposit
made by the debtor in lieu of a supersedeas bond was no longer property of the debtor. The
conclusion regarding the interest of the debtor was not only questionable but an unsatisfactory basis for denying applicability of the stay to the prosecution of the cross-appeal.
166
See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Citizens Loan & Sav. Co., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 903 (Ref., W.D. Mo.
1977) (stay of SEC from seeking an injunction against the debtor's future violations of
federal securities laws lifted as a matter of discretion). See also notes l62supra & 173 infra.
A general stay of proceedings against a debtor entered pursuant to § 314 of the Bankruptcy
Act was held not to forbid compulsory production of documents by the officers of the debtor
in an action against the debtor, its officers, and directors to recover damages for misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Eon
Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court inappropriately regarded the
purpose of the stay as restricted to the protection of the debtor's property. This limitation on
the scope of the stay would probably be overruled by § 362(a)(l) of proposed Title 11, as set
forth in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266.
167
Power-Pak Products, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 684 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
The court terminated the automatic stay, however, because it did not serve the "statutory
purpose" to conserve the debtor's assets and aid in the estate's administration by the
bankruptcy court. Id. at 687.
168
Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
169
The only stay rule applicable in debtor relief cases that does not extend to nonjudicial
proceedings against the debtor is Rule 13-401.
170
The explanation appears in the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rules I0-601(a) and
12-43(a).
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and reduces the scope indicated by the rule's literal language. 171 One
court has seized upon the Note statement in ruling that the stay does not
affect pending proceedings before a municipal agency to revoke the
license of a debtor. 172 A number of rulings, however, support, the
applicability of the automatic stay to administrative proceedingsfederal, state, and local.' 7 3
Rule 8-501 excepts from the scope of the automatic stay in Chapter VIII
cases "the commencement or prosectuion to judgment of any claim or
action for damages caused by the operation of trains, buses, or other
means of transportation." This carries into the rule the exception imposed by section 77(i) of the Act on the grant of authority to the bankruptcy court to enjoin suits. 174 No comparable exception appears in any
of the other automatic stay rules or in the grants of power to enjoin suits.
The impingement on these stay rules of section 959(a) of Title 28 of the
United States Code should also be considered:
Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, including
debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the court
appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property .11 5
Does the automatic stay operate in a debtor relief case against a proceeding brought to enforce a cause of action arising out of the operation of
the debtor's business? The language of the automatic stay rules for the
chapter cases may suggest an affirmative answer when an action or
proceeding is commenced against the debtor, as distinguished from a
trustee or receiver. Arguably, however, the stay does not operate with
respect to a proceeding against a debtor in possession, who, like a trustee
or receiver, is an entity separate from the debtor . 176 Such a construction
avoids conflict between the stay rules and the Judicial Code provision
quoted above. 177 While the result under the present stay rules of the
171
For a case applying a stay rule to arbitration proceedings, see Taylor v. Brodt, 396
N.Y.S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (confirmation of arbitration award denied when Chapter XII
petition was filed before arbitration hearing had been completed).
172 Colonial Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976).
173
In re Zeitzer Food Corp., 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 614 (Ref., E.D.N .Y: 1976) (administrative proceeding to revoke debto,'s license to resell farm products); In re Airport Iron &
Metal, Inc., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 281 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1974) (proceeding before NLRB to
determine whether debtor was successor entity). In sharp contrast to the court's ruling in the
Colonial Tavern case, cited in note 172 supra, is Kalman v. New Jersey (In re C. Angelo
Priest, Inc.), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 524, 529 (Ref., D.N .J. 1977), where a municipal board's
proceeding resulting in cancellation of a bankrupt's liquor license was held to violate the
stay of Rule 401.
174 For a discussion of this provision see 5 COLLIER ,i 77.12 at 515-18 (1964).
175 For a discussion of this section see 7B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE JC-308 et seq.
(2d ed. 1966).
176 8 COLLIER ,J,J 6.30-.32 (1974). Cf. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY§ 313, at 377 (1956)
(" A debtor in possession is theoretically a trustee of his estate for his creditors").
177 This provision was unsuccessfully invoked against application of the automatic stay in
Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977). The court held that the action against the Chapter XI debtor
which was subject to the stay was brought to enhance a creditor's position in the reorganization of the debtor and did not arise out of the conduct of routine business operations after the
Chapter XI petition was filed.
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debtor relief chapters is debatable, 178 the question would be settled under
the proposed bankruptcy law pending in Congress: a proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the filing of the petition
is not subject to the automatic stay of the statute. 179
D. The Stay of Acts and Proceedings to Enforce Liens Against the
Property of the Debtor in Debtor Relief Cases

The automatic stay rules applicable in chapter cases 180 prohibit any
act or the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding to
enforce any lien against the debtor's property. Neither possession by the
lienor nor custody in another court insulates the creditor against the stay.
The property and the rights of lienors in the debtor's property that may be
dealt with in the plan vary among the chapters. 181 The language of the
several chapter stay rules suggests, however, that the reach of the stay is
not limited by the extent to which the Iienor's rights in the property may
be dealt with in the plan. The courts have accordingly sustained the stay
against lienors whose rights cannot be altered by the plan without their
consent. 182 This construction of the chapter stay rules follows the course
charted by many cases sustaining the entry and continuation of stays
entered against lien foreclosures pursuant to the express grants of injunctive power in the debtor relief chapters. 183
The scope of the chapter stay rules has been influenced by the fact that
the court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor's property in

118 A proceeding ought not ordinarily be brought against a debtor in possession, or indeed
a trustee or receiver; except in the bankruptcy court where the case is pending or with the
permission of that court. The bankruptcy court may for cause, however, permit such
litigation to be commenced or continued in another court. Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
119 § 362(a)(l) & (b) of Title II, as set out in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266.
1 8° Rules 8-501, 9-4, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401.
181 Beneficial Corp. v. Barker, 445 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Mo. 1977); In re East Coast
Enterprises, Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 66,763 (Ref., 0.0.C. 1977).
182
See, e.g., Akron Nat'I Bank & Trust Co. v. Freed & Co., 534 F. 2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1976)
(automatic stay in Chapter XI case operative against foreclosure commenced in state court
over four months before the filing of the petition); Beneficial Corp. v. Barker, 445 F. Supp.
JOI (W.D. Mo. 1977).
183
See e.g., Chatman v. Daugherty, 527 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1975), (construing § 614);
Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963) (construing§ 614);
Mongiello Bros. Coal Corp. v. Haughtaling Properties Inc., 390 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1962)
(construing §§ 113 and 148); Countryman, Real Estate Liens in Business Rehabilitation
Cases, 50 AM. BAN KR. L.J. 303, 305-12 (1976). In the landmark case of Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island & P-ac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 675-76 (1935), the Supreme Court
relied on§§ 2 and 2a(l5) of the Bankruptcy Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the "all writs" statute,
to empower· the bankruptcy court to enjoin the sale of pledged collateral. The fact that
§ 77(j) of the Bankruptcy Act authorizes a stay only of the commencement or continuation of
judicial proceedings to enforce a lien did not affect the Court's view of the injunctive powers
of the bankruptcy court in railroad reorganization cases. The provisions relied on by the
Court in Continental are also available to the bankruptcy court in any case arising under the
Bankruptcy Act.
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each of the debtor relief chapters .184 Judicial construction of these j urisdictional grants has tended to minimize, if not to ignore, possible implications of statutory limitations on the scope of a permissible plan when the
issue before the court is the permissible scope of an injunction against a
lienor. The extent to which these jurisdictional grants and other provisions of the Act enable the bankruptcy court to enter orders and judgments affecting the debtor's property other than as incidental to the
exercise of its power to enjoin is beyond the purview of this article. 185
The acts precluded by the stay of lien enforcement include the taking of
possession of collateral and the notification of obligors on assigned accounts or rentals to remit payments to the secured creditor. 186 Whether
the stay forbids notice-filing or recordation is debatable, since arguably
the principal purpose of such a step is not enforcement but perfection by
giving effective notice to persons dealing with the debtor. 187 Proposed
Title 11 clarifies the application of the statutory stay to such acts. 188 It
does not, however, settle the troublesome question of the effect of the
184
See, e.g .. Fidelity Mtge. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977), where the interest of a Chapter XI debtor as the
holder of a deed of trust on a condominium project and the underlying land was held to be
property subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the reorganization court under § 311 of the
Act. The court said emphatically that "[e]xclusive jurisdiction means exclusive jurisdiction." Id. 550 F.2d at 53. The test of the court's sweeping statement would be posed by the
filing of contemporaneous petitions by or against a mortgagor and a mortgagee of the same
assets.
185
See, e.g., Sada Yoshinuma v. Oberdorfer Ins. Agency, 136 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1943),
refusing to order turnover by a state court receiver in a Chapter XI case. See note 248 and
accompanying text infra.
In Caribbean Food Products, Inc. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 575 F.2d 961 ()st
Cir. 1978), the court ordered the turnover of proceeds of assigned accounts receivable
collected by the secured creditor pursuant to instructions given to the debtor's customers
after the filing of the petition. The bankruptcy court's power to require restoration of
property improperly taken from the debtor, receiver, or trustee in bankruptcy after it has
come into the custody of the court is well accepted. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 194,
at 205-06 (1956). The court's turnoverorder may be viewed as an applicaton of this principle.
186
Caribbean Food Prod., Inc. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 575 F.2d 961 (I st Cir.
1978), abstracted in note 185 supra.
187
Cf. In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971). The proviso of§ 67c(l)(B)
allows a statutory lienor to perfect his lien against the trustee after bankruptcy if applicable
lien law requires perfection of a statutory lien valid against a judicial lien creditor in order to
make it valid against a subsequent bona fide purchaser. The court in the Nieves case held
that while sequestration of goods subject to a vendor's privilege under Puerto Rican law
would be effective against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, such a sequestration would be
an act of enforcement, not perfection, and thus the vendor's privilege could not be perfected
after bankruptcy against the trustee.
Security Nat'! Bank v. Cotton (In re Atlanta International Raceway, Inc.), 513 F.2d 546,
549 (5th Cir. 1975), presented the question whether transmission of a letter to a Chapter X
debtor demanding payment of a note within ten days entitled the holder of the note to
payment of attorney's fees when payment was not made within the ten-day period. Such
notification of the debtor was a condition to the enforceability of a lien for attorney's fees
under a Georgia statute, GA. CooE ANN. § 20-506 (1977), but the court held that the notice
was ineffective because it constituted an "act or proceeding to enforce a lien upon the
property of the debtor" prohibited by§ 148 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 549. The rationale
of the case is equally applicable to Rule 10-601.
166
Under § 362 (a)(4) & (5), as set forth in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, the automatic stay
operates against an act to perfect a lien against property of the estate or the debtor, but
under§ 362 (b)(3), as set forth in these bills, the stay does not apply to any act of perfection
that relates back as against the trustee.
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automatic stay on prepetition arrangements between the debtor, secured
creditors, and third-party obligors of the debtor by which payments are
transmitted directly to the creditor or to an escrow holder. 189 While the
stay presumably does not revoke the arrangement or require the creditor
to work out new arrangements with the obligors, the rights and duties of
the secured creditor with respect to postpetition receipts are left at large.
The situation calls for circumspection on the part of the secured creditor
pending a determination by the court as to the proper application of these
moneys.
In a quite unsatisfactory opinion the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit declined to stay an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment
rendered against a Chapter XI debtor, on the ground that a deposit made
by 'the debtor in lieu of a supersedeas bond was, "in the context of this
case," not the property of the debtor. 190 The court did acknowledge that
the deposit was held by the court in trust and that the debtor had "a
contingent reversionary interest as a potential beneficiary of the trust. " 191
The interest of the debtor in the deposit was not substantially different
from that of any debtor in property pledged to a secured creditor. The fact
that the Chapter XI petition was filed on the eve of the argument of the
appeals and that there was some question as to whether the deposit was
sufficient to protect the cross-appellant may have contributed to what
appears to have been an unduly strict reading of the rule.
Troublesome questions are presented by cases involving partners and
partnerships. It has been held that the filing of a petition by or against a
partner does not authorize the bankruptcy court to stay proceedings
against the partnership or to enforce liens against partnership property. 192
Although that ruling is consistent with traditional legal principles, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has more recently sustained an
injunction issued by a court in which a Chapter X petition was pending to
enjoin the continuation of a bankruptcy case commenced by two of the
general members of a partnership of which the Chapter X debtor was a
member . 193 Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the Chapter
X debtor arguably did not have title to the partnership assets, 194 the
debtor's interest in the partnership business was property within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the reorganization court under section 111 of the
Bankruptcy Act. That section, together with section 5d, long considered
only a venue provision of the partnership section, 195 enabled the court to
order the transfer of the partnership bankruptcy case to the court in which
the reorganization was pending. The decision antedated the promulgation
189
See Flintridge Station Assoc. v. American Fletcher Mtge. Co., 438 F. Supp. 410 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (adversary proceeding ordered to determine the question).
190
Mid-Jersey Nat'I Bank v. Fidelity Mtge. Investors, 518 F.2d 640, 643 (3d Cir. 1975).
191 Id. at 644.
192
Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 110 F.2d 169, 173 (1st Cir. 1940) (involving petition
filed by a member of a Puerto Rican Comunidad).
193
In re Imperial ·"400" National, Inc., 429 F.2d 671 (3d. Cir. 1970).
194
Id. at 678.
195
See Kennedy, A New Deal for Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 610,
624-25 (1960).
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of the automatic stay rules, 196 but it is doubtful that most courts regard
the automatic stay triggered by a petition by or against a partner to be
operative against proceedings by partnership creditors against the
partnership .197 On the other hand, if a creditor of the partner seeks
enforcement of a judgment or lien against the partner's interest in the
partnership, there is no reason why the automatic stay should not apply.
Still more problematical is the question whether the filing of a petition
by or against a partnership operates as a stay against acts and proceedings
to enforce liens against the property of the partners. It is an oversimplification to say that the Bankruptcy Act adopts an "entity theory" of
partnerships and therefore regards only the property owned, legally or
beneficially, for partnership purposes as belonging to the estate of a
partnership debtor. 198 The surplus of each general partner's property
remaining after payment of his individual debts must be added to the
partnership assets . 199 There is substantial case authority for requiring
partners of a bankrupt partnership to file schedules of their assets and
liabilities and to turn over an amount of their separate property equivalent
to the surplus that belongs to the partnership trustee. 200 Bankruptcy
Judge Norton recently found the automatic stay in a Chapter XII case
inoperative as to the separate property of the general members of the
partnership debtor but issued an injuction to restrain a secured creditor of
the partnership from proceeding to collect its claim from individual assets
of a general partner. 201 It is submitted that the automatic stay resulting
from the filing of a petition by or against a partnership should operate to
stay the enforcement of any judgment or lien against separate property of
the general partners, pending a determination by the bankruptcy court
that the enforcement does not affect the surplus belonging to the partnership estate. 202
Another troublesome question is whether the automatic stay rules for
cases under Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII preclude a setoff by a creditor

196
Rule I 16(c) now explicitly authorizes the kind of orders entered in the Imperial 400
case. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 116(c).
197
Although the petition in bankruptcy was filed "on behalf of the partnership" by two
members of the partnership, a petition by less than all the general partners seeking adjudication of a partnership is filed "against" rather than "by" the partnership. See Rule 105(b).
198
See e.g., Taylor v. Brodt, 396 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
199
§§ 5g and 67d(l)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.
200
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Fisher, 224 F. 97 (8th Cir. 1915); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 240 F.
Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kennedy, A New Dea/for Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM ..
L. REV. 610, 626-27 (1960). Rule 108(c) particularizes the scheduling duties of nonadjudicated partners respecting their assets and liabilities in the bankruptcy of a partnership.
201
/n re Helmwood Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1151, 1157, 1160 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1976). As
Judge Norton observed, id. at 1159, the Rules do not impose the same scheduling duties on
general partners of partnership debtors in Chapter XI and XII cases that apply to them in
straight bankruptcy cases. As a condition to the issuance of the injunction against a
proceeding by a partnership creditor to collect its claim from a partner, the partner was
required to file schedules of individual assets and liabilities. Id. at 1160.
202
Cf. Kennedy, A New Dea/for Partnerships in Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 610,
625-30 (1960).
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against an obligation owing by the creditor to the debtor. 203 Although a
bank's right of setoff is sometimes described as a lien or type of security
interest, 204 the better view is generally opposed to this categorization of
the right of setoff. 205 The fact that the automatic stay rules applicable in
Chapter VIII and IX cases 206 explicitly operate against setoff is persuasive evidence that the other stay rules are not intended to affect the right.
The automatic stay provided by section 362 of proposed Title 11 applies
explicitly to setoff. 207
Provisions in Chapters X and XII that specially protect particular
classes of secured creditors raise questions concerning the applicability of
Rules 10-601 and 12-43 to acts and proceedings to foreclose these protected security interests. Sections 263 and 517 provide that nothing in
Chapters X and XII shall affect or apply to creditors secured by mortgages insured under the National Housing Act. 208 The courts have regarded these sections as meaning exactly what they say. 209 If either Rule
10-601 or 12-43 should be deemed to apply because of the absence of any
exception for such a creditor, the court should grant prompt relief on
request by the creditor. On the other hand, a provision in section 517 that
precludes an application of Chapter XII "to allow extension or impair203
Rule 11-44 has been held to apply to a setoff. Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett
Bank & Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Ben Hyman & Co. v. Fulton Nat'!
Bank, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 145, 156-57 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 423 F. Supp. 1006
(N.D. Ga. 1976). Without determining the correctness of the ruling on the applicability of
Rule 11-44 to setoff, the court based its reversal in the latter case on three considerations: (I)
the bankruptcy judge had exceeded his power in ordering turnover of balances in the
debtor's bank account without providing any protection of the creditor's security; (2) the
Chapter XI case had in the meantime been converted into a straight bankruptcy case where
the right to setoff is generally available; and (3) the court's order punishing the bank creditor
for contempt was imposed without fair warning to the bank in view of the uncertainty in the
law concerning setoff in Chapter XI cases. 423 F. Supp. at 1010-11.
The applicability of the automatic stay of Rule 13-401 to setoffby a bank in a Chapter XIII
case was denied in In re Williams, 422 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Ga. 1976), but a court order
postponing setoff was nevertheless held to be valid and an adjudication of contempt based
on disregard of the order was sustained.
20
• See cases cited in note 203 supra; Batson v. Alexander City Bank, 179 Ala. 490, 497, 60
So. 313, 315 (1912); McStay Supply Co. v. Stoddard, 35 Nev. 284, 297, 132 P. 545, 548
(1913); cf. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 240 (1947) (referring to the
United States as "the best secured of creditors" because of its right of setoff against a
government contractor).
205
See Note, 38 HARV. L. REV. 800 (1925); Comment, 26 S.C. L. REV. 89, 109-112 (1974);
cf. Note, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150-53, 1156-57 (1975).
206
See Rules 8-50l(a) and 9-4(a). The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 8-501 explains
that setoff is made subject to the stay of the rule "[i]n light of the holding in Baker v. Gold
Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974), that 'as a general rule of administration for§ 77
Reorganization Courts, the setoff should not be allowed.' 417 U.S. at 474." The trustee's
ultimate right to payment of the outstanding obligation to the debtor is, of course, a matter of
substantive law not governed or affected by the rule.
207
§ 362(a)(7) of proposed Title 11, as set forth in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266. Section 362(b)(6)
of S. 2266, however, excludes from the stay a setoff in connection with certain commodity
futures transactions.
208
These provisions are discussed in 6A COLLIER ,I 15.04 (1977) and 9 id. ,I 14.02 (1976).
20
• See, e.g., Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1967)
(construing§ 263), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968); In re Bristol Hills Apts., 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 164 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1978) (construing§ 517). The Small Business Administrations is
not protected by § 263. United States v. Hollowell (In re Delta Food Processing Corp.), 446
F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1971).
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ment of any secured obligation" held by the Home Owners Loan Corporation or a Federal Home Loan Bank has been held not to prohibit a
temporary stay at the commencement of a Chapter XII case against
foreclosure by a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank. 210 Such a
court-ordered stay was held to be neither an extension nor an impairment
of a secured obligation within the prohibition of section 517, 211 and the
rationale fully sustains the applicability of the automatic stay to such a
foreclosure.
Section 770) and section 116(5) and (6), using language similar to the
first clause of sections 263 and 517, protect the interests of financers of
rolling stock equipment sold or leased to a debtor in a section 77 case,
aircraft and aircraft parts sold or leased to air carriers certified by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, and vessels acquired by water carriers certified
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 212 These provisions specify
that the "title of any owner, whether as trustee or otherwise," to the
categories of property referred to, and the right to take possession pursuant to a security agreement or lease, cannot be affected by the provisions of section 77 and Chapter X. Rule 8-50l(a) explicitly excepts from
the automatic stay in Chapter VIII cases the taking of possession of
rolling stock equipment by an "owner, as trustee, lessor, or otherwise."
No comparable exception is provided in Rule 10-60l(a). While the rule
apparently applies notwithstanding the categorical prohibitions of the
protective provisions of the Act, appropriate deference to the congressional policy decisions involved requires expeditious and forthright grant
of relief to any protected beneficiaries.

IV.

THE DURATION OF THE ST A y

Although there is considerable parallelism in the prov1s10ns of the
several rules governing the duration of a stay, there are some noteworthy
differences.
A. General Limitations
Subdivision (c) of each of the stay rules, except Rules 601 and 10-601,
annuls the stay as against any unscheduled creditor who has not filed a
claim within thirty days after the first date set for the first meeting of
creditors. 213 Every rule recognizes that the court may terminate the stay
in proceedings seeking relief pursuant to one of the subdivisions of the

210 In re Carousel Ltd. Partnership, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 760, 766 (Ref., N .D. Ga. 1977);
In re Hall Assoc., 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 290 (Ref., E.D. Poa. 1976); Clearwater Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Consolidated Motor Inns, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 301 (Ref., W.D. Ga. 1975).
211 In re Hall Associates, supra note 210, at 292.
212 For a discussion of§ 77(j) see 5 COLLIER 1177.12, at 518-19 (1964). For a discussion of
§ 116(5) and (6), see 6 COLLIER 1]1] 3.34A-348 (1977).
213
See discussion in text accompanying notes 114-116 supra.
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rule, and every rule terminates the stay on dismissal of the case. 214 Only
Rule 401 does not likewise terminate the stay when the case is closed,
thereby causing an unanticipated problem. 215 When a chapter case is
converted to bankruptcy, the broad stay prescribed by the chapter rule is
terminated, and the question whether the automatic stays prescribed by
Ru!es 401 and 601 then take effect must also be considered. 216 All the
rules that operate against enforcement of liens on property-that is, all
but Rule 401-terminate the stay when the property subject to the lien is
abandoned or transferred with the approval of the court, and Rule 601
also terminates a stay against lien enforcement when the property subject
to the lien is set apart as exempt. 217 Finally, the automatic stay provided
by Rule 401 terminates automatically if the bankrupt is denied his discharge or otherwise loses his right to a discharge.
B. Effect on Collection of Educational Loans

Since September 30, 1977, an individual indebted on an educational
loan insured or guaranteed under federal legislation is subject to a limitation when he seeks a discharge of the obligation under the Bankruptcy
Act. 218 The obligation is not dischargeable until at least five years have
intervened between the date repayment of the first installment is due and
the grant of the discharge. 219 The dual purpose evident here is to give the

214 The closing of a Chapter XI case effected by a final decree was held to terminate an
injunction entered pursuant to§ 314 of the Act against holders of nondischargeable claims.
In re Lieb Bros., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. N.J. 1961).
2 15 See Part IV B infra.
21• See Part IV C infra.
217
Since exemptions are not ordinarily set apart in chapter cases, a provision for termination of the stay in such cases was not deemed necessary. Moreover, the need of the debtor
for continuing use of exempt property during the pendency of the case-i.e., the continuing
occupancy of his homestead during the term of a Chapter XIII plan-seems a sufficient
warrant for extending the stay to exempt property until one of the other terminating events
occurs.
218
See statutes cited in note 132 supra.
219 This provision is similar to one originally proposed by the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part JI, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-506(a)(8) (1973). Under the
Commission proposal, five years must intervene between the due date of the first installment
and the filing of the petition in the case, whereas the legislation enacted in 1976 indicates that
the discharge can be granted whenever the five-year period has elapsed. Query, whether a
bankruptcy case in which the debtor could not obtain a discharge from the educational loan
obligation because of the five-year bar can be reopened after the lapse of the five-year period
to obtain a determination that the debt is now dischargeable? Rule 40'J(a)(I) and section
I 7c(6) authorize the reopening of a case for the purpose of obtaining a determination of
dischargeability and excuse the applicant from the payment of any filing fee. The Commission's proposal authorized the granting of a discharge within the five-year period if payment
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his dependents. The hardship provision
is incorporated in 90 Stat. 2141 (1976), supra note 132, but not in 90 Stat. 2262 (1976), supra
note 132.
Somewhat differing versions of section 523(a) (8) of Title 11, as set out in H.R. 8200 and S.
2266, both postpone dischargeability of an educational loan obligation unless at least five
years have intervened between the maturing of the first installment and the filing of the
petition commencing the debtor's case, and both contain provisions, again diverging in form
and content, to permit dischargeability of such an obligation if hardship would otherwise
result.
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debtor a five-year interval within which to pay, or to work out a plan to
pay, the matured obligation, and the creditor a like interval within which
to resort to collection procedures if necessary to stimulate or enforce
payment. 220 Unless perhaps the claim is being sued on by the federal
government, 221 the automatic stay of Rule 401 and any applicable chapter
stay rule operate against the commencement or continuation of any action
to collect the nondischargeable obligation. 222
Subdivision (b) of Rule 401, prescribing the duration of the stay, does
not provide for its termination on the closing of the case because at the
time of its promulgation there was no need for such a provision. 223 It
would be a stultifying construction of the Act and the Rules, however,
that would stay automatically any action or enforcement of a judgment on
an educational loan excepted from discharge after the close of the bankruptcy case. The purpose of the stay to protect the opportunity of the
debtor to assert his rights during the pendency of the bankruptcy case
would have been served, and the creditor should be unimpeded by any
stay in seeking the collection of the debt excepted from discharge. Since
extension of the automatic stay of Rule 401 beyond the closing is incompatible with the congressional policy embodied in the 1976 legislation
regarding the dischargeability of certain loan obligations, the courts
should treat the stay as terminated with respect to such loan obligations as
are not discharged when the case is closed. The suggested approach
makes it unnecessary to construe the word "dismissed" in Rule 40l(b) to
mean "closed" in order to reach a sensible result. Although dismissal
under the Act frequently includes the closing of a case after complete
administration, 224 the term as used in the Rules refers only to termination
220
See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 140 (1973) (§ 4-506(a)(8) n.16
o( the Bankruptcy Act of 1973 proposed by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States).
221
See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
222
The automatic stay of Rule 401 operates against the commencement or continuation of
any action, or the enforcement of any judgment, founded on an unsecured provable debt
unless it is excepted from discharge under § 17a(l), (5), (6), or (7).
223
When Rule 401(a) was promulgated in 1973, every contingency was provided for. With·
respect to dischargeable debts, the stay does not continue under subdivision (b) after the
bankrupt is denied a discharge, waives it, or otherwise loses it. If the discharge is granted,
the order of discharge is a statutory injunction against any action or use of process to collect
dischargeable debts; the statutory stay thus overlaps and may be deemed to supersede the
stay of Rule 401 with respect to such debts. With respect to nonprovable debts, secured
debts, and debts not dischargeable under§ 17a(l), (5), (6), or (7), the stay of Rule 401 never
becomes operative. With respect to debts not dischargeable under § 17a(4), the stay becomes inoperative after the lapse of 30 days after the first date set for the first meeting of
creditors except with respect to claims scheduled or filed before the end of the 30 day
period. The automatic stay terminates with respect to such scheduled or filed claims as if
they had been promptly scheduled. With respect to a debt not dischargeable under § 17a(2),
(3), or (8), a creditor must obtain a determination of dischargeability and an appropriate
order necessary for the enforcement of the debt pursuant to Rule 408. An exception to the
foregoing statement applies to a creditor who relies on § 17a(8) and who has demanded or
intends to demand ajury trial of the action on his claim in a nonbankruptcy court, but such a
creditor must obtain relief from the automatic stay to continue his action in a nonbankruptcy
court. If a bankruptcy case is dismissed without any grant or denial, waiver, or loss of the
right to discharge, the automatic stay does not continue as to any creditor under Rule 40i(b).
224
See, e.g., §§ 261, 367(4), 391, 516, and 676. See note 242 infra.
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prior to complete administration. 225 Circumspect counsel for the collector
should seek relief from the stay before suing the discharged obligor,
although it is inconceivable that in any clear case of nondischargeability
the collector would be subject to any sanction for proceeding after the
case is closed. Disregard of the stay after the closing of the case should at
least be excusable if the collector faced imminent lapse of the period of
limitations and obtaining relief from the stay was either not thought to be
required or would have resulted in prejudicial delay or other difficulties.

C. Effect of Conversion of a Case from One Chapter to Another
All the chapter stay rules terminate the stay when a chapter case is
converted to bankruptcy, and the assumption is commonly made that the
stays provided by Rules 401 and 601 become automatically and immediately effective. 226 The result is ordinarily a restriction on the reach of
the automatic stays theretofore in effect with respect to both in personam
actions 227 and lien enforcement, 228 but it is assumed that there is no
interlude between the operation of the stays against most in personam
actions and against enforcement of liens on property in the custody of the
court or liens vulnerable under section 67a of the Act. The conclusion that
the automatic stays do become effective on the conversion of a chapter
case to bankruptcy is, however, far from clear.
The automatic stays provided by Rules 401 and 601 arise only upon the
filing of a petition, and conversion of a chapter case to bankruptcy is not
conditional upon the filing of a petition. Statutory provisions like sections

225
See Rules 120 (Dismissal Without Determination of the Merits), 514 (Closing Cases),
10-117 (Conversion to Chapter XI), 10-308 (Dismissal or Conversion to Bankruptcy or
Chapter XI After Approval of the Petition), 11-42 (Dismissal or Conversion to Bankruptcy
Prior to or After Confirmation of Plan), 12-41 (Dismissal or Conversion to Bankruptcy Prior
to or After Confirmation of Plan), 13-112 (Dismissal or Conversion to Bankruptcy Without
Confirmation of Plan), and 13-215 (Dismissal or Conversion to Bankruptcy After Confirmation of Plan).
226
See, e.g., In re Stroderd, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 598, 602 (Ref., W.D. La. 1977); cf.
Shaffer v. Anderson, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 327, 333 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1977), where the
stay of Rule 401, assumed to be operative in a bankruptcy superseding a Chapter XIII case,
did not affect a claim and delivery action against the bankrupt because the plaintiff creditor
was secured and its claim was not scheduled until almost three months after the first meeting
of creditors.
227 Whereas the stay prescribed for a debtor relief case extends to actions and enforcement of judgments on nondischargeable as well as dischargeable claims and, except under
Rule 13-401, to nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings, Rule 401 limits the operation of
the automatic stay in straight bankruptcy cases to actions and enforcement of judgments on
unsecured provable debts and further excepts from the stay actions on debts that are not
dischargeable under § J7a(I), (5), (6), or (7) of the Act. Other differences in the scope of the
stay for different kinds of cases are summarized in the text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
They are further elaborated in Part III of this article.
228
Whereas the automatic stay prescribed for a debtor relief case extends to the enforcement of a lien against the property of the debtor, without regard to who has possession or
custody of the property and without regard to the nature of the lien, Rule 601 limits the
operation of the automatic stay to ()) property in the custody of the bankruptcy court or (2)
property subject to judicial liens obtained within four months of bankruptcy. These differences are further elaborated in Part III of this article.
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378, 483, and 667, which require a converted case to be conducted as if a
petition for adjudication had been filed, do not compel the conclusion that
rules making the filing of a petition operative as an automatic stay have
such an effect in a converted case. Rule 122, which governs the procedure
in bankruptcy cases converted from chapter cases, does not appear to
require automatic applicability of Rules 401 and 601 on conversion. A
construction making these rules immediately effective on conversion
raises questions about the effect in the converted case of a ruling that had
terminated, modified, or conditioned the automatic stay during the pendency of the chapter case. 229 Ordinarily, of course, if relief was granted
against a stay in a chapter case, the considerations that led to the court's
order would be even more cogent in the subsequent bankruptcy. When an
order of adjudication of bankruptcy is entered in a converted case, however, it behooves the court to particularize the scope of the stays intended
thereafter to be in effect, particularly when any order granting relief has
been entered in the superseded case.
A similar problem arises and a similar approach seems appropriate
when a case commenced under one chapter is converted to a case under
another chapter without the filing of a petition under the second chapter.
On the other hand, when a second petition is filed under a different
chapter, as expressly authorized by Rules 11-3, 12-3, and 13-104, there is
ordinarily no reason why the usual effect should not be given to the filing
of each petition. Where relief from the stay has been granted in the first
case, however, the court should be alert to prevent the abuse of its
processes through the filing of successive petitions with the purpose of
frustrating the relief previously granted.
D. Effect of the Stay on Statutes of Limitation

A critical question likely to arise in connection with an action on an
insured or guaranteed educational loan obligation and, to a lesser extent,
with any nondischargeable debt, is what effect the stay has on the running
ofthe statute of limitations. Section I lfofthe Act suspends the statute of
limitations affecting the provable debts of a bankrupt from the date of the
filing of the petition until thirty days after denial or loss of his right to
discharge or after the dismissal of the case. Unless dismissal as used in
section l If is construed to include the closing of a case, 230 the statute of
limitations arguably is suspended indefinitely when a discharge is granted
and the case is closed after full administration. A counter argument,
avoiding such an incongruous result, is that since the Act does not bar the
enforcement of a nondischargeable debt, the statute of limitations is not
suspended at all during the pendency of a bankruptcy case with respect to
229
Robert Greenfield, Esq., of the Los Angeles bar has reported to me a ruling by a
bankruptcy judge that the conversion of a chapter case to a bankruptcy case resulted in the
imposition of full-fledged stays under Rules 401 and (i()J, although relief had been granted
against a stay of a mortgage foreclosure in the superseded chapter case. Letter from Robert
Greenfield (Nov. 22, 1977).
230
See notes 224 supra and 242 infra.
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such a debt. That argument would at least have been persuasive prior to
the promulgation of Rule 401. 231 Since that rule went into effect, actions
on four categories of.debts-i .e., those excepted from discharge by subsections 17a(2), (3), (4), and (8)-are apparently stayed indefinitely when
the debtor gets a discharge and the case is closed rather than dismissed. 232
The problems respecting creditors with claims falling within these four
clauses turn out, however, to be of a quite limited character. A creditor
with a claim nondischargeable under section 17a(2), (4), or (8) must
ordinarily commence a proceeding in the bankruptcy court to obtain a
determination ofnondischargeability and ajudgment on his claim within a
limited time fixed by the court, which cannot be more than ninety days
after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors. Although the
allowability in bankruptcy of provable claims is not affected by the
interposition of the bar of the statute of limitations after the filing of the
petition, 233 that proposition does not necessarily entitle the creditor to file
a complaint seeking aj udgment on a claim that is nondischargeable. If the
petition by or against the bankrupt is filed on the eve of the expiration of
the statute of limitations for bringing an action on the creditor's nondischargeable claim, the time may run out before the creditor files a complaint. Since the stay should not be construed as a bar to the filing of a
complaint in the bankruptcy court, however, it does not create any
problem for creditors required to file timely complaints to preserve their
rights under section 17a(2), (4), and (8). Ordinarily there is thus no sound
reason for suspending the statute of limitations on the filing of a complaint
or the enforcement of a judgment on a claim nondischargeable under
section 17a(2), (4), or (8). The same conclusion applies a fortiori to action
on a claim not dischargeable under section 17a(]), (5), (6), or (7), since the
automatic stay of Rule 401 does not operate against such an action.
When the claim of the plaintiff is for willful and malicious injuries to the
person or property of the bankrupt other than conversion, the stay does
not operate against the commencement of any postpetition action, since
the claim is not provable. For the same reason, the pendency of a
bankruptcy petition by or against the tortfeasor does not suspend the
statute of limitations. The same observation pertains to any other non-

231
.
See 59 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1946); 31 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1946). Cf. J. MACLACHLAN,
BANKRUPTCY 90 (1956): "Where claims are not subject to stay, it would seem that there
should be no effect upon statutes of limitation, but there is no such express restriction upon
the suspension provision."
In Maier v. Meyers, 314 Mich. 471, 22 N.W. 2d 869 (1946), however, the court held the
statute of limitations to have been suspended during bankruptcy in respect to a claim
excepted from discharge by § 17a(2). The case was criticized in the two law review
comments cited supra. "A necessary corollary of the court's construction of§ 11(0 ... [was]
reading into that section a fourth provision for terminating the period of suspension, i.e., the
grant of a discharge." 59 HARV. L. REv. at 1158.
232
As pointed out in the discussion accompanying notes 219-22 supra, the 1976 legislation
postponing dischargeability of certain educational loan obligations added another category
of debts to which the automatic stay of Rule 401 applies, but a construction of the rule to
make the stay operative indefinitely against actions and judgments on such obligations
should be rejected. See text accompanying notes 223-25 supra.
233
See IA COLLIER ,r 11.14 (1974); 3A id. ,r 63.07(13] (1972).
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provable claim, except perhaps one that becomes nonprovable because
the court determines pursuant to section 57d that the claim cannot be
liquidated or reasonably estimated within the time available for expeditious administration of the estate. 234 When a creditor has a contingent or
unliquidated claim, he is nonetheless subject to the automatic stay unless
the claim is of a kind not dischargeable under section 17a(l), (5), (6), or
(7). A creditor should not be permitted to determine, with or without his
debtor's concurrence, that his claim is too difficult to liquidate to be
allowable under section 57d and provable under section 63d and that he is
therefore free to sue the bankrupt without regard to the stay. If, after the
creditor has filed a proof of claim not excepted from discharge under
section 17a, the court determines pursuant to sections 57d and 63d that it
is nonallowable and nonprovable, such a determination ought to be tantamount to an annulment of the stay, whether or not its ruling on the claim
makes reference to the stay. It is arguable that the statute of limitations
ought to be tolled during the interim between the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy and a disallowance of the claim under the proviso to section
57d. 235 The instances of potential prejudice to creditors resulting from the
interrelation of sections 1lf, 57d, and 63d of the Act with Rule 401 are
likely to be rare, however, and would disappear under the proposed
bankruptcy legislation, which eliminates difficulty of liquidation as a
ground for disallowance and dispenses with the concept of provability
altogether. 236
Action on a claim that is neither scheduled nor filed before the lapse of
thirty days after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors is not
subject to the automatic stay .237 The temporary effectiveness of the stay,
if the claim is otherwise dischargeable, is annulled by Rule 401(c) and can
therefore be disregarded. There is thus no reason for suspension of the
statute of limitations applicable to action on such a claim. A special
problem may arise with respect to a claim scheduled or filed within the
thirty-day period. Notwithstanding the scheduling or filing, the court may
determine that the claim is nondischargeable because the creditor did not
have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the creditors' meeting. 238
A creditor relying on section 17a(3) is not required to seek a determination ofnondischargeability during the pendency of the bankruptcy case or
prior to any particular date. If the bankrupt is discharged, the automatic
stay continues with respect to an action by the creditor who filed during

234

See 3 COLLIER, ,i 57.15 (1974).
Cf. Maier v. Meyers, 314 Mich. 471, 22 N.W.2d 869 (1946), cited in note 231 supra,
where court held the statute of limitations suspended during bankruptcy in respect to an
action on a nondischargeable claim.
236
See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No.
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1977), discussing proposed 11 U.S.C. § 502(c), as set out
in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266.
237
Rule 401(c).
238
If scheduling of his claim and knowledge of a pending bankruptcy of his debtor come to
a creditor too late for him to participate meaningfully in the bankruptcy case, the creditor's
claim may be excepted from the debtor's discharge. Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 195 U.S.
345, 350 (1904).
235
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the thirty-day period, unless the court modifies its operation. There may
thus be an extended interval during which the creditor remains subject to
the stay, and in such a situation the creditor may contend that the statute
of limitations applicable to an action on his claim was tolled during the
interval. In view of the availability to the creditor, during the pendency of
the case and thereafter, of a determination by the bankruptcy court of the
dischargeability of his claim and of a judgment against the debtor on his
nondischargeable claim, there appears to be no reason for suspending the
statute of limitations in such a situation.
The argument against suspension of the st2tute of limitations to actions
on nondischargeable claims is subject to the criticism that it ignores, or at
least discounts, the fact that section l lf suspends the statute of limitations
"affecting the debts of a bankrupt provable under this Act" whether
dischargeable or not. The apparent irrelevance of nondischargeability
under this subdivision is belied, however, by the fact that denial, waiver,
or loss of discharge by a bankrupt triggers termination of the suspension
under section l lf(l) thirty days after the discharge issue is settled against
the bankrupt. As earlier suggested, it attributes irrationality to Congress
to construe section l lf to suspend all statutes of limitation indefinitely
when a discharge is granted. Such a construction would mean that while a
bankrupt denied a discharge could at least invoke statutes of)imitation
when sued on nondischargeable as well as dischargeable claims, a discharged bankrupt would never be able to invoke the statute of limitations
when sued on a debt excepted from discharge. It does not make the
scheme of section l lf intelligible to read clause (3) to terminate the
suspension with respect to nondischargeable claims thirty days after the
case is closed when a discharge has been granted. That reading inexplicably gives creditors holding nondischargeable claims against a discharged
bankrupt the benefit of a suspension of the limitations during the entire
period of the pendency of the bankruptcy case plus thirty days, whereas
creditors holding such claims against a bankrupt denied discharge get the
benefit of a suspension for a period lapsing thirty days after the denial,
waiver, or loss of discharge. The argument made in this section of the
article for not suspending the statute of limitations as to actions on
nondischargeable claims in straight bankruptcy gives effect to the policies
implicit in section I If and avoids anomalous results when Rule 401 is
applied to creditors holding nondischargeable claims. 239
· What of the effect of the automatic stay on the statute of limitations that
applies to actions to enforce liens? There are more ways in which a stay
may be terminated under Rule 601 than under Rule 401, 240 and there is
thus less likelihood of prejudice to the creditor resulting from operation of
239

The argument has been supported elsewhere. See note 231 supra.
Both Rule 401 and Rule 601 recognize that the court may terminate or otherwise
modify the automatic stay by appropriate action on a request. Rule 401 continues the
automatic stay, if not so modified, until dismissal or denial or loss of the right to discharge.
Rule 601, however, provides for termination of the stay of lien enforcement on dismissal or
closing of the case or on disposition of the property subject to the lien by transfer,
abandonment, or setting apart as exempt.
240
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a statute of limitations. The stay of Rule 601 is an effective bar for its
duration to the enforcement ofliens against property in the custody of the
court and of judicial liens against property obtained within four months of
bankruptcy. The effect of the automatic stay against the enforcement of
liens on the statute of limitations is of course entirely analogous to the
effect of an injunction issued by the court against such enforcement.
Although the issuance of such injunctions has traditionally been routine
and the applicability of statutes of limitations to nonjudicial enforcement
of liens is unclear, problems involving application of the statute of limitations to lien enforcement after bankruptcy of the debtor have seldom
arisen.
Since the stay does not prevent the debtor from bringing any action, it
cannot have any effect on the statutes of limitations that apply to his
causes of action. If, however, the stay leads to the dismissal of an action
against a debtor, including a pending counterclaim filed by the debtor, the
debtor may be left remediless because of the intervention of the statute of
limitations. 2 41
The breadth of the automatic stay in chapter cases has not generated
difficulties with the statute of limitations because the suspension of the
statute of limitations in chapter cases is correspondingly broad. 242 The
proposed bankruptcy legislation pending in Congress provides for a comprehensive stay in straight bankruptcy as well as debtor relief cases, but
there is no suspension of any statute of limitations applicable to an action
on a claim subject to the stay. The creditor or other person subject to the
stay is nevertheless allowed at least thirty days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay for commencing an action that becomes
barred by the statute of limitation during the operation of the stay.

V.

RELIEF FROM THE STAY

A. Procedure
1. Pleadings-Relief from an automatic stay may be sought by filing a
complaint with the bankruptcy court, 243 which commences an adversary
241
See First Wisconsin Nat'I Bank of Milwaukee v. Grandlich Dev. Corp., 565 F.2d 879,
880 (5th Cir. 1978).
242
Sections 261, 391, 516, and 676 of the Act suspend all statutes of limitation affecting
claims provable under Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII. The suspension is effective during the
pendency of a case under each chapter and until it is finally dismissed. Dismissal in this
context includes closing by a final decree after confirmation and consummation of a plan.
There are no comparable provisions in Chapters VIII and IX. Sections 261, 391, 516, and 676
are discussed in 6A COLLIER ,i 15.02 (1977); 9 id. ,i 12.01 ( 1975); 9 id. ,i 14.01 (1976); and JO
id. ,i 32.01 (1974).
While the court acknowledged the proposition stated in the text in Willis v. Gladding
Corp., 567 F2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1978), it referred to possible "statute of limitations
questions" that might arise if it did not vacate a dismissal of an action pending against a
Chapter XI debtor.
243
Bankr. Rule 701(6).
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proceeding. 244 Adversary proceedings are governed by the rules in Part
VII of the Bankruptcy Rules, 245 which are adaptations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 246 The principal differences are found in Rules
704 and 712. Rule 704 requires the bankruptcy judge to set a date for trial
or for a pretrial conference upon the commencement of an adversary
proceeding. The rule then directs that a summons and notice of the trial or
pretrial conference be issued without delay. The court is required, however, to set the trial of the issues on a complaint seeking relief from a stay
for the earliest possible time, and "it shall take precedence over all
matters except older matters of the same character. " 247 Rule 712 allows

244
Bankr. Rule 703. It has been suggested that the practice previous to the promulgation
of the Rules was for the hearing on continuation of a stay to be brought on by a motion. C. I.
Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 387, 389-90 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1975) (suggesting that a complaint seeking relief for a stay is "a fit aspect of
ordinary motion practice and not of a plenary suit"); Peitzman & Smith, supra note 3, at
1242-43. The practice prior to the promulgation of the Rules was not comparable because,
except in Chapter XII cases, when an automatic stay became operative on the filing of the
petition, the debtor or other party in interest had to take the initiative to obtain a stay.
2 4 5 Bankr. Rules 701-782.
246
Many of the rules in Part VII incorporate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
reference, and the numbering of the rules in Part VII is correlated with the numbering of the
Federal Rules. Thus, Bankruptcy Rule 703 adapts and corresponds to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 3.
Rules 8, 9, and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to the pleadings
filed in an adversary proceeding by virtue of the incorporation of those rules by reference in
Bankruptcy Rules 708, 709, and 710. It has been suggested that a secured creditor should
"include the same detail in a complaint to vacate a stay in a typical foreclosure complaint."
Werth & Reed, The Chapter XI Stay Order and the Secured Creditor, 38 Omo ST. L.J. 33,
36 (1977).
247
While the court may set a date for a pretrial conference, the party seeking relief under
the stay rules should not ordinarily be subjected to the delay incident to a pretrial conference. Cf. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.
1977), where the bankruptcy judge, promptly after the filing of a Chapter XII petition,
determined that a first mortgage was partially unsecured for classification purposes under
Rule 12-31(b); the district court of appeal terminated the automatic stay of Rule 12-43, and
the court of appeals on review reversed, in part because the bankruptcy judge's determination was made in a pretrial hearing and in part because the finding of no equity rested on a
"liquidation" rather than "going concern" value.
In Associated Midwest, Inc. v. White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Mich.
1978), the bankruptcy judge permitted a Chapter XI debtor unlimited discovery and adjourned hearings on pretrial motions and pretrial conferences. As a result no date for a
hearing on the secured creditor's complaint seeking relief from the automatic stay of its
pending mortgage foreclosure had been set, although seven and one-half months had
intervened since the filing of the complaint. The district court, on appeal by the mortgagee
from rulings on several motions, reversed the bankruptcy court for its failure to conduct a
hearing at the earliest possible date on the complaint of relief from the stay. The district
court directed the bankruptcy court to allow the mortgagee to introduce "relevant evidence
on the sole issue of whether the property in question is essential to the rehabilitation of the
debtor or to the liquidation of the debtor's estate." Id. at 1346. After giving instructions to
the bankruptcy judge as to the factual and legal issues to be determined, the evidence to be
allowed, and possible dispositions of the proceeding, the district court refrained from
dictating the remedy to be formulated by the bankruptcy judge. Id. Other aspects of the case
are discussed at notes 269, 271, 276, 334, and 387 infra.
It has been suggested that the requirement that precedence be given the trial of the issues
in a proceeding to obtain relief from a stay may be unrealistic and more honored in the
breach than in the performance. Miller, The Automatic Stay in Chapter XI Cases-A
Catalyst for Rehabilitation or an Abuse of Creditors' Rights?, 94 BANKING L.J. 676, 704-05
(1977). Section 362(e) of proposed Title II attempts to deal with this problem by putting a
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the defendant thirty days for serving his answer after the issuance of the
summons, but Rule 906 authorizes the court to reduce that time for cause
shown.
2. Standing of a Secured Creditor in a Chapter XIII Case-There is a
restriction on the standing of a party to seek relief from a stay in a Chapter
XIII case that does not apply in a case under any other chapter. The clear
implication of the chapter stay rules other than Rule 13-401 is that any
party aggrieved by the stay may have standing to challenge it. Under Rule
13-401, however, only "a creditor who has timely filed his claim or who is
secured by an estate in real property or chattels real" is recognized as an
appropriate plaintiff entitled to seek relief from the stay. Thus, a creditor
secured by personal property of a Chapter XIII debtor must file a claim in
order to proceed to enforce his security interest. Moreover, according to
Rule l3-302(e), the secured creditor must file his secured claim before the
conclusion of the first meeting of creditors if he wishes to preserve his
status as a secured creditor, although the court may grant an extension or
allow a later filing. An unsecured creditor must likewise timely file his
claim-that is, within six months after the first date set for the first
meeting of creditors-in order to be qualified to file a complaint seeking
relief from a stay under Rule 13-40 l.
Arguably, a person who is neither a secured nor an unsecured creditor
has no standing to file a complaint seeking relief from a stay, but so
drastic a reading of Rule 13-401 is neither compelled nor persuasive.
Consider, for example, a partition suit in which the Chapter XIII debtor is
one of many holders of undivided interests and which has progressed
nearly to a successful conclusion in state court when the Chapter XIII
petition is filed. The automatic stay clearly bars the continuance of the
action against the debtor, but it would be stultifying to deny the other
parties to the partition action standing to seek relief from the stay in the
bankruptcy court.
If the secured creditor is a pledgee, the stay is nevertheless operative
and the claim-filing requirement of Rule l3-40l(d) applies. The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction of the property notwithstanding
the possession of the secured creditor. Like Chapter XI, Chapter XIII
contains no statutory authority for the issuance of a turnover order to a
lienor in possession, and the court's power to issue such an order under
Chapter XIII is even more questionable than under Chapter XI. An
argument can be made under either chapter, however, that if the debtor's
possession of the collateral is necessary to the performance of a plan of
rehabilitation and if the secured creditor's interest in the collateral can be
adequately protected, the court may issue an appropriate order to obtain
such possession. 248 This argument, however, is not implied from the stay

time limit on the effect of the automatic stay once a request for relief has been made unless
the court continues the stay after notice and hearing. See H.R. REP. No. 95-295, 95th Cong.,
Isl Sess. 175, 344 (1977).
248
See Countryman, Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349,
351-54 (1977). See also note 185 supra.
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rule in either a Chapter XI or a Chapter XIII case. 249
3. Ex Parte Relief-The rules governing stays of action and acts to
enforce liens recognize that immediate relief may be warranted without
notice to the adverse party. Such relief may be granted ex parte under
most of the Rules on a showing by sworn allegations that "immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff' before a
hearing can be held. 250 The plaintiff must, however, disclose the efforts
made to give notice and the reason it should not be required. If ex parte
relief is obtained, the plaintiff is obliged to give prompt notice to the
trustee or receiver or, if neither of these officers has qualified, to the
petitioner. Reinstatement of a stay terminated or modified without notice
may be sought by motion made on two days' notice or, if the court so
orders, on shorter notice. The court is required to proceed to hear and
determine the motion for reinstatement "as expeditiously as the ends of
justice require." The procedure applicable in proceedings to obtain ex
parte relief from a stay is patterned on that governing the issuance of a
temporary restraining order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is no ten-day limit on the effectiveness of an order granting relief
from the stay, however, as there is for a temporary restraining order.
4. Burden of Pleading and Proof-All the stay rules authorize the court·
"for cause shown" to terminate, annul, modify, or condition the stay.
The rules require a party seeking continuation of any stay against lien
enforcement, however, to show that he is entitled to the extension of the
protection. 251 It is not easy to reconcile the requirement of a showing of
cause for modification of the stay with the requirement of a showing of
entitlement for its continuation. It has been suggested that the burden of
proof rests on the party seeking continuation of the stay, whether or not
lien enforcement is involved. 252 The legislative developments reflected in
the amendments of the Bankruptcy Act from 1960 to 1970, 253 however,

rn CJ. First Nat'! Bank v. OvennyerCo .• IO Collier Bankr. Cas. 389, 395 (Ref., S.D.N.Y.
1976), where a Chapter XI debtor interposed a counterclaim unrelated to a pledgee's claim
for relief from the automatic stay.
250
Rules 601(d)(I), 8-50I(d)(I), I0-60I(d)(I), I 1-44(e)(I), 12-43(e)(I), and 13-401(e)(I). The
provisions of the debtor relief stay rules authorize ex parte relief not only against the
commencement or continuation of rehabilitation or liquidation proceedings.
251
The following provision appears as the last sentence of Rules 60I(c), 8-50I(c), I060I(c), I I-44(d), 12-43(d), and 13-401(d): "A party seeking continuation of a stay against lien
enforcement shall show that he is entitled thereto." Rule 9-4(c) requires a party seeking
continuation of a stay against any proceeding or act in a Chapter IX case to show his
entitlement.
252
See Miller, supra note 247, at 706 n.88. The suggestion was made in the context of the
stay in Chapter XI cases, but if silence in Rule 11-44 means, contrary to the usual canons of
statutory construction, that the burden is similarly placed in both in personam and lien
enforcement cases under Chapter XI, the same construction arguably should be given to the
other stay rules. In re Zeckendorf, 326 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), was cited for the
proposition that, in a case antedating the Rules, the burden was on the debtor to justify
continuation of relief from a stay of an in personam action, and the Rules, it was argued,
were not intended to·enlarge or modify substantive rights. The answer to the latter suggestion is that allocation of the burden of proof is generally procedural, not substantive. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 133 (1971). The Zeckendorf case is
abstracted and further discussed in note 255 infra.
253
See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
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support the view that the burden of proof as well as the initiative should
rest on the party seeking relief from the stay against in personam actions
of the kinds mentioned in Rule 40l(a). As pointed out in the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 401, "facts providing ajustification for modifying the stay will ordinarily be more easily provable by the creditor than
disprovable by the bankrupt." In any event, the Bankruptcy Rules leave
to the courts, except in Chapter IX cases, 254 the allocation of the burden
of proof as well as the burden of going forward with the evidence in a
proceeding to obtain relief from a stay of in personam actions. 255
The provision requiring the lienor to show cause may be given effect if
the party seeking relief is first required to allege and prove, or offer to
prove, a prima facie case. The burden of proof, then, by virtue of the last
sentence of the subdivision authorizing relief, 256 falls on the debtor or
other party seeking continuation of the stay to overcome the prima facie
case. 257 The ultimate burden of persuasion is apparently placed on the
defendant, the provision requiring a showing of cause serving only to fix
the lienor's initial burden of pleading and going forward with the evidence.258 The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in the adversary proceeding initiated by the complaint, 259 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
govern discovery, subject to minor adaptations. 260
5. Counterclaims-Whether a creditor who files a complaint seeking
relief from an automatic stay should be required to respond to a counterclaim filed by the trustee, receiver, or debtor is governed by Rule 713.
Rule 713, an adaptation of Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, protects a party sued by a trustee or receiver in an adversary
proceeding from being required to state a compulsory counterclaim-that
254

Rule 9-4(c). See note 251 supra.
Cf. In re l.eckendorf, 326 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court in theZeckendorf
case, District Judge Frankel, criticized Referee Herzog for placing the burden of demonstration and persuasion on the creditors to obtain modifications of a stay of an action. The
action, brought nearly four months before the debtor filed a Chapter XI petition, charged
violations of§ IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970),
and S.E.C. Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. IOb-5. There were numerous plaintiffs and defendants, and the action had been pending in the district court for nearly three years when
District Judge Frankel delivered his ruling vacating an injunction entered by the referee
pursuant to§ 314. In the meantime, many motions and notices had been filed, a hearing had
been held, and discovery procedures had been pursued in the litigation. The facts presented
an appropriate case for the grant of relief ordered by the court, with directions to the referee
to modify the restraining order to protect the debtor against the entry of a judgment until the
issues of dischargeability had been resolved. 326 F. Supp. at 185. The opinion and rulings
are entirely consistent with Rule 11-44.
256
See note 251 supra.
257 See, e.g., Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp., 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 192, 203 (Ref.,
S.D. Cal. 1975); Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 715,
717 (Ref., D. Me. 1976); Bateman Fin. Corp. v. Glanville Mortgage Co., 5 Bankr. Cas. 488,
491 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1975); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 657, 662-63 (Ref., D. D.C. 1974).
258 See C.i. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146, 149,
155 (Ref., S.D.N .Y. 1977); cf. First Nat') Bank v. Overmyer Co., 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 389
(Ref., S.D.N. Y. 1976) (burden of proof said to shift to debtor when secured creditor showed
that stay resulted in erosion of collateral, thereby causing irreparable damage).
259
See Rule 917.
260
See Rules 726-737.
255
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is, one arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the trustee's or receiver's claim. Since Rule 13 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is otherwise generally applicable in adversary
proceedings, the trustee, receiver, or debtor appears to be subject to the
compulsory counterclaim rule when a creditor or other party in interest
seeks relief from an automatic stay. 261 This result is consistent with that
reached by the courts prior to the promulgation of the Bankruptcy
Rules. 262 As the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 713
points out, however, a rigid application of the compulsory counterclaim
rule against the trustee, receiver, or debtor may defeat the objective of the
rules to facilitate a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of litigation. Thus, if the filing of a complaint seeking relief from a stay against
lien enforcement required the answer to include all claims the trustee,
receiver, or debtor may have against the lienor under the avoidance
sections, he would typically be obliged to ask for an extension of the time
for filing a responsive pleading. Indeed, in most bankruptcy cases, the
trustee would not have been appointed or elected when the court would
be called upon to continue or to grant relief against the stay. Moreover,
the trial of the issues presented by a counterclaim would be likely to
require a pretrial conference, discovery, and an extended trial of issues on
the merits.
If the trustee, receiver, or debtor does file a counterclaim, has the party
seeking relief from the stay submitted to the jurisdiction of the court to
determine the counterclaim? Neither the stay rules nor the rules governing counterclaims extend the scope of the summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court to determine the controversy raised by a counterclaim, 263 but, according to conventional principles of federal jurisdiction, the court would have jurisdiction unless the counterclaim is permissive only. 264 There are, however, at least three issues that complicate the
application of these conventional principles. First, do the complaint seeking only relief from an automatic stay against lien enforcement and the
counterclaim seeking avoidance of the lien present claims arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence? Second, should a party required to
come into the bankruptcy court in order to get relief from an automatic
stay prescribed by a Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure be subjected to the
further obligation of defending himself against a counterclaim filed in a
forum that was not his choice? Third, should the determination of the
issues raised by a complaint seeking relief from an automatic stay be
261
Rule 713(3) protects the trustee, receiver, or debtor against imposition of the usual bar
when he fails to file a compulsory counterclaim in his answer as a result of oversight,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The omitted counterclaim may be set up later by
amendment, by commencing a new adversary proceeding, or by the filing of a plenary action
in a nonbankruptcy court.
262
The relevant case law with citations is set out in the Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 713.
263
See Kennedy, Overview in BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE 11
(Lempert ed. 1974).
264
3]. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 13.19[1] (2d ed. 1972); Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 73, 76 (1962).
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complicated and delayed by consideration and resolution of issues concerning the validity of the plaintiffs underlying claim?
(a). Compulsoriness of the Counterclaim-It has been held that a
complaint seeking relief from a stay does not even state a claim, as that
term is used in the rules governing counterclaims, and thus cannot provide a basis for the assertion of a counterclaim. 265 The view of the courts
rejecting the standing of the defendant to plead a counterclaim is predicated on the defensive character of the plaintiffs complaint requesting
relief from the stay. Every complaint filed under the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, as under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, must, however, state a claim for relief or be subject to dismissal. 266
If a party stayed from enforcing a claim seeks relief from the stay, it
might appear that the party defending the stay should be able to challenge
the validity of the claim and that his attack has a sufficiently close
relationship to the plaintiffs claim to warrant categorization as a compulsory counterclaim. 267 When a plaintiff seeks relief from a stay of the
prosecution or enforcement of his claim, however, there are at least two
related but different claims to be considered, namely, the claim the
plaintiff is being stayed from pursuing and the claim for relief from the
stay imposed by the rules. When the defendant opposes the complaint
seeking relief from the stay by attacking the validity of the underlying
claim being pursued by the plaintiff, the counterclaim does not arise out of
the same subject matter as the plaintiffs claim. 268 The transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim for relief is the
stay of the action, proceeding, or nonjudicial act, not the underlying claim
he is seeking to enforce. 269 It may be appropriate for the defendant to
265 See Krause v. Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. co. v. Marrietta Cobb Apts. Co., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 720, 727
(Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977); C.l. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., I Bankr. Ct. Dec.
923, 924-25, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 387, 391 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Tamasha Town
& Country Club v. McAlester Constr. Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 80, 87 (S.D. Cal. 1966), where·
the court rejected summary jurisdiction of a counterclaim against a secured creditor in a
Chapter XI case because he was not asserting a "claim" against the estate, even though the
creditor had sought dissolution of an injunction, reclamation of its collateral, adjudication of
the debtor as a bankrupt, an accounting and posting of a bond -by the debtor, and an
examination of the debtor!
266
See 13 COLLIER ,i 708.03[2] (1977); 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i 8.13 (2d ed.
1962).
267
Several tests have been employed by the courts in determining whether a counterclaim
should be categorized as compulsory: (I) whether the issues of law and fact raised by the
claim and counterclaim are largely the same; (2) whether judgment on the plaintiff's claim
will be res judicata of the defendant's counterclaim; (3) whether trial of the plaintiffs and
defendant's claims will require substantially the same evidence; and (4) whether the plaintiff's and defendant's claims have a logical relationship to each other. 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE § 1410 (1971).
268
See, e.g .. First Nat'I Bank v. Overmyer Co., 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 389, 394 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1976); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., 4 COLLIER Bankr. Cas.
387, 391 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1975).
269
The claim of the creditor is the right to sue or act outside the bankruptcy court,
whereas the trustee's, receiver's, or debtor's claim is the right to postpone the creditor's
action or act. Cf. Associated Midwest, Inc. v. White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342,
1346 (E. D. Mich. 1978), where the court, in directing the exclusion of evidence relating to a
counterclaim, unduly narrowed the issue raised by a complaint filed under Rule 11-44 to the
~ssentiality of the property in question. See also notes 271 and 276 infra.
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present a counterclaim that goes to the merits of the claim the plaintiff is
precluded by the stay from enforcing, but such a counterclaim often will
be permissive and presents different jurisdictional considerations. 269 "
(b). Inappropriateness of Hinging Jurisdiction and Venue on the Stay
Ru/es-Notwithstanding the relationship between the creditor's claim for
relief from an injunction issued by a bankruptcy court or from an automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Rules and the defendant's counterclaim challenging the merits of the stayed claim, there is good reason
not to regard them as so related as to compel the defendant to present
such a counterclaim. Otherwise, the grant of injunctive powers to the
bankruptcy court and the automatic stay rules could become means for
enlarging the jurisdiction of the court to embrace all the issues in the
litigation subject to irtjunction or stay. The purposes underlying the injunctive provisions of the Act and the automatic stay rules do not require
that all litigation against the debtor be forced into the bankruptcy court.
Thus, where the stay operates against a secured creditor in possession
of the collateral or against an unsecured creditor who is or may be liable
to the trustee, receiver, or debtor, the creditor may generally remain aloof
from the proceedings in the bankruptcy court if he does not wish to
contest the stay or to seek relief from the bankruptcy court. Prior to the
Bankruptcy Rules, except where the Bankruptcy Act imposed an automatic stay in a Chapter X or a Chapter XII case, 270 the trustee, receiver, or
debtor had to take the initiative to obtain a stay or an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of an action by a creditor or other
adversary in another court. The grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
court to ertjoin an action pending in another court does not carry with it
ancillary jurisdiction to determine the validity of the claim sued on in the
action stayed. 271 Unless there is an independent ground for summary
269
" Cf. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
720, 7r7 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977).
210
By § 148 in a Chapter X case and§§ 428 and 507 in a Chapter XII case. See notes 32-33
and accompanying text supra.
271
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Delaney, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 315, 318 (5th Cir.
1976); Associated Midwest, Inc. v. White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); cf. Rubin v. Virgin Islands Refinery (In re Co-Build Companies, Inc.), 408 F.
Supp. 717, 721 (D. P.R. 1976) (ruling that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction in a
Chapter XI case to stay litigation on a contract debt between the debtor and an adversary
party unless the court had constructive possession of the debt).
In the White Birch Park case, a Chapter XI debtor had counterclaimed on grounds offraud
and usury against a secured creditor who had sought relief from the stay of its pending
mortgage foreclosure action. The district court, in reviewing several rulings of the bankruptcy judge, held that the bankruptcy court was without power to grant relief to the debtor
on its counterclaim. Unfortunately, the district court rested its ruling on the lack of power of
a Chapter XI court to affect the claims of secured creditors. If the court in which the
foreclosure was pending had not acquired prior custody, it is clear that the bankruptcy court
could have avoided the mortgagee's security interest for fraud and usury. 2 COLLIER
1J 23,04[2] (1974); 8 id. 1J 6.32 [7]-[7.5] (1974); J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY§§ 339-40 (1956).
The fact that the court in which the foreclosure was pending may have acquired prior
custody raises a question as to the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to determine controversies respecting the property, but in view of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor's property conferred on the bankruptcy court by § 311, that court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the mortgages notwithstanding the pendency of the foreclosure
action in another court. See 8 COLLIER ,i 3.02 (1974). It is another question whether the

WINTER

1978)

Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy

231

jurisdiction of a claim against the adversary, the trustee, receiver, or
debtor cannot join such a claim in a complaint seeking an injunction.
Accordingly, when a party subject to an injunction seeks relief from it, the
trustee, receiver, or debtor cannot, by challenging the merits of the
adversary's underlying claim, force litigation of these issues in the bankruptcy court instead of the court where the enjoined action is pending or
may be brought. If the imposition of the automatic stay by the Rules
should be construed to enable the bankruptcy court to exercise jurisdiction over a counterclaim filed against a party seeking relief from the stay,
the rule would have the result of extending the summary jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court.
Whether or not the Bankruptcy Rules could have extended the scope of
the summary jurisdiction, they were not drafted with that end in view. 272
To decline jurisdiction of a counterclaim against one who is seeking relief
from a stay avoids not only an objectionable use of the Rules to expand
the court's jurisdiction but also the criticism that the Rules have taken the
choice of forum for the counterclaim from the creditor or other adversary
party and given it to the trustee, receiver, or debtor. 273 A similar result
did not seem to bother the Supreme Court in Katchen v. Landy, 274 where
the trustee was allowed to prosecute in the bankruptcy court a counterclaim for surrender of voidable preferences against a creditor who had
bankruptcy court should, as a matter of wise judicial administration, relegate the debtor to
his remedy in the foreclosing court.
272
See the Advisory Committee's Introductory Note to the Preliminary Draft of the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rules 701 and 928; cf.
Krause v. Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112, 1115-116 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (quoting and
emphasizing Rule 928, which declares that the rules "shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy over subject matter"). Frequent comments are
nevertheless encountered suggesting that the Rules have broadened or strengthened the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., In re Caribbean Food Prod., Inc., v. Banco
Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 358, 360 (D. P.R. 1977), affd, 575 F.2d
961 ()st Cir. 1978); White Birch Park, Inc. v. Consumers Power Co., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas.
412, 416 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1977) ("it is well-settled that the recent Bankruptcy Rules have
influenced the courts broadening jurisdiction").
273
See Krause v. Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
where the debtor had raised usury as an affirmative defense in a mortgage foreclosure action
pending in state court and thereafter, in a subsequently filed Cha-pter XII case, stated a
counterclaim alleging usury and a number of other causes of action in opposition to the
mortgagee's complaint seeking relief from the automatic stay; cf. Henkin v. United States,
229 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1956), where the United States was held not to have consented to
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to determine the validity if its lien by seeking vacation of
a stay against its foreclosure; In re Oceana Internal'!, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 956, 960
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), where the court rejected a claim that a bank's request for authority to
foreclose a'security interest in property in the court's custody was a consent to the court's
jurisdiction of a controversy respecting the property after the foreclosure sale; Tamasha
Town & Country Club v. McAlester Constr. Fin. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 80, 87 (S.D. Cal.
1966), where the court rejected a contention that a mortgagee had submitted to summary
jurisdiction by seeking dissolution of an injunction against its foreclosure. The courts in the
last two cited cases emphasized the defensive character of the secured creditor's requests
for relief. See also note 265 supra.
In In re The All American Burger, Inc., 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 748 (Ref., C.D. Cal. 1976),
the court rejected an argument of the debtor that the filing of a complaint for relief from a
stay constituted a general consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to determine an
unrelated controversy between the parties.
274
382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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filed a claim there and who had no alternative forum. The Court found a
specific congressional intention to make the allowance of a creditor's
claim conditional upon summary determination and avoidance of any
voidable transfer to the creditor, but it is not clear that the considerations
underlying Katchen v. Landy support jurisdiction of a counterclaim
against a party seeking relief from a stay prescribed by the Bankruptcy
Rules.
(c). Need for Expeditious Determination of Need for Relief from
Stay-The stay rules contain several safeguards against the risk of undue
delay in the consideration and disposition of a complaint seeking relief
from the stay. They include the requirement that the trial of the issues
presented by such a complaint and its answer be set for the earliest
possible date. If "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the plaintiff before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard
in opposition," ex parte relief may be granted under most of the rules
without notice to the adverse party. 275 The injection of a counterclaim
may frustrate the hope of an early determination of whether an automatic
stay should be terminated or modified. 276 If the court has jurisdiction of
the counterclaim on an independent ground-that is, independent of the
submission by the creditor or other adversary to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court-the court may, of course, proceed to determ\ne it, 277
but it will often be wise to dispose first of the plaintiffs request for relief

27
•
276

See Part V A 3 supra.
See, e.g., Associated Midwest, Inc. v. White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342
(E.D. Mich. 1978), where a Chapter XI debtor filed a counterclaim against a secured
creditor, who had sought relief from a stay of its pending mortgage foreclosure action. The
debtor alleged fraud and usury in its counterclaim and filed 220 written interrogatories
concerning the financial status of the secured creditor during the preceding six years. A date
for a hearing on the complaint seeking relief not having been set, although more than seven
months had elapsed after the complaint was filed, the district court directed an expedited
hearing to be held on remand of the proceeding to the bankruptcy judge. 443 F. Supp. at
1346. The district court concluded that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction of the
counterclaim. This aspect of the case is discussed in notes 269 & 271 supra.
The requirement of the stay rules that a party seeking relief file a complaint has been
criticized as an invitation to the debtor or other adversary to assert counterclaims and
affirmative defenses and to argue that the filing of the complaint constitutes submission to
summary jurisdiction. Peitzman & Smith, supra note 3, at 1247. The cases cited in notes 268
and 273 suggest that the courts are generally making correct disposition of the issues raised
by these responsive pleadings and arguments. The White Birch Park case illustrates the
delays possible under the present Rules. Proposed§ 362(e) of Title II U.S.C. as set forth in
H .R. 8200 and S. 2266 addresses the problem of delay in action by the bankruptcy judge on a
request for relief from an automatic stay. Unfortunately the Rules ·are also susceptible to
abuse by secured creditors when they "inundate the debtor and the ... court with early
repetitive motions, complaints, hearings and trials" and thus "require diversion of the
attention of the debtor and his counsel from the consideration of the formulation of a viable
plan, ... contrary to the expected orderly rehabilitative process." In re Carousel Ltd.
Partnership, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 760, 765 n.11 (Ref., N .D. Ga. 1977).
277
See Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Club., Inc. v. Fairway Wholesale, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 1302, 1303 (Ref., D. Conn. 1976) (acknowledging that the court would not have
jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim for return of a preference by a landlord who
sought relief from an automatic stay in a Chapter XI case but for the fact that the plaintiff
filed a reply to the counterclaim before making a jurisdictional objection).
In a Chapter X case,§ 23 poses no jurisdictional obstacle to the entertainment by the court
of a counterclaim presented by the debtor or trustee. 6 COLLIER 11 3.18 (1977).
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from the stay. Alternatively, the stay may be continued pending a determination of the counterclaim. 278 Even though the counterclaim falls
within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, wise judicial
administration may dictate deference to a nonbankruptcy court, particularly when an action on the counterclaim is already at an advanced stage.

B. Considerations Favoring and Opposing Continuation of the Stay
I. In Personam Actions Against a Bankrupt-Neither Rule 401 nor any
of the other stay rules undertakes to indicate what factors a court should
take into account in determining whether to continue or modify a stay.
Section l la authorizes the court to prolong a stay of actions grounded on
dischargeable claims beyond the date of adjudication until the determination of the bankrupt's right to a discharge. The considerations formerly
weighed by the courts in extending, modifying, or terminating the stay of
such actions are now appropriately assessed by bankruptcy courts in
passing on the issues raised by a complaint seeking relief from the automatic stay ofin personam actions prescribed by Rule 401. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 401 recognizes that appropriate justification for
relief from the stay may exist when the amount of an unliquidated claim
can be more expeditiously and conveniently determined in a pending
action 279 or when the creditor seeks a judgment against the debtor to
satisfy a condition precedent to the liability of a surety or other third
party. 280 Relief is also appropriate when the litigation threatens no im-

278 See. e.g., In re Stroderd, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 598, 603 (Ref., W.D. La. 1977). In
First Wis. Nat'! Bank v. Sal Amato, Inc., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 954 (Ref., D. Conn. 1975), the
debtor in a Chapter XI case opposed a complaint seeking relief from a stay by alleging that
he held a substantial equity in the property and that the secured debt was usurious. When
the creditor thereupon moved for dismissal of the debtor's claim, the court, treating the
motion as one for a summary judgment, continued the stay pending the trial of the issues
raised by the defenses. The court in Krause v. Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112,
1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977), noted that the plaintiff in Sal Amato did not raise any jurisdictional
objection and that the debtor had asserted usury only defensively in support of his claim that
there was a substantial equity, not for the purpose of setoff or affirmative recovery.
279
Citing In re Gerstenzang, 52 F.2d 863, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). For illustrative cases
granting relief under Rule 401, see Wood v. Fiedler, 548 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1977) (determination of dischargeability of the claim was deferred while malpractice action pending in state
court was permitted to proceed against bankrupt); In re DeCordier, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
11 66,774 (Ref, E.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); but cf. J. Thad Heinlein Co. v. National Aluminum
Co., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 678, 682 (Ref., W.D. Pa. 1977) (relief denied where bankrupt
already discharged from potential liability to parties to pending negligence action and
vacation of stay would result in confusion).
28
° Citing Manufacturers' Fin. Corp. v. Vye-Neill Co., 46 F.2d 136 (D. Mass. 1930), aff d,
62 F.2d 625, 628 ( I st Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 738 (1933). For analogous cases under Rule
401, see Rensenhouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Magee, 415 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo. 1976), and
Chittenden Trust Co. v. Burnett, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1657 (Ref., D. Vt. 1975), where creditors
holding joint obligations of husbands and wives were allowed to obtain judgments enforceable against property held by them as tenants by the entirety; cf. Globe Constr. Co. v.
Oklahoma City Hous. Auth., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1286, 1287 (10th Cir. 1978) (joint and several
judgment rendered against Chapter XI debtor and surety released by judgment creditor as to
debtor; release held not to affect surety's liability).

234

Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 11 : 177

pairment of the estate or the fresh start policy of the Act. 281 In such
situations the relief may be conditioned to prohibit enforcement of the
judgment against property of the estate or exempt property of the debtor. 282
2. Acts and Actions to Enforce Liens Against Property of the Bankrupt
in the Custody of the Bankruptcy Court-The issues to be resolved by the
bankruptcy court when a lienor seeks relief from a stay under Rule 601
against property in the custody of the court are fairly simple and
straightforward. The key question is whether extension of the stay is
necessary or at least justified as a protection against loss of or injury to
the interest of the estate in the property. This was the question faced by
the courts prior to the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Rules when the
trustee resisted reclamation proceedings and other efforts of lienors to
enforce their liens against such property in the custody of the court. Prior
to the Rules, such a lienor was uniformly required to bear the burden of
proof when he sought reclamation or permission to foreclosure outside
the bankruptcy court. 283 In imposing the burden on the party seeking
continuation of the stay, Rule 60l(c) is probably more generous than prior
law to the lienor without possession.
The existence of an equity or a dispute concerning the validity of the
creditor's lien ordinarily constitutes good cause for continuing the stay in
straight bankruptcy proceedings. 284 The trustee who is able to establish
either of these facts is in a good position not only to resist the lienor's
effort to terminate the stay but also to obtain authority to sell the property
free of the lien. 285 If the validity of the lien is not vulnerable to attack and

281
Cf. Childs v. Castleberry (In re Convenient Food Mart), 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 389 (Ref.,
E. D. Arie. 1977) (temporary injunction against a criminal prosecution of a debtor for alleged
violation of a state's "bad check" law vacated, since debtor's rights could be vindicated in
the state court).
282
See In re Zeckendorf, 326 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), abstracted in note 255
supra and in notes 298 & 300 and accompanying text infra. See also notes 384, 386-87 and
accompanying text infra.
283
See 4A COLLIER ,i,i 70.06, at 79 n.5; id. 70.16[7) at 164 n.37; id. 70.39[3] (1967).
281
See, e.R., In re Valley Gold Ranch, Inc .• 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 710, 713 (Ref., N.D.
Cal. 1977). The Valley Gold Ranch case presented the unusual spectacle of what the court
referred to as a "straw man" bankruptcy. The bankrupt had been created by incorporation
four days before bankruptcy for the acknowledged purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition.
The sole stockholder transferred to the corporation encumbered real property scheduled to
be sold under a deed of trust three days after bankruptcy. The corporation assumed secured
and unsecured debts related to the property transferred to it. The stockholder retained other
property and, of course, remained obligated on the debts assumed by the corporation.
Secured creditors sought relieffrom the automatic stay imposed by Rule 601 on enforcement
of their liens by sale and argued that since the transfer to the corporation was a fraud on
creditors of the transferor, the court should not facilitate the consummation of the fradulent
purpose. The court declined to lift the stay for the reason that the purpose of the transfer was
to preserve an equity for unsecured creditors that would otherwise be lost as a result of the
scheduled foreclosure. Since the secured creditors were amply secured, the court could not
discern how they could be injured. The court was nevertheless troubled by countenancing of
the "straw man" bankruptcy.
285
See 4A COLLIER ,i,i 70.97[2], 70.98(11], 70.99[1] (1967); Rule 606(b)(3) requires a
proceeding to sell property free of liens to conform to the rules governing an adversary
proceeding. Kennedy, An Adversary Proceeding Under the New Bankruptcy Rules, with
Special Reference to a Sale Free of Liens, 79 COM. L.J. 425 (1974).
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there is insufficient value in the property to yield anything for the unsecured creditors, the trustee should abandon the property and allow the
lienor to pursue his remedy outside the bankruptcy court.
3. Enforcement of Liens Obtained by Judicial Proceedings Within Four
Months of Bankruptcy-Relief from the stay imposed by Rule 60l(a)(2)
against enforcement of a lien obtained by judicial proceedings within four
months of bankruptcy ought to be available whenever it appears that the
debtor was not insolvent when the lien was obtained. 286 If the lien was not
obtained by judicial proceedings or was obtained more than four months
before bankruptcy, the stay was never operative against its enforcement and relief need not be sought under Rule 601(c) or (d). 287 The burden
of proof is on the trustee, receiver, or debtor to establish the elements of
voidability under section 67a ofa lien obtained by judicial proceedings, 288
and it comports with that allocation of the burden as well as with the last
sentence of section 60l(c) 289 to require the party relying on the stay to
establish the character of the lien and the date it was obtained. Since the
lienor is in a better position to establish both those elements, however,
the trustee, receiver, or debtor should not be obliged to furnish official
records of the attachment of the judicial lien. If a lien creditor alleges in a
complaint seeking relief from a stay of proceedings imposed by Rule
60l(a)(2) that the debtor was not insolvent at the time the lien was
obtained, the stay should be terminated unless the trustee, receiver, or
debtor contests the allegation and carries the burden of proof on the issue
of insolvency. 290
4. Proceedings and Enforcement of Judgments Against the Debtor in
Debtor Relief Cases-The language of the stay rules for cases under
Chapters VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII is practically identical. Unlike the
stay rules applicable in straight bankruptcy, the stay rules for the chapter
cases operate against any kind of proceeding and the enforcement of any
kind of judgment against the debtor. The comprehensive scope of the stay
may reach proceedings and judgments even though they do not interfere
significantly with the attainment of the objectives of the debtor relief
chapter under which the case is pending. 291 Thus, unless and until mod286
As pointed out in notes 63 and 154-57 and accompanying text supra, the stay imposed
by Rule (i()l(a)(2) is intended to prevent frustration of the purpose of§ 67a by a transfer of
the property subject to the voidable lien to a bona fide purchaser. See Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule (i()l(a). The stay should accordingly be terminated by the court when it appears
that the lien is not voidable.
287
Cf. Marine Midland Bank v. Bryant, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 400 (Ref., W.D.N.Y. 1977)
(ex parte stay lifted against officer who had levied to enforce a judgment lien over four
months old when bankruptcy occurred).
288
See 4 COLLIER ,i 67.18, at 200 nn.13, 15 (1975).
289
"A party seeking continuation of a stay against lien enforcement shall show that he is
entitled thereto."
290
See 4 COLLIER ,i 67.05, at 100-02 n.5 (1975).
291
Without questioning the scope of the injunctive power of the bankruptcy court, the
appellate courts sometimes vacated injunctions issued in debtor relief cases before the
advent of the Rules because they found continuation of the litigation restrained to be
compatible with conduct of the reorganization case. See, e.g., Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines,
299 U.S. 77, 87 (1936) (conduct of a jury trial on a seaman's claim under the Merchant
Marine Act commenced before the filing of a§ 778 petition by the debtor-employer was held
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ified, the stay prevents the commencement or continuation of a proceeding or the enforcement of a judgment by one who is not a creditor and
whose rights cannot be affected by any plan that the court could confirm
under the Act.
As previously noted, 292 the party seeking relief must show cause for
relief, and, with a single exception, 293 the party seeking continuation of
the stay has no obligation to show that he is entitled to a stay unless it
operates against lien enforcement. Nevertheless, if the creditor alleges in
his complaint that the proceeding or judgment is unrelated to the debtor
relief case and that its continuation or enforcement will not interfere with
the conduct of the debtor relief case, that should constitute a sufficient
statement of cause. 294 If the trustee, receiver, or debtor contests this
allegation, resolution of the issue should not require any elaborate presentation of evidence by the party seeking relief. Not only would it be
inappropriate to require the plaintiff to supply extensive proof of a negative, but the party seeking continuation of the stay is ordinarily in a better
position to provide the information needed by the court to determine the
issue presented. The trustee, receiver, or debtor typically will assert that
any litigation and the enforcement of any judgment will, at a minimum,
distract those engaged in the effort to keep the business going or the
family group intact and, at worst, destroy any hope of successful rehabilitation.295 The purpose of the stay rules is to protect the rehabilitation
process against litigation that would compromise the ability to formulate
and obtain confirmation of a plan. 296
In resolving the often difficult but important question of the effect of
nonbankruptcy litigation on a chapter case, the courts may consider the
not to "hinder, burden, delay, or be inconsistent with the pending reorganization");
Amadori Constr. Co. v. Hoffenberg (In re Stanndco Developers, Inc.), 534 F.2d 1050, 1055
(2d Cir. 1976) (suit seeking determination of validity of lien for the purpose of fastening
liability on a surety was said not to "interfere with the execution of any plan of reorganization"); cf. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 (1949) ("Congress did not give the
bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies that in some way affect the
debtor's estate").
292
See Part V A 4 supra.
293
Rule 9-4(c) requires a party seeking continuation of a stay against any proceeding or
act in a Chapter IX case to show that he is entitled to the stay.
294 While the bankruptcy court prior to the Rules could enjoin such a plaintiff, the courts
were understandably reluctant to grant or, if granted, to continue such an injunction. See,
e.g., In re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1956) (fair trader's injunction against price cutting by
Chapter XI debtor held improperly restrained by referee); Herman v. Herman, 12 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 274 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (denying injunction of action against Chapter XIII
debtor to compel payment of child support, an obligation not included in plan); cf. Bauer v.
American Training Serv., Inc., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 40 (Ref., D. N.J. 1977) (stockholder's
derivative action permitted to continue in the interest of the estate of a Chapter XI debtor, a
trustee being designated to represent the debtor's estate in the litigation).
295
See Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 229 U.S. 77, 86 (1936); In re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir. 1956).
296
See Power-Pak Prod., Inc. v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 684, 687 (W.D.N.Y.
1977) (stay of Rule 11-44 terminated since it did not serve the "statutory purpose" to
"conserve a debtor's assets and aid in the estate's administration"); cf. Teledyne Indus.,
Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (order requiring production of
documents in action against debtor, its officers, and directors for use only in prosecution of
the action against the individual defendants deemed not in conflict with stay).
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same factors in acting on complaints seeking relief from the automatic
stay as they did prior to the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Rules in
granting injunctions and relief from injunctions against suits not seeking
the enforcement of liens. 297 Thus, both before and since the Rules, the
courts have granted relief from a stay when the principal purpose of the
litigation was to establish the liability of a third person. 298 If the transfer
of litigation pending in another court to the bankruptcy court will disrupt
the calendar of the bankruptcy court and the discharge of its duties in
connection with other cases, the court can be fairly easily persuaded to
modify the stay to permit the proceeding to continue in the other court. 299
Another factor likely to influence the court in granting relief is the length
of time the proceeding has been pending in the other court. 300 In acting on
297 See, e.g., Young v. Kerr Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1976) (class action filed
under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e, stayed pursuant to
§ 314 of the Bankruptcy Act to prevent interference with orderly administration); Amadori
Constr. Co. v. Hoffenberg (In re Stanndco Developers, Inc.), 534 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (2d Cir.
1976), abstracted in notes 291 supra and 298 infra.
298
Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 84, 87 (1936) (suit by a seaman against a
§ 778 debtor expected to be defended by the debtor's insurer); Amadori Constr. Co. v.
Hoffenberg (In re Stanndco Developers, Inc.), 534 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1976) (action to
establish liability of surety on bond releasing mechanic's lien against Chapter X debtor's
property); Power-l"ak Prod., Inc. v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 684 (W.D.N.Y.
1977) (action by insurer against debtor for declaratory judgment on insurer's liablity). The
fact that the ultimate result of the litigation in the nonbankruptcy court may be adverse to
the debtor's interest has not deterred the courts from granting relief in some cases. Thus in
Foust, it was acknowledged that the insurance coverage of the liability asserted was not
complete. The argument thatjuries often give larger verdicts "than reason justifies" was not
persuasive to the court. In Stanndco, it was acknowledged that if the plaintiff prevailed
against the surety, the surety would be entitled to enforce a security interest taken in the
debtor's property. These potential impingements on the debtor's estate were not deemed of
sufficient significance to warrant further postponement of the litigation. The Foust and
Stanndco rulings involved stays entered by the courts before the effective dates of the
Bankruptcy Rules. A case reaching the same result as Stanndco under the Rules is Sandberg
v. Marty's Bum Steer, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1009 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1976). In In re Zeckendorf,
326 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), abstracted and discussed in notes 252 & 255 supra and
note 300 infra, the circumstances were thought to dictate relief from the stay, although the
role of the debtor in the litigated events was "central." 326 F. Supp. at 185.
299
See, e.g., Austin v. Wendell-West Co., 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 319 (9th Cir. 1976) (stay
of action brought by 23 plaintiffs against Chapter XII debtors held to have been properly
.lifted; dischargeability of plaintiffs claims reserved for· bankruptcy court). Judge Trask,
dissenting, read § 17c of the Act to require the court to enjoin the proceedings in the
nonbankruptcy courts. 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 326. He did not take note of the fact that the
applicability of§ 17cin debtor relief cases has been a matter.of debate. See Countryman,
The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BAN KR. L.J. 1, ~W55 (1971); cf. Forman, Application of the New Dischargeability Law of 1970 to Corporations and Chapter XI, 46 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 105 (1972); Weintraub, The Dischargeability Amendments: Are They Applicable to Corporate Bankrupts and to Chapter XI?, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 115 (1972).
There was a reference in the district judge's ruling in Austin v. Wedell-West Co., to the
. prohibitive expense to the individual plaintiffs if they were required to travel from California, where they resided and the land in dispute was located, to Seattle, where the Chapter
XII case was pending. The proceedings, if conducted in the bankruptcy court, could, of
course, be transferred by the court to any other district "in the interest of justice and for the
convenience of the parties." Bankr. Rule 782.
300
See, e.g., In re Zeckendorf, 326 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Sandoval, 78 F.
Supp. 135 (D. P.R. 1948).
In the Zeckendorf case litigation had been pending only about four months when a
Chapter XI petition was filed against the debtor and many other persons, but it had been
pending for over two years when the debtor's counsel sought enforcement of the stay.
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requests for relief the court is often influenced by the argument that relief
can be granted without disadvantaging the rehabilitation process by the
entry of an order against the enforcement of any judgment against the
debtor's estate. 3 01
5. Acts and Proceedings to Enforce Liens Against the Property of the
Debtor in Debtor Relief Cases-Notwithstanding the identity of the language in the stay rules for debtor relief cases, the courts do take into
account different considerations that depend on the chapter involved
when passing on requests for relief from automatic stays. As a result, care
must be exercised in applying a construction or interpretation of a stay
rule in one case to another case under a different chapter, even though the
relevant language of the stay rules in the two chapters is identical. Thus,
the significance of the presence or absence of an equity in property
subject to a lien varies from chapter to chapter. 302 While it has been stated
that a stronger ground should be required to sustain a stay of lien enforcement in a Chapter XI case than in a Chapter X case, because of the
difference in the power of the court under the two chapters to affect the
rights of a lienor, 303 this difference has not perceptibly influenced the
approach of the courts in construing the automatic stay rules for the
debtor relief chapters. A special rule of construction has developed,
however, for Chapter XIII cases: subject to the satisfaction of what may
be referred to as the Hallenbeck conditions, 304 the courts have frequently
followed a general and guiding proposition that in rehabilitation proceedings such as contemplated under Chapter XIII, "injunctive relief should
be granted more liberally than would be the case in other proceedings. "3os
The case law construing the sections of Chapters VIII-XIII that vest
exclusivejurisdicton of the debtor's property in the bankruptcy court and
authorize injunctions against suits to enforce liens provides persuasive
authority for the courts to follow in evaluating complaints seeking relief
from the ~utomatic stay rules prescribed for cases under those chapters. 306 In deciding whether an injunction should be entered or continued
against the enforcement of a lien in a Chapter X, XI, or XII case, the
courts have typically inquired into: the likelihood of a successful reorNearly three years had elapsed when the district judge delivered his opinion requiring a
modification of the stay. Meanwhile, as indicated in note 255 supra, the litigation had been
moving forward "sedately" notwithstanding the stay. 326 F. Supp. at 183.
301 See, e.g., Amadori Constr. Co. v. Hoffenberg (In re Stanndco Developers, Inc.), 534
F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Zeckendorf, 326 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
302
See notes 340-61 and accompanying text infra.
303 See, e.g., Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Serv., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1970), citing a
passage in the COLLIER treatise now found in 8 COLLIER ,i 3.22, at 256 (1974).
304
These conditions, specified in Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566,
572 (4th Cir. 1%3), are discussed in the text accompanying notes 394-95 infra.
305
See In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (W.D. Mo. 1972); In re Willett, 265 F.
Supp. 999, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 1%7).
306
See, e.g., Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 203 F.2d 645, 646 (2d Cir. 1953)
(injunction against foreclosure proceedings pending in Honduras held properly denied in
bankruptcy case in the absence of proof of irreparable injury); In re Murel Holding Corp., 75
F.2d 941, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1935) (debtor required to make a "clear showing" to obtain stay of
foreclosure of mortgage on apartment house in § 778 case).
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ganization; the likely need of the property subject to the lien for a
successful reorganization; and the likelihood of injury to the security of
the lienor caused by the stay. 307
A commentator has recently propounded the view supported by impressive documentation, that a number of courts, in particular the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, have tended to require the party seeking
continuation of the stay to carry the burden on all three of these issues. 308
As he suggests, the courts of the other circuits adopt a more flexible
approach. 309 While they give some weight to the proofs and arguments
adduced in regard to these three issues, other considerations are also
taken into account, and particular factors may be given varying degrees of
significance in different cases.
(a). Likelihood of Successful Rehabilitation-The issue of whether
there is a likelihood of a successful reorganization may arise at different
stages in a Chapter X case. First, in order to be approved, every petition
filed under Chapter X must be found by the court to have been filed in
good faith, 310 and a petition is not filed in good faith if "it is unreasonable .
to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected." 311 Second,
before a plan of reorganization can be confirmed under Chapter X, the
court must find that the plan is feasible, 312 and the standard of feasibility
under Chapter X has generally been viewed by the courts as equivalent to
likelihood of successful reorganization. 313 In addition, the court must be
satisfied at the time of confirmation that ''the proposal of the plan and its
acceptance are in good faith. " 314 A plan put forward without any realistic
hope for its success would not be proposed in good faith. 315
If the court is satisfied that a Chapter X petition is filed in good faith, it
can approve the petition without delay. 316 If the court wishes to hold a
307
See Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization
and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 31 (1974).
308
Webster, Collateral Control Decisions in Chapter Cases, Clear Rules v. Judicial
Discretion, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 206-21 (1977). Mr. Webster notes that Bankruptcy
Judge Paskay has imposed a four-part test by requiring Chapter XI debtors seeking prolongation of the automatic stay against lien enforcement to show: (!) an equity in the property
subject to the security interest; (2) that the stay does not jeopardize the security interest; (3)
a realistic possibility of confirmation of a plan; and (4) the essentiality of the encumbered
property to the operation of the debtor's business and the consummation of a plan. Northwestern Financial Investors v. O.K. Motels, I Collier Bankr. Cas. 416, 419 (M.D. Fla. 1974);
Continental Mortgage Co. v. Bric of America, Inc., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 34, 39 (M.D. Fla.
1975). In both cases the stay was lifted because the debtor failed to pass the test. The test is
approved in Seidman, The Plight of the Secured Creditors in Chapter XI, 80 CoM. L.J. 343,
346 (1975). The requirements that the debtor have an equity and that it not be jeopardized by
the stay are discussed as aspects of a single consideration in the text accompanying notes
340-61 infra.
309
51 AM. BANKR. L.J. at 222-40.
310
Bankruptcy Act §§ 141 (voluntary petition), 142 (involuntary petition); Bankr. Rule
10-l 13(a) & (b).
311
Bankruptcy Act§ 146(3); In re Hunterbrook Bldg. Corp., 276 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1960).
312 Bankruptcy Act§ 221(2).
313
6 COLLIER ,i 11.07 (1977); King, Feasibility in Chapter X Proceedings, 49 AM. BAN KR.
L.J. 323, 325-26 (1975).
314
Bankruptcy Act§ 221(3).
315
6A COLLIER ,i 11.08, at 243 nn.8-10 (1977).
316
The procedure described in this paragraph is governed by Bankr. Rule 10-113.
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hearing before approving the petition, however, it may do so on such
notice as it may direct. If an answer challenges the good faith of the
petition or raises issues requiring an inquiry into that matter, the court is
required to hold a hearing "at the earliest practicable time on such notice
as it may direct." 317 Although Rule 10-601(c) also requires the trial of
issues raised on a complaint seeking relief from the automatic stay to be
held at the earliest possible date and to be given precedence over all
matters except older matters of the same character, it is likely that such a
trial will be held after the Chapter X petition has already been approved.
If the lienor filed an answer contesting the good faith of the petition, he
may have already been heard on the issue of the likelihood ofa successful
reorganization. Insofar as he renews the attack on the likelihood of a
successful reorganization at the trial on the issues raised by the request
for relief from the stay, the lienor will face a defense of collateral estoppel. Even if collateral estoppel is not operative because the lienor did not
contest the good faith of the petition, he will be confronted ordinarily with
the argument that approval of the petition necessarily rested on a finding
that effectuation of a plan of reorganization was not an unreasonable
expectation. 318 The significance of prior approval of the Chapter X petition is, of course, augmented if there has been a vigorous contest and
inquiry into the good faith issue, involving particularly the prospects for a
successful reorganization. On the other hand, the approval is far from
conclusive of the request for relief from the stay, since other considerations may well support the termination, modification, or conditioning of
the stay. 319
Although Chapters XI and XII do not require the court to approve a
petition as one filed in good faith, there is case law declaring that the court
may dismiss a petition filed under Chapter XI if rehabilitation is hopeless, 320 and the reasoning is equally applicable to a petition filed under
Chapter XIl. 321 Moreover, these chapters and Chapters IX and XIII all
317

Bankr. Rule I0-113(c)(2).

318

But cf. Mongiello Bros. Coal Corp. v. Houghtaling Properties, Inc., 309 F.2d 925,
927-30 (5th Cir. 1962), abstracted in note 319 infra.
319
Cf. Mongiello Bros. Coal Corp. v. Houghtaling Properties, Inc., 30') F.2d 925 (5th Cir.

1962), where the court apparently regarded the finding of good faith in the order of approval
of the petition vulnerable to attack because ofa lack of supportive findings of fact. There had
been no contest of the Chapter X petition, and the matter on appeal was the stay of a sale
pursuant to a state foreclosure decree.
320
Ira Haupt & Co. v. Klebanow, 348 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1965) (dismissal grounded on "no
prospect of rehabilitation"); see Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Philadelphia Import Center,
Inc. (In re Carlton Indus., Inc.), 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1312, 1313 (Ref., E.D. Va. 1976)
(emphasizing "vast and significant" difference between "no prospect" and the absence of a
"reasonable prospect" that constitutes lack of the good faith required by§ 146 for approval
of a Chapter X petition).
321
Charlestown Sav. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Realty Investment Co.), 516 F.2d
154, 160-61 (!st Cir. 1975); In re Bolton Hall Nursing Home, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 441 (D. Mass
1977); Trustees of Builders Inv. Group v. Samoset Assoc., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 393, 395-96
(Ref., D. Me. 1977).
In In re Carousel Ltd. Partnership, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 760 (Ref., N .D. Ga. 1977), when
a secured creditor sought dismissal of a Chapter XII petition by an "application" filed
within two weeks of the filing of the petition, the court denied the application as unauthorized by the Act or the Chapter XII Rules. The court acknowledged that the cases cited
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require a plan, in order to be confirmed, to be feasible and proposed in
good faith. 322 Since the requirements applicable to plans filed under
Chapters X, XI, and XII differ in important respects, the indicia of lack of
good faith are not the same. In passing on requests for relief from stays in
all chapter cases, however, the courts eschew conducting elaborate hearings on the prospects for successful reorganization. 323
The degree of likelihood of a successful rehabilitation required to justify
continuation of a stay in a chapter case is variously stated. The typical
formulation in a case denying relief is that reorganization appears to be a
"reasonable possibility. " 324 In a recent Chapter XII case Judge Babitt
was satisfied by evidence that "it is as reasonably likely that the debtor
will successfully rehabilitate as not. " 325 The typical rationale when relief
is granted is that reorganization is not a "realistic expectation. " 326 Where

above discuss "good faith" of a Chapter XII petitioner but explained them as concerned
with the good faith required of a plan proposed for confirmation or good faith in the sense
required in a hearing on whether a stay should be continued. Id. at 763. Good faith at such a
hearing was equated to a showing of" 'a sufficient possibility of a successful arrangement'
within a reasonable time 'to justify whatever risk to the collateral of secure parties may be
entailed.' "Id. The court noted that it had found no case requiring a determination of good
faith in this sense "at an early stage of the proceeding." Id. at 764.
In C.I. Mortgage Group. v. Castle Village Co., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 452, 461 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court noted that Chapter XII does not require a showing of good faith
by the petitioner but that the lienor seeking dismissal and termination of the stay presented
"no actual evidence ofaffirmative bad faith." See also Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty
Trust v. Bergman, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 222, 228 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977).
With reference to the possibility of dismissal of a Chapter XIII petition for hopelessness of
any prospect for rehabilitation, see text accompanying notes 304-05 supra and notes 330-33
irifra.
322
See Bankruptcy Act§§ 94(b)(I) & (5), 366(2) & (4), 472(2) & (4), and 656(a)(2) & (4). In
the absence of objection the court may, in a Chapter XI, XII, or XIII case, find that a plan
has been proposed and accepted in good faith without the taking of proof. Bankr. Rules
l 1-38(d), 12-38(d), and 13-213(a). The requirement of feasibility does not apply if all creditors
have accepted the plan, as provided in §§ 361, 457, and 651, but the plan and its acceptance
must be in good faith to be confirmed under any of these sections.
323
But see C.I. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146,
152 n.7 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("the degree of proof required to establish the possibility of
rehabilitation and thereby the good faith of the petition matches the degree of proof
necessary to establish the possibility of rehabilitation in deciding whether or not to vacate or
modify the stay of Rule 12-43(a) ").
324
See BVA Credit Corp. v. Consolidated Motor Inns, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1526, 1532
(Ref., N.D. Ga. 1975); see also McGregor v. ABC Dev. & Inv. Co., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas.
94, 99 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1977); cf. In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah
1964) (stay granted under Bankruptcy Act§ 314 directed to be terminated unless incident to
a "plan susceptible of reasonably prompt processing").
325
See C.l. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146, 151
(Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977), where the court added that "it is not necessary that the debtor prove
to a high degree of certainty that it will successfully rehabilitate itself."
326 See Pledger v. Red Carpet Corp., 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 487, 490 (Ref., N .D. Fla.
1976); Sentinel Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Elegante Realty Co., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 395
(Ref., W.D. Mo. 1975); Northwestern Financial Investors v. O.K. Motels, I Collier Bankr.
Cas. 416, 420 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1974). A number of opinions emphasize the speculative or
visionary character of the debtor's possibilities for reorganization. See, e.g., Bateman
Financial Corp. v. Slanville Mortgage Co., 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 488, 492 (Ref., M.D. Fla.
1975); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., 4Collier Bankr. Cas. 387, 394 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1975); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 657, 664
(Ref., D.D.C. 1974).
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the prospects for successful rehabilitation in a Chapter XII case were
"dim," the court continued the stay for three months. 327
Whether the issue of the likelihood of a successful reorganization is
raised in a contest of the petitioner's good faith or in a request for relief
from the stay, its determination requires the court to speculate on the
probable outcome of a complicated and uncertain process. A coldblooded appraisal of relevant experience probably warrants adoption by
the courts of a strong presumption against the likelihood of success of any
reorganization. 328 Notwithstanding the burden of justification imposed on
the party seeking continuation of the stay, the bankruptcy courts have
understandably been reluctant to terminate a stay at an early stage.of the
reorganization process solely on a finding that reorganization is hopeless
or unlikely. 329
A decision by the bankruptcy judge that a successful reorganization is
not reasonably probable is not likely to be reversed, since such a determination is almost certain to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The effort required
to establish the error by appeal would indeed aggravate the burden of
overcoming the financial difficulties that led to the filing of the reorgnization petition .. A decision predicated on an erroneous finding that a successful reorganization is reasonably likely is more apt to be overruled by
events than by a court on appeal. These observations help to explain the
reluctance of courts to find no reasonable expectation of a successful
reorganization, but they afford little consolation to a lienor whose security suffers continuing deterioration during the pendency of the stay.
There are cases where courts can confidently determine at an early stage
that reorganization cannot reasonably be expected, and in such a case this
determination justifies termination of the stay. In most cases, however,
disposition of a complaint seeking relief from the stay will require a
consideration of other issues.
Dicta are frequently encountered to the effect that a Chapter XIII
debtor must show good faith in submitting a plan and an ability to perform
in order to be entitled to a stay. 330 The proportion of dismissals and
"repeaters" under Chapter XIII is high, 331 but even partial success of a
Chapter XIII plan is generally viewed as a benefit, at least to creditors. 332
To terminate the automatic stay would assuredly reduce the number of
confirmed plans and accelerate and augment plan failures; but modificaIn re Triangle Inn Assoc., Inc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 66,335 (Ref., E.D. Va. 1976).
See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 140, 145,
146 (1971).
329 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Bergman, 14 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 222, 228-29 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
330 See, e.g., Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963).
331 See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 328, at 104-05; Haden, Chapter XIII
Wage-Earner Plans-Forgotten Man Bankruptcy, 55 KY. L.J. 564, 594-600 (1976). The
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States recommended a number of changes
in Chapter XIII to mitigate the high mortality rate of Chapter XIII plans. REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
Part I, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 160-67 (1973). Most of these features have been incorporated
into proposed new Title 11, now pending in Congress.
332
See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 328, at 102 and 105-06.
327
328
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tion of a Chapter XIII plan to fit the debtor's financial capabilities is
ordinarily preferable, for both the debtor and his creditors, to liquidation
and foreclosure. Only a few cases illustrate the possibility that the courts
will terminate a stay in a Chapter XIII case because of the debtor's
inability to perform. 333
(b). Essentiality of the Encumbered Property-In a few cases, the court
has resolved the question whether enforcement of a lien against a debtor
undergoing reorganization should be enjoined by focusing on whether the
property subject to the lien was essential to a successful reorganization. 334 Esse·ntiality may be found not only when the property is indispensable to the reorganized enterprise 335 but also when it is required to
enable the debtor to operate its business during the pendency of the case
in the bankruptcy court. 336 In Chapter XIII cases, the courts typically

333
See Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Johnson, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 982 (Ref., D.D.C.
1975) (plan to pay arrearage of $2,064.59 on $22,100 secured debt held not realistic, and
continuation of stay would be in derogation of rights of secured creditor); cf. In re Cassidy, I
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1455 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (case remanded for findings on debtor's good faith,
feasibility of plan, existence of debtor's equity, and reasonableness of delay of mortgagee).
334
National Bank v. Goodwin, 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 493 (Ref., D. Md. 1977) (debtor's·
stock not essential to Chapter XI plan); Pledger v. Red Carpet Corp., 11 Collier Bankr. Cas.
487, 489 (Ref., N .D. Fla. 1976) (mortgaged cottage used by debtor and family not necessary
to operation of Chapter XI debtor's restaurant, lounge, and motel business); cf. Continental
Mortgage Co. v. Bric of America, Inc., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 34, 40 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1975)
(mortgaged, unimproved realty not essential to debtor's business because debtor no longer
had a going business and had never developed property).
In remanding a proceeding on a complaint filed under Rule 11-44 to the bankruptcy judge
for an expedited hearing, a district court instructed the bankruptcy judge to "permit the
debtor to introduce relevant evidence on the sole issue of whether the property in question is
essential to the rehabilitation of the debtor or to the liquidation of the debtor's estate."
Associated Midwest, Inc., v. White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D. Mich.
1978). It did not appear in the opinion why the debtor's evidence should bear only on this
issue, but the court was concerned to preclude further inquiry on remand into issues raised
by the debtor's counterclaim based on allegations of fraud. The issues raised by the
counterclaim are discussed in notes 269, 271, and 276 and the accompanying text supra. The
reference to essentiality of the property to the liquidation of the debtor's estate is inexplicable.
In/n re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1961), it was suggested that if the debtor
had ample accounts receivable to pay all his unsecured creditors, it would be an abuse of
discretion to restrain the enforcement of a lien against fixed assets. Since there was
uncertainty, however, as to the .collectibility of the accounts and there appeared ample
equity in the fixed assets, a stay entered by the referee pursuant to§ 314 was continued. The
court nevertheless directed the referee on remand to reconsider, inter alia, whether the
debtor's residence, which constituted security for two mortgages, "was of such essential.
necessity to the transaction of business" of the debtor and its sale "a sufficient disadvantage
to the consummation of the arrangement" as to justify the continuation of the stay.
335
In re Atlantic Steel Prod. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N .Y. 1939) (foreclosure of
mortgage on debtor's plant and equipment enjoined pursuant to § 314 since foreclosure
would have rendered impossible the carrying out of the plan); BY A Credit Corp. v.
Consolidated Motor Inns, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18, 32 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1975) (relieffrom stay
and reclamation deemed, for lessor of equipment, "absolutely ... essential to reorganization
or the prospect thereof'').
336
Any significant interruption of business during the effort to evolve a reorganization is
almost certain to be fatal to the effort. Thus, repossession of a substantial portion of the
inventory of a merchant or manufacturer by a lienor could destroy any prospect of rehabilitation under the Bankruptcy Act, even though the particular inventory is not expected to be
part of the property of the reorganized enterprise. In re Creed Bros., Inc., 14 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 426, 429, 431 (Ref., S.D.N .Y. 1977) (pledged inventory of lumber and building mate-
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require that the stay be necessary to preserve the debtor's estate 337 or to
enable the debtor to carry out the plan. 338 In the absence of a demonstrated need of the property for the purposes of the reorganization or
rehabilitation, the proponent of the injunction or stay cannot sustain the
burden of justifying intereference with the lienor's right to enforce his
lien. Indispensability of the property to the debtor's survival and hope of
rehabilitation is not enough, of course, to justify continuation of the stay
when rehabilitation is hopeless or the stay threatens injury to the lienor's
security. 339
(c). Presence of Equity and Potential Injury to the Creditor's
Security-Most litigation regarding injunctions and stays of lien enforcement has focused on whether the injunction or stay will injure the secured
position of the creditor. Determination of that issue practically entails a
preliminary determination of the value of the collateral. If a substantial
rials essential to continuance of business and formulation of plan); BV A Credit Corp. v.
Consolidated Motor Inns, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1975).
Webster, supra note 308, at 209 n.51, 226-27, states that, under the four-part test of
Northwestern Financial Investors v. O.K. Motels, I Collier Bankr. Cas. 416, 419-20 (Ref.,
M.D. Fla. 1974), cited in note 308 supra, the property subject to a stay must be essential
both to the operation of the business and to the consummation of a plan. The test was
reformulated, however, in Continental Mortgage Co. v. Bric of America, Inc., 4 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 34, 40 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1975), cited in note 334 supra, to require essentiality
only for one or the other of these purposes. As indicated above, continuity of the business
and consummation of the plan are such closely interrelated objectives that the courts have
not found it necessary or appropriate to distinguish between the two kinds of essentiality.
337 See, e.g., Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963);
Chatman v. Daugherty, 527 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284,
1289 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
A number of cases have emphasized, as a justification for staying foreclosure of a
mortgage of real estate during the pendency of a Chapter XIII case, the need to preserve the
debtor's equity of redemption for the benefit of other creditors if bankruptcy should
eventuate. See Hallenbeck, 323 F.2d at 572; In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 460-61 (N.D.
Ala. 1962).
338 See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217, 1219 (5th Cir. 1973)
(loss of car, debtor's only means for getting to work, would endanger debtor's continued
employment and ability to make payments urider the plan); In re Mickens, BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) ,r 66,752 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (injunction against reclamation of car dissolved, bus
transportation being available); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garcia, 396 F. Supp.
519, 522, 524 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (vehicles protected from reclamation by injunction necessary
for husband and wife to carry out plan); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933, 936 (E.D. Ark.
1967) (automobile "necessary for the success of the plan" of a disabled war veteran);
Leavenworth Nat'l Bank v. Visocsky, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 688, 691-92 (Ref., D. Kan.
1977) ("the vehicles, furniture and other personal property herein are essential to the
rehabilitation of this Plan because while living outside the city limits, both husband and wife
need transportation to get to and from their respective jobs; and obviously, the seven
children need a bed in which to lay their heads, a stove for their food to be cooked, and
refrigerator to preserve the food, and a table on which to eat");In re Pilson, 9 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 424, 428 (Ref., W.D. Va. 1976) (stay against foreclosure of mortgage on family dwelling
deemed "absolutely necessary to preserve debtors' estate in the real property and to carry
out the plan"); Bank of Virginia Tidewater v. Porter, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18, 20, 22 (Ref.,
S.D. Cal. 1976) (vehicle "for general transportation and general use" deemed "necessary to
preserve these debtors' estate and carry out their plan"); cf First Nat'! Bank v. Freeman, I
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 576 (Ref., M.D. Ga. 1975) (automobile needed to take debtor's blind
daughter to and from academy).
339
See, e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 657, 663
(Ref., D.D.C. 1974); Northwestern Financial Investors v. O.K. Motels, I Collier Bankr.
Cas. 416, 420 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1974).
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equity is present, a stay of the enforcement of a lien is not likely to
jeopardize the position of the secured creditor, and proof of such an
equity thus goes far to carry the burden imposed on the party seeking
issuance of the injunction or prolongation of the stay .340
If, on the other hand, there is no surplus value in the property beyond
what is required to_pay the debt secured, the debtor, receiver, or trustee
will find it exceedingly difficult to convince the court that a stay of
enforcement will not injure the secured creditor. The property, unless it is
land, is almost certain to depreciate during the pendency of the stay, and
if the property is used by the debtor during the term of the stay, the rate of
depreciation may be so high as practically to destroy the value of the
collateral. If the equity is nonexistent or thin and the debtor is unable to
make payments of accruing installments of principal and interest of secured debt, the debtor's burden of justifying continuation of the stay is
heavy indeed. 341
The standard of valuation presents a subsidiary issue that may assume
critical importance in a determination of the presence or absence of an
equity and the adequacy of the protection for the lie nor subject to a stay.
In seeking relief from the stay, a secured creditor is likely to support his
argument by attempting to show the inadequacy of the collateral to cover
his debt and the prejudice likely to accrue from a postponement of
foreclosure of the security interest. The argument may well be predicated
on a valuation of the property on liquidation rather than on a going
concern value. If the court nevertheless stays the enforcement of the
security interest and valuation of the collateral becomes necessary later in
the determination of whether a proposed plan should be confirmed, the
secured creditor is then likely to insist on a valuation by reference to the
going concern standard. 342

340
See, e.g., In re Creed Bros., Inc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 426, 429 (Ref., S.D.N.Y.
1977) (Chapter XI case); Leavenworth Nat'l Bank v. Visocsky, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 688.
690-91 (Ref., D. Kan. 1977) (Chapter XIII case involving stay of enforcement of liens on
personal property).
341
But cf. C.i. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146,
155 (Ref., S.D.N .Y. 1977), where the secured creditor argued that the stay threatened to add
$780,000 to its deficiency claim, but the court anticipated that the property could be
improved sufficiently during the stay to permit full payment of the secured debt, whereas
termination of the stay would force the secured creditor to take the property with no
prospect for return on its investment; In re Lax Enterprises, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 628, 632
(Ref., N .D. Ohio 1976), where accrual of interest and penalty interest could shortly deplete
the debtor's equity and the court allowed foreclosure proceedings to continue up to execution.
342
See Webster, supra note 308, at 232. Bankruptcy Judge Cyr observed in Chemical
Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 715, 719-20 (Ref., D. Me. 1976)
that "it sometimes serves the interests of secured creditors to attempt to whipsaw the debtor
by insisting upon a going-concern of fair-market valuation at the commencement of the
proceedings, but a forced-sale valuation later on, in order to demonstrate more extensive
collateral depletion or diminution following the petition. A secured creditor is then better
positioned to assert that retention and use of the collateral by the debtor has rendered the
secured creditor an involuntary lender entitled to priority payment from the estate for the
impairment of its lien." In the scenario envisioned by Judge Cyr, the secured creditor
apparently has not engaged in a closely contested hearing at an early stage of the case on
whether there was an equity sufficient to justify continuation of the automatic stay. Judge
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The usual assumption is that the court should receive evidence as to the
''fair market value'' when the issue is whether property sought to be
reclaimed or subjected to foreclosure has any equity. 343 Since the secured
creditor may be relegated to collection by forced sale if the rehabilitation
effort under the Bankruptcy Act aborts, there is logic in an argument that
the liquidation value of the property ought to be the focus of the court's
inquiry at the hearing on a complaint seeking relief from the stay. 344 If
there is a substantial difference between the forced sale value and the
going concern value of property subject to a lien, however, and if the
question of value must be determined at the threshold of the case or if a
successful reorganizafon appears to be a reasonable prospect, the court is
likely to avoid making and relying on a stark determination of the liquidation value. 345 If the property subject to the lien is inventory reasonably
salable in the ordinary course of business, it is sensible for the court to try
to determine what the property will bring when disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. 346 It is generally conceded that the value of
property subject to a lien may change during the course of a case, and
thus a finding of a particular value at one stage or for one purpose ought
not to preclude a re-examination of the question when circumstances may
have changed. 347
Cyr opted for a valuation ''equitable with the net recovery realizable from its disposition as
near as may be in the ordinary course of business'.' in continuing the stay against foreclosure
on accounts receivable, inventory, and fixed assets. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 721-22.
343
ln re Hosmer, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 66, 778 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1977); Bank of
Virginia Tidewater v. Porter, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18, 20 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976); Mission
Inv. Trust v. Capri Dev. Co., IO Collier Bankr. Cas. 756, 757 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976);
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sixth Ave. Inv. & Dev. Co., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1222,
1224 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976); cf. Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp., 6 Collier Bankr. Cas.
192, 203 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1975) (using standard employed in eminent domain cases where
debtor had no going business).
344
ln re Stevens Enterprises, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 12, 14 (E.D. Pa. 1957). The Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed that the liquidation value of the
collateral at the date of the petition be taken as a "benchmark" in determining the adequacy
of protection of a secured creditor when collateral is being used by the debtor in a reorganization proceeding. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7-203 n.3, at 237 (1973).
345
Going concern value was preferred to liquidation value in Reliance Standard Life v.
Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977) (Chapter XII case); In re Creed Bros.,
Inc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 426, 431 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Chapter XI case); cf. In re Lax
Enterprises, JI Collier Bankr. Cas. 628 (Ref., N.D. Ohio 1976) (considering both an "income approach" and a "cost approach" to valuation of properties of a motor inn). Reliance
on the "going concern value" is criticized by Webster, supra note 308, at 235-37, on the
ground that it gives the secured creditor the benefit of a bonus to the extent it recognizes a
value above what he would receive if he enforced his security in accord with his contract.
346
In Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 715, 722 (Ref.,
D. Me. 1976), Bankruptcy Judge Cyr, in a careful opinion, argued for consistent application
throughout reorganization proceedings of "the most economically realistic collateral standard," that is, the value recoverable from a sale or other disposition conducted in a commercially reasonable manner in accordance with §§ 9-504(3) and 9-507(2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
347
See Peitzman & Smith, supra note 3, at 1239-40; cf. H. R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977); but cf. Mission Inv. Trust v. Capri Dev. Co., JO Collier Bankr.
Cas. 759 (Ref., E.D. Cal. 1976) (determination after hearing on complaint to modify stay
under Rule 12-43 that value of encumbered property exceeded secured debt held to be res
judicata where secured creditor thereafter claimed deficiency based on successful low bid at
subsequent foreclosure sale).
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The absence of an equity has usually been viewed as critically significant in a Chapter XI case. 348 The assumption that an equity is necessary
to the continuation of a stay has often been predicated on the bankruptcy
court's lack of power to affect the rights of secured creditors, without
their consent, 349 in a plan confirmed under Chapter Xl. 350 The existence
of an equity is not, however, and should not be, indispensable to the
continuation of a stay .351 Congress explicitly authorized the bankruptcy
court to enjoin lien enforcement when appropriate in the pursuit of the
objective of rehabilitation under Chapter XI. 352 If the secured creditor is
adequately protected from injury resulting from the stay, the collateral is
essential to the reorganization, and a reorganization in the interest of
unsecured creditors is a realistic possibility, the absence of an equity
should be immaterial. The possibilities for discharging the burden of proof
required to sustain the stay should not be overwhelming when the debtor
has a positive cash flow and the enterprise is in the hands of capable
management. 35 3
The presence or absence of an equity does not have comparable importance in a Chapter X 354 or a Chapter XII case, 355 because it is at least

348
See Silver Gate Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.), 418 F.2d
880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969) (upholding remand of case to referee to determine whether there was
equity in property; presence of equity said to warrant permanent injunction of mortgage
foreclosure until final decree; absence of equity said to require termination of temporary
restraining order under § 314).
Stays were terminated in the following cases, in significant part because the debtor had no
equity. In re Rosslyn Dev. Co., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 660, 668 (Ref., D.D.C. 1977); Pledger
v. Red Carpet Corp., 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 487, 489 (Ref., N.D. Fla. 1976); Otay Land Co.
v. DLB Dev. Corp., 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 192, 205-06 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1975); National Life
Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 657 (Ref., D.D.C. 1974); see Akron
Nat') Bank & Trust Co. v. Freed & Co., 534 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1976).
The presence of an equity was an important factor in construing the stay in In re Atlantic
Steel Prod. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1939);/n re Valley Gold Ranch, Inc., 13
Collier Bankr. Cas. 710, 711-12 (Ref., N.D. Cal. 1977).
349
The validity of a Chapter XI plan affecting secured creditors with their consent was
recognized in RIDC Industrial Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
350
See, e.g., In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah 1964); National Life
Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 657, 663-64 (Ref., D.D.C. 1974).
351
See Festerson, Equitable Powers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Protection of the
Debtor and the Doomsday Principle, 40 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 333 (1972); Webster, supra
note 308, at 231-32. The court observed in In re Bolton Hall Nursing Home, 14 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 90, 92 (D. Mass. 1977), that Chapters XI and XII were intended for the use of
debtors without equity in their property.
352
Bankruptcy Act§ 314; Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 715, 718 (Ref., D. Me. 1976).
353
See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Coolspring Estates, Inc., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas.
55, 60 (Ref., N.D. Ind. 1977); BVA Credit Corp. v. Consolidated Motor Inns, 6 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 18, 32 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1975); In re Mesker Steel, Inc., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 235
(Ref., S.D. Ind. 1974).
354
Lincoln-Alliance Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, 108 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1939).
355
See, e.g., C.J. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146,
156 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court continued the stay and rejected the secured creditor's
request for a determination of the value of its security); C.l. Mortgage Group v. Castle
Village Co., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 452, 462 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (existence of an equity
was not required as a condition to the continuation of a stay against a second mortgagee in a
Chapter XII case); In re Triangle Inn Assoc., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 66,335 (Ref., E.D.

248

Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 11 : 177

theoretically possible for a plan confirmed under either of these chapters
to reduce or otherwise alter the rights of secured creditors in the property
subject to their liens. 356 Secured creditors seeking termination of stays in
Chapter X and XII cases frequently contend, however, that since they
will not accept any proposal affecting their rights, there is no reasonable
possibility of a successful reorganization when the debtor has no equity.
This argument has been viewed by some courts as well nigh conclusive of
the right to a termination of the automatic stay, and even dismissal of the
case, when the debtor's petition has been filed under either Chapter X or
XJI.357

Va. 1976) (stay continued at instance of junior mortgagees and the debtor, notwithstanding
the first mortgagee's "biased" appraisal showing no equity and the court's acknowledgement that prospects for a successful rehabilitation were dim). Cf. In re Hartsdale Assoc., 11
Collier Bankr. Cas. 87, 93 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1976) (second mortgagee stayed for eight months
where property alleged to be worth more than two mortgages but not more than third and
fourth mortgages; "eroding position of secured creditors" held to warrant lifting stay to
permit foreclosure to proceed to point of sale). The court in Nevada Towers Assoc.
nevertheless suggested that "there is greater tension between the needs of a Chapter XII
debtor and the mortgagee than in the typical Chapter XI case," because the security is more
likely to be "at the heart of the case" in Chapter XII than in Chapter XI.
A Chapter XII case often cited for requiring an equity is Hamburger v. Dyer, 117 F.2d 932
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 572 (1941). This construction of the chapter has been
regarded as a necessary result of the absolute priority rule, which has subsequently been
eliminated from the chapter. See C.I. Mortgage Group v. Castle Village Co., 13 Collier
Bankr. Cas. at 462.
356
Where, however, a Chapter XII debtor's secured debts were nearly double the fair
market value of his property, the property was deteriorating, and there was no evidence that
a plan could be worked out which would offer secured creditors adequate protection,
termination of the stay was required. In re Hosmer, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 66,778 (Ref.,
N.D. Ga. 1977).
357 In re Hunterbrook Bldg., Corp. 276 F.2d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 1960) (Chapter X case
dismissed for lack of good faith in view of insolvency of debtor and "stated unwillingness"
of first and second lienors to consent to plan that did not provide for full payment of the
secured debts); Kunze v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 106 F.2d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 1939)
(Chapter XII case dismissed when sole creditor rejected only plan submitted); In re
Spicewood Assoc., 445 F. Supp. 564, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (Chapter XII petition dismissed
when debt of first mortgagee exceeded by more than 50% the highest offer received for the
mortgaged property, and first mortgagee objected to alternate plans offered by debtor); First
& Merchants Nat'I Bank v. Country Green Ltd. Partnership, 438 F. Supp. 699, 700-01 (W.D.
Va. 1977) (stay lifted when requisite creditor majorities not shown to have accepted Chapter
XII plan, and plans proposed by debtor failed to provide protection contemplated by § 461
(11)).
In a recent opinion District Judge Carter declared that "there is virtual unanimity in the
decided case law that rejection of a plan in a Chapter XII proceeding by all the secured
creditors bars its confirmation." In re Schwab Adams Co., No. 77-8-225 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Judge Carter cited the following cases to support this propostion: Taylor v. Wood, 458 F.2d
15 (9th Cir. 1972); Meyer v. Rowan, 195 F.2d 263, 266 (10th Cir. 1952); Kyser v. MacAdam,
117 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1941) (secured creditors held improperly denied right to vote on
plan notwithstanding delivery to them, pursuant to plan, of mortgages equal in worth to the
value of their security in the debtor's estate).
Additional authority supporting Judge Carter's position includes Herweg v. Neuses, 119
F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941) (dismissing Chapter XII petition when neither first nor second
mortgage creditors consented to proposed plan); In re Spicewood Assoc., 445 F. Supp. 564,
572 (N.D. Ill. 1977); In re Fierman & Fierman, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1006, 1007 (Ref., E.D. Pa.
1977);/n re Georgetown Apts., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 498, 511, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 512 (Ref.,
M.D. Fla. 1977) (unanimous opposition of secured creditors barred confirmation, even
though a class of unsecured creditors approved the plan and the plan provided adequate
protection to the secured creditors).
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In a number of recent opinions, bankruptcy courts have not allowed
adamant opposition or even vehement attack by secured creditors to
prevent efforts to obtain debtor relief under Chapter X or XII. 358 Some of
these opinions point out that the court retains the power to confirm a plan,
notwithstanding creditors' objections, when the plan provides adequate
protection for the realization of the value of their claims. 359 This position
has been taken even when all the debtor's property is subject to the lien of
a single creditor who insists that he will not consent to a plan altering his
rights and that the court cannot confirm a plan against the opposition of
the only creditor entitled to vote on a plan. 360 In sustaining the stay in
such a case, the courts are likely to emphasize the possibility that creditor
opposition may dissolve in the light of subsequent developments and a
consideration of the opportunities and benefits presented by a specific
plan.361
The preservation of an equity has been recognized as a justification for
continuing a stay in a number of Chapter XIII cases. 362 The courts
sometimes stress the protection of the unsecured creditors' interest in this
source of payment of their claims in the event of a superseding bankruptcy, but more often the court's concern is with the contribution the
property may make to the debtor's rehabilitation. 363 A usual requirement
for continuing the stay is that the security of the creditor not be impaired
during its pendency .364
The existence of an equity should not, of course, in and of itself, sustain
the burden of proof resting on the party seeking continuation of the

m C.l. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146, 152 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("heralded recalcitrance" of only secured creditor of Chapter XII debtor at
"something it has not even learned of' held to be insufficient justification for terminating
stay); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Castle Village Co., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 452, 464 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1977).
359
Cf. In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971).
360
See C.l. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1977), and C.I. Mortgage Group v. Castle Village Co., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 452
(Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The court in In re Schwab Adams, No. 77-B-225 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), cited and quoted in
note 357 supra, acknowledged that a single secured creditor was not allowed to veto a plan
where adequate protection was provided in In re Pine Gate Assoc., Ltd., IO Collier Bankr.
Cas. 581 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1976), and Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marietta Cobb Apt.
Co., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 720 (Ref., S.D.N .Y. 1977), but in each case only one secured creditor
was involved. Bankruptcy Judge Norton had emphasized that fact as a limiting consideration in his opinion in Pine Gate Assoc., but Judge Babitt had not regarded it as one of
controlling significance in Marietta Cobb. The court of appeals in Taylor v. Wood, 458 F.2d
15 (9th Cir. 1972), held a Chapter XII plan incapable of confirmation where the only creditor
affected refused to accept, 458 F.2d at 16. See also Meyer v. Rowen, 195 F.2d 263, 266 (10th
Cir. 1952), where the only secured creditors affected by the plan were related and had the
same interest, and a proposal to provide them adequate protection was said not to authorize
confirmation over their opposition.
361
CJ. In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971) ("creditors have been known
to change their minds when a plan is actually put on the table").
362
See note 337 supra.
363
See note 338 supra.
364
See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217, 1218 (5th Cir. 1973); In
re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 461 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
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stay. 365 Since an equity existing at the threshold of the case may quickly
disappear, the secured creditor should not be delayed in enforcing his
rights if the debtor is in default, unless the secured creditor is protected
against injurious diminution of his collateral, the collateral is necessary to
the reorganization, and the success of the reorganization in the interest of
unsecured creditors is a reasonable possibility. 366
(d). Progress Toward Formulation and Implementation of a Plan-A
factor surfacing in an increasing number of cases where relief from a stay
has been granted is the lack of progress toward the "formulation and
implementation" of a viable plan of reorganization. 367 This is a factor, of
course, that becomes more influential in the disposition of a request for
relief the longer the stay has run. Assessing this factor involves nothing
less than a determination of what is a reasonable period of time for the
debtor, receiver, or trustee to develop a plan and obtain the approvals
requisite to confirmation. No rule of thumb has developed to guide the
courts in making this determination. Before the court can conclude that
the stay has run long enough, all the circumstances bearing on the debtor's situation and the reorganization process must enter into the
calculus-including the causes of the debtor's financial distress, the nature and size of the enterprise, the causes for delay, the prospects for
early resolution of the difficulties producing the delay, the consequences
of further prolongation compared to termination of the stay, and the vigor
of the efforts being made to accomplish the legitimate objectives of the
proceedings.
365
See, e.g., Marshall McGregor v. ABC Dev. & Inv. Co., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 94, 99
(Ref., M.D. Fla. 1977); Bateman Financial Corp. v. Glanville Mortgage Co., 5 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 488, 492 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1975).
366
Trust Co. v. Weems ( In re Hamilton Mortgage Corp.), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 77, 99
(Ref., E.D. Tenn. 1977) (stay limited where little equity existed and unpaid interest was
accruing); In re Advanced Lighting Prod. Co., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 66,466 (Ref., M.D.
Fla. 1977) (inventory subject to floating lien being depleted); First Nat'! Bank v. The
Overmyer Co., Inc., 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 389 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rapid accrual of
interest causing erosion of collateral); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jenifer Mall Corp., 2 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 657, 663 (Ref., D.D.C. 1974) (equity expected to be consumed in five months by
interest accruing during stay); In re Hartsdale Assoc., 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 87, 93 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1976) (relief granted where mortgagee's position was deteriorating because of
accrual of unpaid interest during stay); Northwestern Financial Investors v. O.K. Motels, I
Collier Bankr. Cas. 416, 420 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1974) (collateral diminished by constantly
accruing interest).
367
See, e.g., Lincoln-Alliance Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, 115 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1940)
(foreclosure permitted after stay of 14 months, during which debtor acquired equity but
proposed no plan); Trust Co. v. Weems (In re Hamilton Mortgage Corp.), 13 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 77, 109 (Ref., E.D. Tenn. 1977) (stay of first mortgage limited to 90 more days in
Chapter XI case filed by second mortgagee where no payment of interest had been made
during year of pendency of Chapter XI case and there was no equity in the property); In re
Hartsdale Assoc. 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 87, 93 (Ref., S.D.N .Y. 1976) (stay modified after
eight months); Otay Land Co. v. DLB Dev. Corp., 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 192, 205 (Ref., S.D.
Cal. 1975) (stay terminated after ten months where there was no prospect of financing a
plan); Bateman Financial Corp. v. Glanville Mortgage Co., 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 488, 492-93
(Ref., M.D. Fla. 1975) (14 months' stay could not equitably be extended to permit formulation of plan to pay creditors following upturn in economy); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 387, 393 (Ref., S.D.N. Y. 1975) (stay terminated when
debtor made no movement toward plan during nine months of stay and made no payment on
secured debt).
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The courts have not hesitated to recognize a duty of diligence on the
party seeking continuation of a stay against lien enforcement. Failure to
develop a plan and the conditions conducive to its confirmation may be
viewed as lack of good faith. Prolongation of the stay may indeed be
characterized as unconscionable in light of the debtor's conduct. 368 It is
clear, however, that the burden imposed on the party seeking continuation of the stay requires more than showing an absence of bad faith or of
unconscionability.
If the court perceives or is persuaded that the debtor's real purpose in
filing a petition is to stall the secured creditor in his effort to enforce his
lien against the debtor's property, termination of the automatic stay is
practically automatic. 369 Since this decision is appealable, however, the
termination is not necessarily immediate. The secured creditor is, of
course, often inclined to argue that the debtor's purpose is to delay lien
enforcement, when the court suspects but cannot be certain of the debtor's motives. Except in a clear case, the court is unlikely to terminate the
stay solely on the basis of a finding of an ulterior purpose on the part of
the debtor. 370
Closely related to the consideration that court processes should not be
perverted for the prime purpose of delaying a secured creditor in the
pursuit of his remedies is the notion that Chapter XI should not be a
means of effecting a protracted liquidation. The leading case for this
proposition, In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 371 is currently of uncertain
vitality ,372 but a number of cases have referred to a debtor's purpose to
obtain court supervision of an orderly liquidation as a factor adverse to
the continuation of the stay. 373

368
See, e.g .. First & Merchants Nat'I Bank v. County Green Ltd. Partnership, 438 F.
Supp. 699, 700 (W.D. Va. 1977); Bateman Financial Corp. v. Granville Mortgage Corp., 5
Collier Bankr. Cas. 488, 492-93 (Ref., M.D. Fla. 1975). In the County Green case, the
debtor, a limited partnership, filed a Chapter XI petition within two weeks after commencement of foreclosure procedures to enforce a security agreement covering the debtor's
property, but no plan was submitted until more than a year later. The first plan submitted
was found not to have been filed in good faith, and a second plan required large payments to
the two general partners, subordination of the lien of the construction lender, and forgiveness of interest accrued during the 15 months that had elapsed during the pendency of the
stay.
369
See, e.g., Chaffee County Fluospar Corp. v. Athen, 169 F.2d 448, 450 (10th Cir. 1948);
cf. C.l. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 387, 393 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1975).
370
See, e.g., Mongiello Bros. Coal Corp. v. Houghtaling Properties Inc., 309 F.2d 925,
930 (5th Cir. 1962) (case remanded for findings of fact on the petitioners' good faith where
individual mortgagors had transferred their property to a corporation in contemplation of the
filing of a Chapter X petition).
For a case upholding a stay against foreclosure notwithstanding the court's recognition
that the mortgagor's purpose in incorporating and filing a petition was to frustrate the
foreclosure, see In re Valley Gold Ranch, Inc., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 710 (Ref., N.D. Cal.
1977), abstracted at note 284 supra.
371
188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951).
372
See Rosenberg, Corporate Rehabilitation Under the Bankruptcy Act of /973: Are
Repons of the Demise of Chapter XI Greatly Exaggerated?, 53 N .C. L. REv. 1149, 1190
(I 975).
373
Pledger v. Red Carpet Corp., II Collier Bankr. Cas. 487, 490 (Ref., N.D. Fla. 1976);
Northwestern Financial Investors v. O.K. Motels, I Collier Bankr. Cas. 416, 419-20 (Ref.,
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(e). Hospitality for Proponents of Rehabilitation-Many opinions have
given eloquent expression to the recognition of a congressional purpose to
afford a debtor in financial distress a fair opportunity to rehabilitate his
enterprise under the protection and with the assistance of the court. 374
Although there is little or no support for the-notion in either the language
of the Act or its legislative history, a congressional preference for reorganization or rehabilitation over liquidation is sometimes declared. 375
Since a stay that preserves the status quo is conducive if not indispensable to the exploration and exploitation of the opportunity to develop a
viable plan, 376 the party seeking prolongation of the stay in a chapter case
is typically accorded a hospitable reception when he undertakes to show
reasonable likelihood of success in the reorganization effort. 377
The predisposition of the courts in favor of reorganization is reinforced
if the proponent of the stay can point to a public interest in the continuity
of the debtor's enterprise. The public interest may be found in the
economic dependence of a community on the continuation of the enterprise. The possibility of preservingjobs for a substantial number of people
may be mentioned as a reason for staying a lienor from closing down a
going enterprise. 378 Provision of a needed service or manufacture of a
needed article of commerce by the debtor is a factor favorable to the
argument for a stay that will permit the troubled enterprise to continue. 379
M.D. Fla. 1974); cf. In re Spicewood Assoc., 445 F. Supp. 564, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (secured
creditor's objection that debtor's Chapter XII plan proposed liquidation considered but case
dismissed on other grounds); Otay Land Co. v. DLB. Dev. Corp., 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 192,
206 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1975).
374
See In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d '!,67, 369 (2d Cir. 1971), referring to "the Congressional mandate to encourage attempts at corporate reorganization where there is a reasonable possibility of success"; C.l. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 146, 149. 151, 153 (Ref., S.D.N. Y. 1977), where the court speaks of "the
national legislature's grand design for insolvencies."
375
See, e.g., Carlton lndust., Inc. v. Philadelphia Import Center, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1312,
1314 (Ref., E.D. Va. 1976) where it is stated that "as a principle of national economy,
preservation of a business is preferred to its liquidation." The court inferred congressional
support for this statement from a quotation from H.R. REP. No. 479, accompanying H.R.
2517, 90th Cong., !st Sess. ( 1967), which referred to the "object" of Chapters X, XI and XII
"to reorganize and rehabilitate a business rather than to liquidate it."
376
See In re First Baptist Church, Inc., 564 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1977), where the court
speaks of the "Chapter X court's obligation to preserve the status quo in order to afford
interested parties a reasonable opportunity to formulate and implement a plan designed to
mend the debtor's failing financial structure."
377
See Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Bergman, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas.
222, 228 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977), where the court said that a Chapter XII petition should be
dismissed for "bad faith" only where it can be demonstrated that there "is not the slightest
rehabilitation factor in the debtor's equation.''
378
See. e.g .. Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 715
(Ref., D. Me. 1976); Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 542, 544, 547
(Ref., W.D. Mich. 1974). Courts of equity have traditionally taken considerations involving
the public interest into account in exercising discretion to grant or deny requests for
injunctive relief. 11 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2948,
at 431, 451 (1973).
379
In re Bolton Hall Nursing Home, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 90 (D. Mass. 1977) (Chapter
XI and XII cases involving several nursing homes); Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty
Trust v. Bergman, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 222, 226-27 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (involving a
nursing home where trustee in Chapter XII case had taken action in interest of patients and
creditors).
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Cf). The "Balance of Hurt" -A related consideration is that foreclosure
of a lien may sacrifice substantial value, to the detriment and injury of
unsecured creditors and the debtor or i.ts stockholders. When the court is
persuaded that the stay will help to avoid that sacrifice, without inflicting
a comparable injury on the lienor, the burden resting on the proponent of
the stay is significantly mitigated. 380 The bankruptcy courts sometimes
talk of the "balance of hurt" in resolving the conflict between the secured
creditor, 38 I who is subject to possible injury by being denied prompt
realization on his collateral, and the debtor, who may lose the going
concern value of his property if liens on it are enforced.
A factor of undoubted influence in favor of the proponent of a stay
against lien enforcement is the greater risk of harm that a premature or
erroneous decision terminating a stay may be supposed to inflict on the
debtor and the unsecured creditors, compared to the effect on the lienor
of a similarly ill considered decision continuing the stay. 382 It is not
demonstrable that undue leniency in prolonging a stay against lien enforcement generally damages the lienor less than undue strictness in
terminating a stay damages the debtor and the unsecured creditors. The
impact of a lien enforcement against the property of a going enterprise is
nevertheless likely to be more palpable and irrevocable than is the continuation of the stay of the secured creditor.

C. Modes of Relief from an Automatic Stay

The automatic stay rules recognize that relief may take any of several
forms: the stay may be terminated, annulled, modified, or conditioned.
38
° Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Bergman, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 222,
228 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (permitting foreclosure would extinguish debtor's equity and

interest of other creditors, and mortgagee would realize a windfall profit by bidding on
property); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Castle Village Co., 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 452, 463
("While C.I. [the mortgagee] might be better off after foreclosure, that is not the test; and
the effect on the debtor would be disastrous."); Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan, 2
Collier Bankr. Cas. 542, 551 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1974), abstracted at note 162 supra. But cf.
In re Cassidz, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 226, 229 (E.D.N. Y. 1974), where a threat of irreparable
injury to the debtor from a denial of the stay and lack of irreparable injury resulting from the
stay were held to be insufficient justification for continuing the stay. The district court
remanded the case to the referee for findings on the debtor's good faith, the feasibility of the
plan, the existence of the debtor's equity, and the reasonableness of the delay of the
mortgagee.
381
C.I. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146, 153 (Ref.,
S.D.N.Y. 1977); C.I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mtn. Corp., 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 387,
394 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also In re Hosmer, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1166,778 (Ref.,
N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Creed Bros., Inc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 426, 430 (Ref., S.D.N.Y.
1977); McGregor v. ABC Dev. & Inv. Co., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 94, 99 (Ref., M.D. Fla.
1977), where the court noted, however, that "[t]he objective of Chapter XI is
rehabilitation-not resurrection."
Courts of equity have, of course, traditionally engaged in balancing the interests of the
parties likely to be affected when exercising discretion in passing on requests for injunctive
relief. 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1164.04[ I]. at 65-41 to 45 (2d ed. 1972); I IC. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2948, at 431, 442-47 (1973).
382
See, e.g., C.I. Mortgage Group v. Nevada Towers Assoc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 146,
156 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Lax Enterprises, JI Collier Bankr. Cas. 628, 632 (Ref.,
N.D. Ohio 1976).
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When it is terminated, the creditor or other party liberated thereby is free
to pursue whatever remedy had theretofore been stayed. Termination
ordinarily operates only in favor of the party in whose favor the court has
entered an order granting relief. There may be circumstances, however,
where the order clears the way for other persons to pursue remedies
against the debtor or its property without seeking specific relief from the
court.
An order of annulment does not merely terminate a stay but declares it
ineffective against actions, proceedings, or acts that occurred before the
order of annulment was entered. The annulment prescribed by Rule
40l(c) for a stay against any action or judgment of a creditor whose claim
is neither scheduled nor filed is itself automatic and thus requires no
request for relief by the creditor, who presumably has no knowledge of
the pendency of the bankruptcy. If a debtor wishes to contest such an
annulment, he should proceed pursuant to Rule 765 to obtain injunctive
relief against the creditor, and perhaps a determination of dischargeability
of the creditor's claim. 383
A creditor may seek relief from the stay in order to satisfy a condition
precedent to the liability of a surety or insurer. Such relief should be
routinely available, and the court may protect the debtor while granting
the relief by entering an injunction against the creditor's enforcement of
any judgment he obtains against the debtor or the debtor's property. 384
Bankruptcy courts have often been unwilling either to terminate or to
continue the stay indefinitely. Realizing the potential harm a prolonged
stay may inflict on a secured creditor, the court may place a time limit on
the duration of the stay against lien enforcement. 385 The limit may be
fixed or flexible. The court may permit a pending action to continue to
judgment but enjoin the enforcement of the judgment by levy 386 or by
sale. 387 If the stay protects the debtor's possession of collateral and the
debtor is using the collateral, the court may condition the stay on con-

383

See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
The Supreme Court originally suggested this technique in Hill v. Harding, 130 U.S. 699
(1889), in a case arising under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, when a creditor of a discharged
bankrupt wished to satisfy a c:ondition precedent to the imposition ofliability on an insurer.
385
See, e.g., Trust Co. v. Weems (In re Hamilton Mortgage Corp.), 13 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 77, 100 (Ref., E.D. Tenn. 1977) (stay continued for 90 days to permit consummation of
settlements).
386
See, e.g., Leavenworth Nat'I Bank v. Visocsky, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 688, 692 (Ref.,
D. Kan. 1977) ("reclamation" said to be granted but execution stayed during payments
pursuant to Chapter XIII plan).
387
See, e.g., Associated Midwest, Inc. v. White Birch Park, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1342, 1346
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (suggesting that on remand the bankruptcy judge might modify the stay to
allow continuation of a mortgage foreclosure action but to remain operative against any
execution or enforcement of a judgment for the mortgagee); In re Hartsdale Assoc., 13
Collier Bankr. Cas. 692, 694, 708 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (second and third mortgagees
allowed to foreclose "up to the point of sale").
In In re First Baptist Church, Inc., 564 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1977), the bankruptcy judge
authorized a foreclosure to proceed in state court but reserved authority to review the sale
results before authorizing issuance of a title certificate by the debtor. The court rejected an
effort by the trustee to reinstate the stay of the foreclosure sale because notice to creditors of
the sale did not conform to the requirements of Rule 203.
384
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tinued installment and interest payments to the secured creditor. A celebrated case, In re Bermec, 388 conditioned the stay on the making of
periodic payments to the secured creditor equal to the economic depreciation of the collateral during its use by the trustee of the debtor. Other
conditions protective of the secured credtor's interest have been attached
to the continuation of the stay. 389
The role of the automatic stay in Chapter XIII cases has been noteworthy. Although a Chapter XIII plan cannot deal with debt secured by real
estate 390 or, except when the creditor consents, with debt secured by
personal property, 391 bankruptcy courts have enjoined the enforcement
of liens against both kinds of property pursuant to section 614 of the
Act. 392 As earlier indicated ,393 issuance of such injunctions has generally
been governed by restrictions formulated in Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual
Life Insurance Co. 394 An injunction against lien enforcement will be
granted if: the injunction is necessary to preserve the debtor's estate or to
carry out the debtor's plan; the injunction does not impair the creditor's

388
The opinion of Bankruptcy Judge Herzog is unpublished, but his finding that the
trustees should pay the "economic depreciation" on the secured creditors' equipment in
order to preserve the status quo was upheld in In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir.
1971). The debtor's petition under Chapter X was upheld against an attack by secured
creditors on the ground that it was not filed in good faith.
The secured creditor was also protected against economic depreciation during the period
of stay in the following cases: Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1973) (although delinquent in making installment payments, Chapter XIII debtor had
made payments "roughly" covering the depreciation on the car during the pendency of the
plan); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (stay
conditioned on monthly payments covering economic depreciation and on liquidating secured debt during term of plan); Leavenworth Nat'I Bank v. Visocsky, 13 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 688, 689 (Ref., D. Kan. 1977) (payments exceeded monthly depreciation on two motor
vehicles and tractor under a Chapter XIII plan); Bank of Virginia Tidewater v. Porter, 8
Collier Bankr. Cas. 18, 19, 22 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976) (reduced installment payments more
than covered economic depreciation of automobile, the value of which exceeded the debt).
389
See, e.g., Citicorp Business Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc., 407 F. Supp.
861, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (financial information required to be transmitted regularly to
secured creditor and court during pendency of Chapter XI case); In re Stevens Enterprises,
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 12, 15-16 (E.D. P-a. 1957) (injunction against mortgage foreclosure to be
terminated within one week unless debtor remedied all defaults under first mortgages and
paid into court enough to cover operating deficit for next nine months, insurance installment
due, accrued taxes, and $5,000 as advance on trustee's administrative expenses); In re
Creed Bros., Inc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 426, 431 (Ref., S.D.N. Y. 1977) (to insure that the
creditor secured by accounts receivable would receive 60% of the proceeds of sales, debtor
directed to submit monthly statements and information required by creditor to monitor its
security interest); In re Lax Enterprises, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 628, 632-33 (Ref., N .D. Ohio
1976) (debtor required to submit periodic reports of financial operations during period of
stay).
390
Bankruptcy Act§ 606( I) defines "claims" for the purpose of Chapter XIII to exclude
those secured by estates in real property or chattels real.
391
Claims secured by personal property are included in § 606( I) of the Bankruptcy Act,
but, before an application for confirmation can be made, § 652(1) requires a majority of
creditors whose claims are dealt with by the plan to accept it in writing.
392
See, e.g., Illinois Nat'l Barik & Trust Co. v. Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960)
(reclamation of personal property subject to conditional sales contracts enjoined); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963) (foreclosure of mortgage on
real property enjoined).
393
See notes 337-38 & 362-63 and accompanying text supra.
a9 • 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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security; and the secured creditor is not required to accept any reduction
in the installment payments. The court added preliminarily that the court
must also be satisfied of the debtor's good faith and his ability to perform. 395 The automatic stay of Rule 13-401 has generally been applied
with due deference to the restrictions specified in Hallenbeck. Both
before and since the promulgation of the Rules, however, the courts have
been qualifying the third restriction. 396 Thus, several cases have authorized continuation of the stay, notwithstanding a failure by the debtor
to maintain a payment schedule in compliance with the security agreement. 397 In particular, the courts have allowed the debtor to cure defaults
by making installment payments within a fixed or a" reasonable" time. 398
In several cases 399 the courts reduced monthly payments to secured
creditors. In three of them the creditors' secured claims were reduced to
the appraised value of their collateral, and the deficiencies were treated as
unsecured claims. 400 In two of the cases the court conditioned the continuation of the stay on the debtor's making payments according to a
schedule which would compensate for economic depreciation but which
neither conformed to the security agreement nor constituted part of the
Chapter XIII plan. 401 The secured creditors in these cases had not con395

Id. at 572. See note 330 and accompanying text supra.
Cases antedating the Rules include Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d
1217, 1219-20 (5th Cir. 1973), where the debtor was allowed to cure defaults by periodic
payments along with the payments at the contract rate on his car-purchase contract; In re
Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967), where a secured creditor was denied
reclamation of his collateral and the Chapter XIII plan provided for payment of the secured
debt according to the contract except for a balloon payment at the end. For cases since the
advent of the Rules see notes 397-403 infra.
397
Leavenworth Nat'I Bank v. Visocsky, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 688 (Ref., D. Kan. 1977);
cf. In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (E.D. Ky. 1971) (right of trustee to reject
executory contracts said to negate secured creditor's right to insist on payment according to
contract). See also the cases cited in notes 398-403 infra.
398
Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217, 1220 (5th Cir. 1973) (referee
instructed to specify date for curing delinquency in payments); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp.
933 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (delinquent payments required made within 30 days); Moore v.
Mortgage Assoc., Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 943 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1976) (defaults required to
be cured within reasonably short period); In re Pilson, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 662 (Ref., W.D.
Va. 1976) (delinquency to be liquidated within 9 months).
399
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652, 653 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357, 358 (E.D. Ark. 1975); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518, 524 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Bank of Virginia Tidewater v.
Porter, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18, 19 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976); First Nat'l Bank v. Freeman, I
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 576 (Ref., M.D. Ga. 1975).
400
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652, 653 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357, 358 (E.D. Ark. 1975); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518, 521-22 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The rulings in all three cases
were predicated on the provision in Rule 13-307(d) authorizing division of a partially secured
creditor's claim into two claims, one secured and the other unsecured. In Bank of Virginia
Tidewater v. Porter, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976) and First Nat'I Bank v.
Freeman, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 576 (Ref., M.D. Ga. 1975), the secured creditor's collateral was
found to exceed the balance of the secured debt still owing.
401
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518, 524 (C.D. Cal. 1974);
Bank of Virginia Tidewater v. Porter, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 18, 22 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976).
The affirmance of the bankruptcy judge in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McKee, 416 F. Supp.
652, 653 (E.D. Ark. 1976) presumably left the stay prescribed by Rule 13-401(a) in effect.
1nferably the plans in McKee and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357, 358
(E.D. Ark. 1975) provided for the payments to the secured creditor, and in Wall he was to
receive interest on both the secured and unsecured portions of his claim.at the contract rate.
396
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sented to the resulting modifications of their contracts, and the courts
appear to have subjected them to a kind of "cramdown" without a
statutory provision for it in Chapter XIII .402 Since the creditors would
receive full payment of their claims, however, the creditors were deemed
not to be adversely affected. 403
A grant or denial of relief from the automatic stay is appealable. 404
When a secured creditor proceeded with a foreclosure within ten days
after entry of the order granting relief, the fact that the order remained
appealable during the period was held not to invalidate the sale. 405

VI.

EFFECTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY

A. Effect of Acts in Violation of the Stay

As previously noted, 406 a stay prescribed by the Bankruptcy Rules is
effective without the entry of any court order against any person or act or
proceeding subject to the stay. The fact that a person subject to the stay

402
In Wolff v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Moralez), 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Cal. 1975), the
court held that a secured creditor of a Chapter XIII debtor cannot be compelled to accept
less than full payment of all installments provided by his contract, irrespective of the value
of the collateral. The provision in Rule 13-307(d) authorizing allowance of a secured claim to
the extent of the value of the security interest held by the creditor was declared to be invalid
because it modified the secured creditor's substantive right to full performance of his
contract. Id. at 1355. It is a stultifying construction of a provision of the Bankruptcy Act to
attribute substantive significance to the interest of a creditor merely because he has used the
form and phraseology of a security agreement, and to ignore the limitations inhering in the
value of collateral, if any. See Anderson, Partially Secured Creditors: Their Rights and
Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 37 LA. L. REV. 1003, 1018, 1021 (1977);
Countryman, Partially Secured Creditors Under Chapter XIII, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269
(1976); but cf. Williams, Chapter XIII: The (Partially) Secured Creditor and Bankruptcy
Rule XIII-307(d), 32 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 37 (1978).
403
See In re Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Ark. 1975); In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp.
353, 357 (W.D. Ark. 1967) (extending time of "balloon payment" acknowledged to be
technically dealing with creditor's contract, but not materially and adversely affecting it);
Sterchi Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67, 69 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (postponement of
last two installments said not to materially and adverse!:,;- affect creditor); cf. General
Finance Corp. v. Gamer, 556 F.2d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 1977) (secured creditor of Chapter Xlll
debtor held not materially and adversely affected !Sy being compelled to accept $1000 credit
on account of its violation of Truth-in-Lending Act and consequent reduction of monthly
payments on its secured debt).
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217, 1219 (5th Cir., 1973), the court
said that notwithstanding some delay caused by the debtor's default, the secured creditor
had not been required by the plan "to surrender any essential rights under its contract."
See. also Poulos, The Secured Creditor in Wage Earner Proceedings: Dream Versus
Reality, 44 REF. J. 68 (1970); Note, Effectuating the Purposes of Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 22 ME. L. REV. 401 (1970).
404
2 COLLIER ,i,i 24.38[1], at 791 ri.14 (1975); 2 id. ,i 24.38[2], at 792 nn.17, 18 (1975); 13 id.
,i 801.06 (1975). Cf. Reliance Standard Life v. Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th
Cir. 1977) (stay held improperly terminated on premature appeal by mortgagee from order
determining only that mortgagee was a partially unsecured creditor for purpose of voting his
claim).
405
In re Del Mar Properties, Ltd., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 659 (Ref., S.D. Cal. 1976).
406
See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
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has received no notice and has no knowledge of the filing of the petition
does not negate the stay's effectiveness, 407 although lack of knowledge
may have a bearing on the appropriate sanction to be applied to a violator
of the stay. 408
The assumption underlying the stay rules is that any act or step taken in
any proceeding in disregard of the stay is a nullity, unless the stay is itself
annulled. 409 Annulment is explicitly provided for an unscheduled creditor
who does not file a claim before the lapse of the thirty-day period following the first day set for the first meeting of creditors. 410 Moreover, the
bankruptcy court may annul the stay in granting relief to a person subject
to the stay. 411 Otherwise the stay is intended to be operative according to
its terms until it is terminated, modified, or conditioned as provided by
the relevant rule.
Notwithstanding the usual assumption repeating the effect of a stay
until modified, the courts are not bound to treat acts and proceedings that
occur in violation of the automatic stay as nullities. 412 Dismissal of an
action commenced in violation of the stay is not mandatory, whether or
not the stay itself is continued. 413 The stay does not divest any court of
407

See In re Ducich, 3 Collier Bankr. Cas. 733, 738 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
See note 437 and accompanying text infra.
409
Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips Foods Corp., 536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976) (service of
garnishee summons nullified); In re Mott, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1146 (Ref., D. Conn. 1975)
(default judgment on $20,000 gambling debt invalidated); In re Koledin, I Bankr. Ct. Dec.
977 (Ref. N .D. Cal. 1975) (judgment for punitive damages for breach of warranty and deceit
nullified); In re Butcher, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 913 (Ref., N.D. Ohio 1975) (judgment lien
deemed invalid).
Disregard of the automatic stay of§ 148 or § 428 of the Bankruptcy Act has led to a similar
result. See Meyer v. Rowen, 181 F.2d 715, 716 (10th Cir. 1950), and 195 F.2d 263, 266 (10th
Cir. 1952), declaring sales in violation of the automatic stay of§ 428 null and void; Potts v.
Potts, 142 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868 ( 1945), holding state court
foreclosure judgment in violation of automatic stay of§ 428 to be without efficacy; In re
Maier Brewing Co., 38 F. Supp. 806, 817-18 (S.D. Cal. 1941), construing the effect of the
automatic stay of§ 148 on a pending mortgage foreclosure suit in state court and citing Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940). But cf. George F. Weaver Sons Co. v. Burgess, 7
N.Y.2d 172, 164 N.E.2d 677, 1% N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959), recognizing that tax foreclosure
proceedings against property of debtor after approval of its Chapter X petition were defective but holding that state statute oflimitations barred debtor's action to avoid deeds issuing
pursuant to the foreclosure proceedings, 4\.2 years having intervened between dismissal of
the Chapter X case and the debtor's bringing of the avoidance action.
410
Bankr. Rule 401(c). See text accompanying note 115 supra.
411
The court may wish to grant such relief in order to remove any cloud as to the validity
of an act done in technical violation of the stay and to eliminate the necessity for a formal
repetition of the act.
412
See, e.g., Moore v. U.S. Nat'I Bank (In re Tallyn), I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 487 (Ref., E.D.
Va. 1975) (repossession and sale of automobile in violation of stay held to be punishable by
fine but secured creditor allowed to keep proceeds of sale).
413
Willis v. Gladding Corp., 567 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1978); David v. Hooker Music, Ltd.,
14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1977); Baum v. Anderson, 541 F.2d 1166, 1170 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977). In the petition for certiorari in Baum, the
debtor argued that refusal to order dismissal of a foreclosure action commenced in violation
of the stay constituted a denial of his right to equal protection of the laws. 45 U.S. L. W. 3545
( 1977). Since the state court had ordered the sheriff to seize and sell property subject to the
mortgage, the court of appeals thought it meet for the district court to enter a formal order of
stay to reinforce the automatic stay. Such an order entered by the district judge avoids the
troublesome question whether the filing of a petition with the bankruptcy court stays
another court notwithstanding the proviso of § 2a(l5) of the Bankruptcy Act, authorizing
only a district judge to issue an injunction of another court.
408
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jurisdiction of an action or proceeding subject to the stay, 414 and contempt proceedings predicated on disobedience of a court order have been
held not to be subject to the stay provided for in Rule 401. 415 The stay is
neither an order to a receiver in a nonbankruptcy proceeding to turn over
the property nor a discharge of the receiver's responsibilities under the
order that appointed him. The circumstances may dictate that the receiver
seek and obtain instructions from the court that appointed him with
respect to his future duties. If the stay was triggered by a petition in a
chapter case, the exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
vested in the bankruptcy court dictates that the receiver's acts respecting
the debtor and the property must be taken with due deference to the
paramount authority of the bankruptcy court.
B. Contempt and Other Sanctions

The automatic stay rules do not themselves prescribe any sanction or
procedure to be followed when a stay is disregarded, whether knowingly
or innocently. A conventional remedy available against one who disobeys
a stay ordered by a court is a citation for contempt. 416 No case has been
found imposing or considering the availability of contempt sanctions on a
violator of any of the statutory stays referred to in the opening section of
this article. Violations of the automatic stays prescribed by the Bankruptcy Rules have, however, been punished by fines and other monetary
sanctions in a number of reported cases. 417
414
First Wis. Nat') Bank of Milwaukee v. Grandlich Dev. Corpo., 565 F.2d 879, 880 (5th
Cir. 1978); David v. Hooker Music, Ltd .. 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1977).
In First Wis. Nat'/ Bank, the district court dismissed two Chapter XI debtors from
mortgage foreclosure proceedings pending against them. The dismissal order extended to
these parties' counterclaim against the mortgagee for usury. When the debtors thereafter
sought an amendment or vacation of the order of dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) in order to revive their counterclaim, the court denied relief with the
following observation: "Whether or not the district court had jurisdiction to dismiss Grandlich and Fisher as parties to the foreclosure suit, an order that could in no way prejudice
them, it did have jurisdiction to dismiss their counterclaim." 565 F .2d at 880.
415
David v. Hooker Music, Ltd., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court followed earlier cases construing stays entered pursuant to §§ 2a( 15) and 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act as not effective to bar contempt proceedings in the non bankruptcy court. In
re Spagat, 4 F. Supp. 926, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); In re Hall, 170 F. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
In David v. Hooker. the bankrupt had failed•to answer interrogatories as ordered by a
magistrate before the filing of the petition and as ordered by the district judge after the filing
of the petition. The district court stayed the action but ordered discovery proceedings to
continue. 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 304-05.
In the Spagat case, an order to appear for examination had been served on the bankrupt a
few hours after the filing of the petition, and imposition of contempt sanctions was said not
to frustrate any objective of the Bankruptcy Act. 4 F. Supp. at 927. In the Hall case, the act
of disobedience had occurred prior to the filing of the petition and the punishment was
determined and imposed later. 170 F. at 721.
416
See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i 65.02[4] (2d ed. 1972).
411
See, e.g., Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977), discussed in the text accompanying notes 420, 422
and 430-54 infra: Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Quinnett Bank & Trust Co .. 400 F. Supp. 280.
284-85 (N .D. Ga. 1975) (setoff by bank); Holifield v. Pacific Finance Co .. 10 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 696, 705 (Ref., S.D. Ala. 1976) Gudgment obtained by default and garnishment of
debtor's employer; contemner required to pay $100 for bankrupt's attorney's fee, $150 as
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An argument against the availability of the contempt sanction is predicated on the fact that section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act expressly grants
jurisdiction to courts of bankruptcy only to "[e]nforce obedience ... to all
lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment,'' and to
"[p]unish ... for contempts committed before referees. " 418 Rule 920,
governing contempt proceedings, provides a procedure only for conduct
prohibited by section 4la of the Bankruptcy Act, and that section does
not prohibit violations of the Rules. 419 Since a rule is not made enforceable by fine or imprisonment and its violation is not made punishable by
the Act, and since no procedure is provided for governing contempt
proceedings against violators of the Rules, it has been contended that
bankruptcy courts lack any authority to enforce the automatic stay by
contempt proceedings. 420
The courts have generally rejected arguments challenging their power
to enforce the stay rules by holding violators in contempt. 421 The Court of
compensation for reopening bankruptcy case, and a $100 coercive fine); In re Tillery, 2
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 798 (Ref., S.D. Ala. 1976) (liability imposed on contemner for attorney's
fees and expenses incurred by bankrupt in state court and in contempt proceedings in
bankruptcy court and for a coercive $50 fine); Moore v. U.S. Nat'I Bank (In re Tallyn), I
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 487 (Ref., E.D. Va. 1975) ($100 fine imposed on repossessing secured
creditor); In re Gann, I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 154 (Ref., E.D. Tenn. 1974) (attorney's fees
awarded to bankrupt subjected to threats of legal action); but cf. Household Finance Corp.
v. Smith, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 653, 657 (E.D. Va. 1975) (fine and award of attorney's fees
reversed because held to be unauthorized).
In Ben Hyman & Co. v. Fulton Nat'I Bank, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 145, 156-57 (Ref., N.D.
Ga. 1976), a bank exercising setoff after the filing of a Chapter XI petition was ordered to
restore funds by a deposit in a special trust account within five days or to pay a $200 fine for
contempt. The district court reversed the judgment of contempt on review because the bank
was deemed to be innocent of any willful action in view of the uncertainty of the law
governing the bank's right of setoff. 423 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
418
Bankruptcy Act § 2a(l3) and (16).
419
Section 41a of the Bankruptcy Act is substantially a paraphrase of the general federal
statute defining criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). Clause (3) of the latter section
makes punishable by a court of the United States disobedience of "its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command." Section 41a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act refers to disobedience only of "any lawful order, process, or writ." As pointed out in In re Brown, 454 F.2d
999, 1006 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 401 is "totally
unilluminating," but the inclusion of the word "order" in § 41a of the Bankruptcy Act is
entirely consistent with a congressional intent to make disobedience of a general order in
bankruptcy punishable. The omission of the word "rule" from the section is explicable for
the reason that there were no Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 1898 when Congress
enacted the section in substantially its present form. For a holding that violation of a court
rule of practice and procedure may be punishable pursunt to 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), see
Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1967); but see In re Brown, 454 F.2d
999, 1006 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
420
See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
421
See id.; Verran v. United States, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 288, 302 (Ref., E.D. Mich.
1977), vacated on other grounds, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 47 (E.D. Mich. 1978); contra Household
Finance Corp. v. Smith, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 653, 657 (E.D. Va. 1975). The court ofappeals
in the Fidelity Mortgage Investors case regarded the argument of the contemners as "almost
equivalent to saying that the courts cannot enforce the rules at all" and, in any event,
inconsistent with the objective of the Bankruptcy Rules to secure the expeditious and
speedy processing of petitions under the Act. 550 F.2d at 52. Effectiveness of the automatic
stay is not so wholly dependent on the availability of the contempt sanctions as the court
suggests. See cases cited in notes 406-15 and accomanying text supra. On the other hand, it
is frequently impossible or impracticable to nullify acts in disregard of the stay. Judge
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Appeals for the Second Circuit characterized the argument based on the
lack of any literal reference to rules in section 41a of the Bankruptcy Act
as "overly-formalistic" and "unpersuasive. " 422 If only a violation of a
court-issued order staying an act or proceeding can be punished as a
contempt, the stay rules may be revised to include a requirement that the
court sign an order written in the language of subdivisions (a) and (b) of
those rules. As earlier indicated, 423 many courts already supplement the
automatic stays with formal orders restraining substantially the same
conduct as that covered by the automatic stay. Limiting the enforceability
of the stay to situations where this ritual was performed by the personnel
of the bankruptcy court reduces the court to a mockery.
The argument would be more substantial if it insisted that no person can
be held in contempt for violating a stay unless entered by a court after
notice and hearing. Sustaining this position, however, would aggravate
existing difficulties of protecting debtors' estates from dispersion and
depredation by aggressive claimants. It is not and ought not to be the law
that any creditor or other person can bring any action and do any legal act
to enforce his claim until he has been restrained by a court order issued
after notice and hearing. The automatic stays seek to preserve the status
quo, 424 and the equity receivership cases contain numerous instances of
the power of the court to protect its custody of the debtor's property from
interference by any person, irrespective of the basis for his claim. 425 To
require prior notice and hearing as a condition to the enforceability of a
stay of proceedings against a debtor or of an act to enforce a lien against
his property would give the aggressive creditor an advantage incompatible with the objectives and fundamental assumptions of a rational bankruptcy system.
The power of Congress to regulate punishment for contempt of federal
courts has frequently been recognized by the Supreme Court, 426 but the
Court has also carefully acknowledged the inherent power of the courts of
the United States' 'when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction
over any subject. " 427 The inherent power of the bankruptcy courts to
Graafeiland in his dissent suggested inferentially, by citing Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F .2d 235
(2d Cir. 1961), that the court's power to dismiss proceedings may be used against person
violating a stay. 550 F.2d at 61 n.5. The suggestion seems particularly inapropos when the
violator is not in court or is in a court other than the bankruptcy court. Another possibility
for remedying violations of the stay is to require the injured person to prove damages in an
adversary proceeding or a plenary action. Cf. In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, .106, 109 (3d Cir.
1967); Shaffer v. Anderson, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 327 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1977), cited in
note 455 infra. Requiring resort to such a procedure would eliminate to a substantial degree
the advantage the automatic stay was intended to provide over an injunction or restraining
order issued by the court pursuant to its statutory injunctive powers and Rule 765.
422
Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 550 F.2d at 52.
423
See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
424
See In re First Baptist Church, Inc., 564 F .2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 199 (1956).
425
See, e.g .. Ex parte Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 181, 182 (1893) (denying release on writ of
habeas corpus to sheriff imprisoned for attempting to collect taxes out of property in custody
of federal equity receiver); I R. CLARK, LAW OF RECEIVERS§§ 47, 58 (3d ed. 1959); 2 id.
§§ 627, 631.
426
See, e.g .. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-67 (1924).
427
Id. at 75-6.
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punish for contempt was early and authoritatively recognized under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 428 Although the Bankruptcy Act confers jurisdiction on courts of bankruptcy to enforce obedience to lawful orders and
to punish persons for contempts committed before referees, 429 section
41b required a referee to certify the facts concerning any act forbidden by
that section to the district judge for summary hearing and disposition.
This procedure has been modified by Rule 920 to authorize the referee as
bankruptcy judge to punish any minor contempt by a fine of not more than
$250 without certification to the district judge.
In Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 430 Bankruptcy
Judge Herzog, a referee sitting in the Southern District of New York
where a Chapter XI petition was pending, conducted a hearing and
determined that rival lienors, their officers, and counsel had violated the
automatic stay that became operative on the filing of the petition by
instituting litigation against the debtor in a federal court in Mississippi.
After holding the parties in contempt, however, Judge Herzog "certified
the matter" to the district judge for imposition of an appropriate punishment. 431 The district judge conducted a hearing but accepted Bankruptcy
Judge Herzog's findings of fact as not clearly erroneous. The contemners
were ordered to pay costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees for the
defense of the action in Mississippi and the prosecution of the contempt
proceeding, and to obtain the return of a $76,000 deposit made in the
Mississippi action. 432
The contemners appealed the judgment, urging a battery of grounds for
reversal. All were rejected in a sweeping opinion by Circuit Judge Smith
in which Judge Mansfield concurred but to which Judge Graafeiland
dissented. A request for rehearing en bane was denied by the court of
appeals, and a petition for certiorari was likewise denied by the Supreme
Court. 433 The court's rejection of the challenge to the power of the
bankruptcy court has already been referred to. 434 Because of the significance of the other rulings of the court of appeals on the points of challenge
made to the contempt judgments, they are discussed briefly seriatim
below.
First, the contemners contended that Rule 11-44 was unclear and could
not therefore be the basis for a valid adjudication of contempt. The court
agreed that a court order must be "specific and definite" in order for a

428

Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 F. 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1902).
See note 418 supra.
550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976).
431
Id. at 50.
432
Id. Circuit Judge Graafeiland, dissenting, noted that counsel for appellants from Texas
"have been fined $20,000 for alleged violation of a rule governing the practice and procedure
of a bankruptcy court in New York City in a proceeding in which they were not even
parties." 550 F.2d at 58. Presumably the "$20,000 fine" was the aggregate of the joint and
several liabilities imposed on all the defendants.
433
429 U.S. 1093 (1977). Thirteen issues were presented to the Court by the petition. 45
U.S.L.W. 3438 (Dec. 21, 1976). After denial of the petition for certiorari, rehearing was
requested and denied. 430 U.S. 976 (1977).
434
See notes 418-23 and accompanying text supra.
42
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person to be guilty of contempt for violating it, 435 but the court found it
"difficult to conceive of a rule with a more apparent and certain meaning. "436
Second, the contemners contended that they could not be punished for
violating a stay of which they had no knowledge. The court of appeals
agreed with that proposition437 but sustained Judge Herzog's finding that
all the defendants had knowledge of the Chapter XI petition and the
consequent stay.
Third, the contemners contended that the district judge erred in accepting the findings of the referee as not clearly erroneous rather than trying
the facts de novo. Prior to the promulgation of Rule 920 there were rulings
supporting the contention that a referee's findings of fact were not entitled
to any weight on a certification to the district judge, 438 even when the
judge had referred the matter to the referee for report.
In conducting the hearing and determining the facts on the issue of
whether the contemners were guilty of contemptuous conduct and in
certifying the matter to the district judge for determination and imposition
of the appropriate punishment, Judge Herzog adopted a novel procedure
that is neither authorized nor prohibited by the Rules. 439 Neither the
district court nor the court of appeals found any fault with this procedure.440 The court of appeals appeared to think that Rules 752(a) and 810
required the district judge to accept the referee's findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous. Rule 810 applies only to an appeal from a referee to the
district judge, however, and Rule 752 is intended to govern the review of
findings of fact in adversary proceedings and contested matters in bankruptcy cases, whether such findings are made by a referee or district
judge. 441 Nevertheless, as long as the power to impose an onerous penalty
is vested in and exercised by a district judge, the facts of an alleged
contempt committed in the bankruptcy court may appropriately be found
by the referee, as they are by the district judge in a case involving
contempt of his court. Since the contempt charged in the Fidelity Mortgage Investors case appeared not to involve disrespect to or criticism of
the referee, his conduct of the hearing on the facts and the deference
shown his findings by the district court and the court of appeals seem
435

550 F.2d at 51, citing In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967).
550 F .2d at 50-51.
437
550 F.2d at 51. See also Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 600 (1898), requiring
proof of knowledge by the contemner of the order he is charged with violating before he can
be punished.
438
In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967) (findings of fact by referee in a certification pursuant to § 41b of the Bankruptcy Act said to be "subject to a wholly independent
judicial review"); O'Hagan v. Blythe (In re Liberty Return Loads Assoc., Inc.), 354 F.2d
83, 84 (2d Cir. 1%5) (General Order 47, requiring a·referee's findings of fact to be accepted
by a district judge unless clearly erroneous, held inapplicable to a referee's certification of
the facts to the judge pursuant to § 41b of the Act).
439
Rule 920 contemplates either (I) a determination of the facts and imposition of the
punishment by the referee when the conduct appears to warrant punishment by a fine of not
more than $250, or (2) a certification of the facts to the district judge when a more serious
punishment is indicated. Judge Herzog thus followed a hybrid procedure.
440
550 F.2d at 51-52.
441
See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 810.
436
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consistent with sound judicial administration and with the need to protect
the contemner from abusive use of the contempt power. 442
Fourth, the contemners argued that since they did not receive formal
notice of the stay pursuant to Rule 602, they were not bound by it. The
court ruled that notice is not required for a person who knowingly violates
an order. 443 The giving of notice ofan automatic stay may nonetheless be
a matter of some difficulty. The automatic stay rules themselves contain
no provision for giving notice of the stay to persons affected, and the
court properly declined to regard Rule 602 as relevant. 444 The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 401(a) points out that "[a]ll creditors receive
notice of the effect of the petition as a stay along with notice of the first
meeting of creditors." The official forms for notices of the first meeting of
creditors all contain statements informing recipients of the stays, 445 but
the stays become operative from the time of the filing of the petition,
which necessarily occurs prior to the mailing and receipt of this notice. 446
In view of the limitation on the enforceability of the stay by contempt
proceedings against a person without knowledge of it, it behooves the
party relying on the effectiveness of the stay to bring it to the attention of
persons intended to be affected, and proof of effective notice is, of
course, the best way of proving knowledge.
Fifth, counsel for one of the appellants in the case argued that the
Supreme Court's ruling in Maness v. Meyers 441 protects attorneys from
being held in contempt for the advice they give their clients, but the court
442 The contemners apparently also raised a due process objection to the division of the
fact-finding process between Bankruptcy Judge Herzog and the district judge. While such a
division is unusual, it is not unprecedented. Old -General Order 47 contemplated that after a
hearing and a determination of the facts and the law by the referee, the district judge might,
on review, take additional evidence before making a final dispositon of the case. The court
of appeals in the Fidelity Mortgage Investors case made short shrift of the constitutional
objection to the bifurcated hearing by labeling the contemners' theory of due process
"novel" and "unique" and declining to accept it. 550 F.2d at 56.
443
550 F.2d at 52.
444
Rule 602, relied on by the contemners, imposes duty on a receiver or trustee to take
steps to give notice of a pending petition filed under the Bankruptcy Act, and apparently
there had been no compliance with the rule in the Fidelity Mortgage Investors case. The
purpose of the rule is to protect the estate against postpetition transfers by the debtor, but
the effect of such transfers is governed by §§ 2 lg and 70d of the Act, whether or not the rule
is complied with. See the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 602. Although
Rule 11-49 makes Rule 602 applicable in a Chapter XI case, the court of appeals regarded it
as inapplicable in its first published opinion in the case, because no receiver or trustee had
been appointed. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1366, 1370. The reference to the inapplicability of the
Rule was later deleted.
445 See Official Bankr. Forms Nos. 12, 9-F2, 10-5, 11-Fl3, 12-F12, and 13-7. There is no
notice of the first meeting of creditors in a railroad reorganization case under§ 77, but notice
of the automatic stay in such a case is included in Official Form No. 8-4 with the notice of the
appointment of trustee and the proof-of-claim procedure.
446 Dissenting Judge Graafeiland thought that the inclusion of information about the stay
in the official forms for notices of first meetings meant that "something more is required to
call forth the punitive sanctions of contempt than the mere enactment of the rule." 550 F.2d
at 61 n.5. When the applicable statute or rule prescribes that an act shall take effect at a
specified time, a provision for giving notice does not, of course, postpone the effectiveness
of the act until the notice is given or received. See. e.g .. Rule 77 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Bankr. Rules 804 and 922.
441
419 U.S. 449 (1975).
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declined to read Maness v. Meyers so broadly. The court appropriately
noted that Maness involved a narrow issue as to the vulnerability of an
attorney for contempt because of ad vice to a client to refuse to respond to
a subpoena duces tecum in the exercise of the client's constitutional right
not to incriminate himself. The Supreme Court did acknowledge in Maness, as the court of appeals observed, that lawyers can be cited for
contempt for advising clients to disregard court orders. 448 The context
indicated, however, that the Court was referring to a courtroom setting
where the court enters an order during trial, after counsel has had an
opportunity to object.
The contempt order against the Texas counsel in Fidelity Mortgage
Investors is particularly difficult to reconcile with the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the early bankruptcy case, In re Watts & Sachs. 449 In
that case, counsel were convicted of contempt for advising their clients
that certain property was subject to the jurisdiction of the state court
rather than the bankruptcy court. In reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court made the following broad statement of the governing principle:
In the ordinary case of advice to clients, if an attorney acts in
good faith and in the honest belief that his advice is well founded
and in the just interests of his client, he cannot be held liable for
error in judgment. The preservation of the independence of the
bar is too vital to the due administration of justice to allow the
application of any other general rule. 450
The Supreme Court opinions in both Maness 451 and Watts & Sachs 452
emphasized the counsel's good faith, but neither the majority nor the
dissenting opinion in Fidelity Mortgage Investors mentioned that element
or indicated whether it was inquired into in the hearing before the bankruptcy judge or before the district judge. 453 What constitutes "good faith"
advice by counsel to disregard an order or rule is a troublesome issue, but
in light of relevant Supreme Court precedents, it appears to be an appropriate inquiry in any proceeding to hold an attorney in contempt for the
advice he has given. In several cases the court has declined to impose
liability for violation of a stay because the contemner's conduct was

448

Id. at 459-60.
190 U.S. I (1903).
450
Id. at 29.
451
419 U.S. at 458, 467, 468, 470.
452
190 U.S. at 29.
453
In his opinion accompanying his finding of contemptuous conduct, Bankruptcy Judge
Herzog noted that counsel knew that "some kind of 'bankruptcy' case was pending" and
was "well aware of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules." He concluded
that "[t]he rule is equivalent to an order of the court and if acts are done in clear contravention thereof, the intention is of no consequence." In re Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 5
Collier Bankr. Cas. 386, 393 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1975). Curiously, the two rival lienors who
commenced the litigation against the debtor in Mississippi raised an argument respecting
"alleged conflicts of interest on the part of FMI's attorneys." 550 F.2d at 58 n.4. In seeking
to be relieved of liability for the judgment entered against the lienors, their officers, and the
counsel as joint and several obligors, the counsel was apparently involved in a conflict of
interest with his own clients and the other appellants.
449
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found not to be willful. 454
In a recent case 455 a bankrupt sought not only a contempt citation of a
creditor for violating the automatic stay but also resultant damages under
the Bankruptcy Act, the 1970 Civil Rights Act, the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution, and for tortious interference with his wages, fringe
benefits, and reputation. The court rejected the defendant's jurisdictional
objections to the bankrupt's complaint but found for the defendant on the
gro~nd that the stay was not operative under the circumstances presented. 456

454
/n re Ben Hyman & Co., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976); In re Ducich, 3
Collier Bankr. Cas. 733, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Verran v. United States, 13 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 288, 302 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 47 (E.D.
Mich. 1978).
455
Shaffer v. Anderson, 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 327 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1977).
456
14 Collier Bankr. Cas. at 333. The court cited as illustrative cases where the court had
protected a bankrupt's rights in respect to his job. Rutledge v. Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277
(W.D. La. 1975);/n re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905);cf. In re Home Discount Co., 147
F. 538 (N .D. Ala. 1906). For a case recognizing the possibility of recovering damages against
a party who registered a federal judgment in another district pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1963
and obtained issuance of a levy of execution, all in violation of a stay issued pending an
appeal, see Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co. v. LiRocchi, 490 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417
U.S. 938 (1974).

